Dowie v. Driscoll

Citation68 N.E. 56,203 Ill. 480
PartiesDOWIE et al. v. DRISCOLL.
Decision Date16 June 1903
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, De Kalb County; C. A. Bishop, Judge.

Bill by Theodore D. Driscoll, as conservator of Mary Tindall, against John Alexander Dowie and others. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal. Affirmed.V. V. Barnes and Jones & Rogers, for appellants.

Carnes, Dunton & Faissler, for appellee.

This was a bill in chancery, filed October 15, 1901, by the appellee, Theodore D. Driscoll, as conservator of Mary Tindall, against the appellants, John Alexander Dowie, Orlando L. Tindall, Nancy H. Tindall, and Elizabeth abeth T. Milner, in the circuit court of De Kalb county, to set aside a deed from Mary Tindall to said Dowie, bearing date August 5, 1901, conveying to him her homestead, located in Sycamore, in said county; also to set aside the transfer of two promissory notes, for $1,500 each, indorsed and delivered by said Mary Tindall to said Dowie upon the same day upon which said deed bears date, and to require said Dowie to account for and pay over to the said appellee, as conservator, the sum of $400, with interest from August 5, 1901, which said Dowie had before that date received from Mary Tindall; also to cancel a trust agreement entered into between said Dowie, Orlando L. Tindall, and Mary Tindall relative to said property so conveyed and transferred by Mary Tindall to John Alexander Dowie.

The bill, in substance, alleged that Mary Tindall, on the 5th day of August, 1901, was about 87 years of age; that she, by reason of her great age and feeble health, was mentally incapacitated to transact business, and was susceptible to the undue influence of persons surrounding her and in whom she had confidence; that said Dowie was the founder and overseer of a religious sect, and had great power and influence over his followers; that shortly prior to the 5th day of August, 1901, through the influence of said Orlando L. Tindall and Elizabeth T. Milner, the son and daughter of Mary Tindall, who were followers of said Dowie, said Mary Tindall, who was then under their influence and control, was introduced into the presence of said Dowie and became one of his followers; that said Dowie seeks to and does control the property interests of his followers through various agencies, and represents that he can and does successfully conduct various business enterprises, aided and directed by the special and direct interposition of Deity, acting through him; that the said Mary Tindall, through the influence of said Dowie and her said son and daughter, was induced to intrust all her property, consisting of her homestead and personal property, of the value of $3,400, to said Dowie, and that at the time of the conveyance and transfer of her property to Dowie she was mentally incapable of comprehending the effect of such conveyance and transfer; that the appellee was appointed conservator of Mary Tindall on September 23, 1901; that he made demand upon Dowie to surrender to him the property of Mary Tindall, which he declined to do-and prays that the deed conveying said homestead to Dowie be set aside, and he be decreed to restore to the appellee, as conservator of Mary Tindall, said personal property, and that said trust agreement be canceled.

A joint and several answer was filed by the appellants, denying the mental incapacity of Mary Tindall to make said deed, transfer said personal property, and execute said trust agreement, and that said deed, transfer, and trust agreement had been executed by Mary Tindall to Dowie by reason of the undue influence of the appellants, or either of them, over said Mary Tindall; admits that Dowie is the founder of a religious sect, believing in the doctrine of divine healing, and that Mary Tindall, at the time of the execution of said deed, transfer, and trust agreement, was an adherent of said Dowie; admits the great influence of Dowie over his followers, and that his influence is as strong over those whom he has not seen as over those who have been admitted to his presence; avers the great business success of said Dowie, which, it is alleged, shows that the enterprises under his management and control have been blessed and sustained by Deity; avers that the ultimate end of all of said enterprises is the extension of the kingdom of God on earth, through the Christian Catholic Church of Zion, of which said Dowie is the founder and general overseer; avers that said Dowie has provided by will for his successor, who will perpetually carry on the work of said church throughout the world after his death. The appellant Dowie specially answered, for himself, that if his codefendants were willing he stood ready to restore the property of Mary Tindall, but without their consent he averred he did not feel like aiding the six other children of Mary Tindall in preventing her devoting her property to the advancement of religion and the extension of God's kingdom on earth.

A replication was filed, and the questions of undue influence and mental incapacity were submitted by the chancellor to a jury. The jury found both issues in favor of the appellee, whereupon the appellants moved the court to set aside the findings of the jury, and to again submit said questions to a jury, which the court declined to do, and afterwards the court entered a decree, upon consideration of all the evidence produced by the respective parties, finding that Mary Tindall was mentally incapacitated, on the 5th day of August, 1901, to make said deed, transfer said personal property, and execute said trust agreement, and that the execution of said deed and trust agreement and the transfer of said personal property were obtained through the undue influence of the appellants, and setting aside said deed, the transfer of said personal property, and said trust agreement, and requiring said Dowie to deliver up said notes to the appellee, and to account to him for said sum of $400, with interest, from which decree the appellants have prosecuted an appeal to this court.

The deed sought to be set aside is in form a statutory warranty deed from Mary Tindall to John Alexander Dowie, conveying to him her homestead. The promissory notes assigned and delivered to Dowie were for the sum of $1,500 each, bearing interest at 6 per cent., and the $400 had been delivered by Mary Tindall to Dowie in cash, and by him invested in the Zion Land & Investment Association, and a certificate issued to Mary Tindall therefor. The trust agreement was executed by John Alexander Dowie, Orlando L. Tindall, and Mary Tindall, and provided that Dowie was to convert all of the property of Mary Tindall, received by him from her, into cash; that not to exceed $2,500 thereof was to be invested in a house and lot in Zion City; that the balance was to be invested in the stock of the Zion City Bank, and that Orlando L. Tindall should hold all of said property in trust; that the income thereof was to be paid to Mary Tindall for life, then to Elizabeth T. Milner and Orlando L. Tindall for life, and then to Nancy H. Tindall, the wife of Orlando L. Tindall, for life, and upon the death of all of said beneficiaries said property was to vest absolutely in Dowie, his heirs, and assigns.

HAND, C. J. (after stating the facts).

It is first contended that the court improperly instructed the jury as to the law. It appears from the record that the chancellor did not base the decree entered by him in this case upon the findings of the jury alone, but based the same upon his own conclusions as to the facts, which conclusions were reached by him from a full consideration of all the evidence in the case, and that the findings of fact by the jury were, at most, treated by him as only advisory. Where, in a case like this, the findings of the jury are accepted by the chancellor only as advisory, and it appears the decree was rendered upon the consideration by the chancellor of all the evidence produced by the respective parties, the fact that the jury may have been misdirected as to the law is not ground for reversal. Guild v. Hull, 127 Ill. 523, 20 N. E. 665;Kinnah v. Kinnah, 184 Ill. 284, 56 N. E. 376;Ring v. Lawless, 190 Ill. 520, 60 N. E. 881. In the case of Guild v. Hull, supra, it was held (page 530, 127 Ill., and page 667, 20 N. E.): ‘In chancery cases, except in cases where the submission to a jury is required by law or the rules of chancery practice, the chancellor is the judge of the weight of the evidence and of the ultimate facts established by it. If he submits controverted questions of fact to a jury, as he may do, the verdict or finding of the jury is advisory merely. He may adopt the verdict, or set the same aside and resubmit the question to a jury, or he may disregard it and enter such a decree as in his judgment equity demands. He may enter his decree after setting the verdict aside, or without setting it aside.’ In Kinnah v. Kinnah, supra, the court said: ‘It appears from the record the chancellor did not adopt the finding of the jury, but rendered a decree setting aside and vacating the deed upon consideration of the evidence produced by the respective parties. In such state of the record it is not material to consider whether the jury were correctly instructed by the court as to the rules of law applicable to the cause. The decree is the result of the judgment of the court as to the facts established by the weight of the evidence, and it is only necessary we should determine whether the record discloses sufficient testimony, competent to be considered, to justify and uphold the conclusion as to matters of fact reached by the court, and that the decree of the court resulted from the application of correct legal principles to the state of case made by the proofs. Guild v. Hull, 127 Ill. 523, 20 N. E. 665. When the court, in such cases, accepts the verdict of the jury as establishing the facts and enters a decree pro forma thereon, the instructions...

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