Dowie v. Priddle

• Citation: 75 N.E. 243,216 Ill. 553
• Parties: DOWIE v. PRIDDLE.
• Decision Date: 23 June 1905
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

216 Ill. 553

75 N.E. 243

DOWIE

v.PRIDDLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 23, 1905.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District.

Action by Samuel G. Priddle against John Alexander Dowie. From a judgment for plaintiff, affirmed by the Appellate Court (116 Ill. App. 184), defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Rehearing denied October 23, 1905; Cartwright, C. J., and Boggs, J., dissenting.V. V. Barnes, Charles E. Lauder, and P. R. Barnes, for appellant.

Frederick Mains, for appellee.

This was an action on the case commenced in the circuit court of Cook county by the appellee against the appellant to recover damages by reason of an alleged libel which it is averred the appellant had published of and concerning the appellee in a certain publication, called ‘Leaves of Healing,’ of which the appellant was the editor. The declaration contained three counts. The libelous matter set out in the first count was published on June 1, 1901, and charged appellee with being a ‘vile person,’ ‘the very opposite of pious,’ ‘a poor, ungrammatical ignoramus,’ and a ‘heathen man and publican of the worst kind.’ That set out in the second count was published on June 22, 1901, and referred to the appellee as ‘a scoundrel,’ an ‘insane fanatic,’ a ‘poor, insane lunatic,’ a ‘low, mean coward,’ and a ‘paranoiac,’ and charged that the appellee harbored the ‘intent to kill’ the appellant. And that set out in the third count was published on July 13, 1901, and stated the appellee was a ‘low, degraded person, lewd and depraved,’ and a ‘teacher of lewd, adulterous, and polygamous practices.’ The appellant filed the general issue and two special pleas of justification, in which last-mentioned pleas he averred that appellee had, ‘without cause, abandoned his wife and children’; that he had made ‘murderous and diabolical prophecies'; that he had ‘committed adultery’; that he claimed to have ‘visions and revelations direct from God’; that he stated appellant ‘would be killed,’ and that he was ‘the one to do it,’ etc. To the special pleas filed by appellant the appellee filed a general replication and three special replications, denying the averments contained in said pleas. The appellant interposed a demurrer to said special replications, which was sustained; but the court declined, upon request, to carry the demurrer back to the special pleas of justification, but held said special pleas to be good. The case was tried before a judge other than the one who settled the issues upon the pleadings, and upon the trial the presiding judge held that the special pleas were bad, and that the demurrer to the special replications should have been carried back and sustained to the special pleas of justification, and refused to permit the appellant to introduce any proofs under said special pleas of justification. The jury returned a verdict for $2,000 in favor of the appellee, upon which, after overruling a motion for a new trial, the court rendered judgment, which judgment has been affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District, and a further appeal has been prosecuted to this court.

HAND, J. (after stating the facts).

It is first assigned as error that the trial court erred in sustaining the objection of appellee to the testimony offered by appellant to prove the various acts of misconduct of appellee set up in the special pleas of justification filed by appellant. In actions for slander or libel the defendant may deny that he spoke or published the words set out by plaintiff in his declaration, or he may rely upon the truth of the words spoken or published as a defense to the action. If he deny that he spoke or published the words declared upon by the plaintiff, he may mitigate damages in two ways: First, by showing the general bad character of the plaintiff; and, second, by proving any facts which tend to disprove malice. But under a denial that he spoke or published the words he cannot prove the words declared upon to be true, as their truth can only be established under a plea of justification. A plea of justification requires great certainty and particularity of averment. The justification must be of the very charge it is attempted to justify, and it is not permissible to set up a charge of the same general nature, but distinct as to the particular subject. When the charge is specific, then the plea need only allege that the charge is true. Where, however, the charge is general, the plea must state the facts which show the charge to be true. When the trial judge became satisfied that the special pleas of justification were not a bar to the action, and that an erroneous ruling had been made in refusing to carry back to the special pleas the demurrer to the special replications, he should have withdrawn the case temporarily from the jury, and set aside the order sustaining the demurrer to the special replications, and carried the demurrer back to the special pleas of justification, and entered an order sustaining the demurrer to said pleas, and then permitted the defendant to stand by his pleas or plead over. Ft. Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 Ill. 177, 3 N. E. 272,56 Am. Rep. 138. While the method pointed out is the correct practice, as announced in the Klein Case, the defendant did not ask the court to take such action, nor that the case be continued, but proceeded with the trial, and put in proofs of the general bad character of the plaintiff under the general issue. If the ruling of the court in refusing to admit proof under the special pleas of justification worked no injury to the defendant, then the error of the court in not setting aside the former order sustaining the demurrer to...