Dowell v. Goodwin

• Decision Date: 03 December 1900
• Parties: DOWELL v. GOODWIN.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

47 A. 693

22 R.I. 287

DOWELL

v. GOODWIN.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 3, 1900.

Injunction by John Dowell against Patrick Goodwin. Demurrer to bill overruled.

Thomas W. Robinson and Claude J. Farnsworth, for complainant.

McGuinness & Doran, for respondent.

TILLING HAST, J. This is a bill to enjoin the prosecution of an action at law against the complainant, and for other relief. The bill sets out that on the 10th of March, 1806, the respondent sued out a writ before the district court of the Sixth judicial district to recover from the complainant the sum of $80 for work and labor done; that said writ was placed in the hands of one John F. Ryan, a constable of Pawtucket, R. I., for service; that it was returnable on the 23d day of March, 1896, at which time it was entered in said court; that said constable made a return on the writ in which he set forth that on the 14th day of March, 1896, he attached the right, title, and interest of the defendant in that suit to certain land described in his return, and that on the same day he summoned the defendant in that suit by leaving an attested copy of the writ with him; that thereafterwards, on the 30th day of March, 1896, said court rendered judgment against this complainant, the defendant in that suit, for said amount claimed, with costs, which judgment has never been appealed from or reversed; and that the same now stands on the record of said court. The complainant then avers that said Ryan, constable, never made any attachment of the real estate of this complainant on said 14th day of March, 1896, nor on any other day, and that he did not leave any copy of said writ with him (the complainant), and that he did not summon him, as set forth in his return, or in any other manner whatsoever, either on said 14th day of March or at any other time, and that the return of said officer was wholly and absolutely untrue and fraudulent in every particular. The complainant further avers that he did not answer said action at law because he was wholly ignorant of the existence of the same, and that he did not know thereof, or of any judgment rendered therein, until on or about the 13th day of May, 1899. He further alleges that he was not indebted to the plaintiff in said action in any sum whatsoever, and that the alleged claim set up therein is groundless, and that the judgment rendered therein is fraudulent and void. The bill further alleges that on the 19th day of May, 1899, the respondent commenced an action of debt on judgment against the complainant in said district court, said judgment being the same that was obtained in the fraudulent action above referred to; that in said last-named action he has attached the land of the complainant; and that said action is now pending in said district court. The bill further alleges that by the fraudulent acts of said Ryan, and his false return on said writ, the complainant has been greatly injured and damaged, and that the respondent is aware of said illegal and fraudulent acts, but persists in pursuing the complainant on said fraudulent judgment, and also that the complainant is wholly remediless at law, and can only have relief in a court of equity. Wherefore he prays that the respondent be perpetually enjoined from further prosecuting his action on said judgment, and for other relief. To this bill the respondent demurs on the following grounds, namely: (1) That the bill seeks relief against the enforcement of a judgment obtained upon the writ mentioned in paragraph 2 of the bill, because, as the bill alleges, said writ was not served at all, either by summons or by attachment, while the bill itself and the copy of said writ attached thereto show a return by a proper officer of full and regular service of said writ upon the complainant, both by attaching his real estate, and by personal service of a copy of the writ upon him; (2) that the alleged grounds for relief consist wholly and only of the contradiction of the return of the constable upon a writ which he was competent to serve; (3) that the complainant has an adequate remedy at law against the officer and the surety on his bond; and (4) that the bill does not state a case entitling the complainant to the relief prayed for.

The question raised by the first two grounds of demurrer is whether, under the facts set forth in the bill, the officer's return on the writ in the action in which the judgment sued on was recovered can be contradicted. Or, to state it more generally, the question raised is whether a bill in equity will lie to enjoin an action at law on a judgment which was obtained by the fraud of the officer charged with the service of the writ in the original action. The respondent's counsel contend that the officer's return cannot thus be contradicted, and that such a bill will not lie, and that the cases of Angell v. Bowler, 3 R. I. 77, Estes v. Cooke, 12 R. I. 6, and Barrows v. Rubber Co., 13 R. I. 48, fully sustain them in the position which they take. The cases cited hold that an officer's return is conclusive and cannot be contradicted incidentally by motion or plea; also, that the return is part of the record, and that parol evidence cannot be submitted to contradict the court record; for, so long as it remains, it is conclusive upon the parties, and in order to change it some appropriate proceeding acting directly upon the record must be instituted. It is to be observed, however, that the rule as thus laid down in the cases relied on applies to common-law actions. See Pratt v. Jones, 22 Vt., at page 345; Pettes v. Bank, 17 Vt., at page 444. And hence the question arises whether it is also applicable to suits in equity; for, if so, it is controlling in the case at bar, unless it can be held that this is a proceeding acting directly upon the record in said original action, which we do not think it is. To state the question more concisely, can a court of equity ever interfere and grant relief by way of permitting the record of a common-law court to be impeached as to the officer's return on the writ, or as to any other part of the record? We think this question must be answered in the affirmative. One of the peculiar provinces of a court of equity is to relieve against willful misrepresentation and fraud. A court of equity is a court of conscience, and whatever, therefore, is unconscionable is odious in its sight. Indeed, it is said by Judge Story, in his Commentaries, that "fraud is even more odious than force." That a judgment obtained in a court of law by a false and fraudulent writ, or by a false and fraudulent return thereon by the officer, is so wholly unconscionable as to shock the inherent sense of justice of all right-thinking men, ho one will deny. And it would be a reproach to our system of jurisprudence if a court of equity could afford no relief against a judgment so obtained. But that equity does afford a full and adequate remedy against such a wrong, and that the case stated in the bill before us is clearly within the jurisdiction of such a court, is fully shown by the authorities, to some of which we will proceed to refer. Perhaps the leading case in this country upon the subject of equitable relief against judgments at law is that of Insurance Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 332, 3 L. Ed. 302, in Which Chief Justice Marshall specified the grounds for the interference of equity in the following...