Dowd v. Palmer
| Decision Date | 10 October 1944 |
| Citation | 15 N.W.2d 809,245 Wis. 593 |
| Parties | DOWD v. PALMER. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County; August E. Braun, Judge.
Action by Emily Dowd against Raymond Palmer for injuries sustained by plaintiff in an automobile collision. The jury by its general verdict found defendant free from negligence, and from an order granting a new trial in the interest of justice, defendant appeals.-[By Editorial Staff.]
Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.Action commenced July 27, 1941 by Emily Dowd for damages sustained as a result of a collision between the automobile in which she was riding and an automobile driven by defendant.
The action was tried to the court and jury. By their special verdict, the jury found defendant free from negligence. On motions after verdict, the court granted a new trial in the interests of justice. Defendant appeals.
The case arose out of a collision which occurred on January 7, 1940 between an automobile driven by the defendant in a southerly direction on North 26th street and an automobile operated by Stanley Dowd, in which plaintiff was a passenger, travelling in a westerly direction on Wells street at an intersection of those streets in the city of Milwaukee.
Defendant testified that 26th steet on which he was driving was slippery and icy; that he had been driving about 20 miles an hour as he approached the intersection; that he brought his car to a stop about 15 feet north of the north crosswalk on Wells street. He looked both to the west and then to the east and seeing no cars approaching, proceeded into the intersection. He further testified that his view was obstructed by an apartment building on the northeast corner of the intersection so that he could only see 15 feet to the east on Wells street. Having proceeded in low gear to the crosswalk, he testified that he saw the Dowd car approaching from the east about 30 feet away, travelling at a speed of about 25 miles per hour. He then entered the intersection and Dowd's car coming from the east struck the left-hand side of the car after it had reached approximately the middle of the intersection. The afternoon of the first day of the trial, at the suggestion of the court, defendant went back to the scene of the accident and made further observations. Having thus refreshed his recollection he changed his testimony and stated that he now estimated that the Dowd car was approximately 57 feet east of the east crosswalk on Wells street when he made his observation at the crosswalk. He also testified that there was no obstruction to his view to the east and he could see a block or more in that direction.
Dowd testified that he was travelling at about 15 miles per hour on Wells street. When he reached a point about 15 feet east of the crosswalk, he testified that he observed defendant's car for the first time between 65 and 70 feet north of the intersection; that he continued across the intersection without applying his brakes, swerving a little to the southwest; and that defendant's car struck his right front fender. The jury found defendant free from negligence as...
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Rodenkirch v. Johnson
...a new trial on the basis given by the trial court after erroneously changing the answers, was an abuse of discretion. Dowd v. Palmer, 1944, 245 Wis. 593, 15 N.W.2d 809. Those parts of the order appealed from changing the answers to the negligence questions, striking out the apportionment of......
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DeGroff v. Schmude
...for granting a new trial in the interest of justice. See: Bartell v. Leudtke (1971), 52 Wis.2d 372, 190 N.W.2d 145; Dowd v. Palmer (1944), 245 Wis. 593, 596, 15 N.W.2d 809; Field v. Vinograd (1960), 10 Wis.2d 500, 103 N.W.2d However, it is equally well settled that a trial court may order a......
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Dascenzo v. State
...this case was not such a prejudicial event as to have influenced the outcome of the trial, thus necessitating reversal. Dowd v. Palmer (1944), 245 Wis. 593, 15 N.W.2d 809. III. WERE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS INVADED WHEN WAS PROSECUTED BY INFORMATION RATHER THAN BY INDICTMENT? Defen......
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Brons v. Bischoff, 76-646
...at 99 (1955). However, the "general conduct of a trial is largely within the discretion of the judge presiding." Dowd v. Palmer, 245 Wis. 593, 596, 15 N.W.2d 809, 811 (1944). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in forbidding the plaintiff to stand at the rear of the courtroom. The ......