Meredith, J.
This case concerns statutory construction of a provision of the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act that permits a "public safety employee" who is injured and sustains a permanent partial disability to be paid benefits at an enhanced rate, Maryland Code (1991, 2016 Repl. Vol.), Labor and Employment Article ("LE"), § 9-628(h). On September 27, 2016, Ashley Downer, appellant, was employed as an emergency medical technician ("EMT") for the Baltimore County Fire Department (the "County"), appellee. While lifting a heavy bag of equipment at work, Ms. Downer suffered an injury to her neck, which resulted in a permanent partial disability, for which the Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded her 45 weeks of compensation "[u]nder ‘Other Cases’ amounting to 9% industrial loss of use of the body as the result of an injury to the neck."
As a general rule, an injured worker who is awarded "less than 75 weeks" of benefits is paid "compensation that equals one-third of the average weekly wage of the covered employee."
LE § 9-628(f). But Ms. Downer urged the Commission to award her the enhanced benefit available to public safety employees pursuant to LE § 9-628(h). Section 9-628(h) provides that a "public safety employee" who is awarded compensation for less than 75 weeks will be compensated at the rate that is normally paid to injured workers who are awarded 75 to 249 weeks of benefits (pursuant to LE § 9-629 ), i.e. , "compensation that equals two-thirds of the average weekly wage of the covered employee," in other words, double the amount of compensation normally paid when an injured employee is awarded less than 75 weeks of compensation. The Commission denied Ms. Downer's request to be compensated as a public safety employee, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted the County's motion for summary judgment, affirming the Commission's ruling.
In this appeal, as in the circuit court, the sole disputed issue is whether Ms. Downer meets the statutory definition of "public safety employee" set forth in LE § 9-628(a), which reads:
(a) In this section, "public safety employee" means :
(1) a firefighter, fire fighting instructor, or paramedic employed by:
(i) a municipal corporation;
(ii) a county;
(iii) the State;
(iv) the State Airport Authority; or
(v) a fire control district; [or]
(2) a volunteer firefighter or volunteer ambulance, rescue, or advanced life support worker who is a covered employee under § 9-234 of this title and who provides volunteer fire or rescue services to:
(i) a municipal corporation;
(ii) a county;
(iii) the State;
(iv) the State Airport Authority; or
(v) a fire control district;
(3) a police officer employed by:
(i) a municipal corporation;
(ii) a county;
(iii) the State;
(iv) the State Airport Authority;
(v) the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission; or
(vi) the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority;
(4) a Prince George's County deputy sheriff or correctional officer;
(5) a Montgomery County deputy sheriff or correctional officer;
(6) an Allegany County deputy sheriff;
(7) a Howard County deputy sheriff;
(8) an Anne Arundel County deputy sheriff or detention officer; or
(9) a Baltimore County deputy sheriff, but only when the deputy sheriff sustains an accidental personal injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of performing duties directly related to:
(i) courthouse security;
(ii) prisoner transportation;
(iii) service of warrants;
(iv) personnel management; or
(v) other administrative duties.[1]
(Emphasis added.)
Ms. Downer contends that "the daily activities and nature of work of an EMT are significantly similar to that of a paramedic," and she should be considered a "public safety employee" under LE § 9-628(a). The County responds by asserting that the statutory definition does not cover paid EMT employees, although the County concedes in its brief that the definition of "public safety employee" includes "volunteer ambulance, rescue, or advanced life support worker[s]" who provide volunteer "rescue services." Despite the clear inclusion of those similar volunteer emergency medical positions within the definition in LE § 9-628(a), the County maintains: "At no time has the General Assembly seen fit to add paid EMT employees to those public safety employees included in LE § 9-628."
We note, however, that the Workers’ Compensation Act included no statutory definition of the term "paramedic" when the General Assembly adopted Md. Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1987 Supp.), Art. 101, § 67(16)—the predecessor of LE § 9-628(a) —in 1987 and included firefighters and paramedics in the definition of public safety employees eligible for the enhanced compensation rate pursuant to Art. 101, § 36(3)(i)(3.), the predecessor to LE § 9-628(h). In the absence of a statutory definition of "paramedic," we are called upon to determine the intent of the General Assembly when it used the word "paramedic" in 1987 in the definition of "public safety employee" in this section of the Act. See 1987 Laws of Maryland 2681, Ch. 591 (H.B. 239).
The Court of Appeals provided the following guidance on the interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act in Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore , 430 Md. 368, 376-378, 61 A.3d 33 (2013) :
Section 9–745 governs appeals of decisions by the Workers’ Compensation Commission. The Commission's decision "is presumed to be prima facie correct," § 9–745(b)(1), but "this presumption does not extend to questions of law, which we review independently." Montgomery County v. Deibler , 423 Md. 54, 60, 31 A.3d 191 (2011) (citing Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holmes , 416 Md. 346, 357, 7 A.3d 13 (2010) ). This appeal is from the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must make the threshold determination as to whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, and only where such dispute is absent will we proceed to review determinations of law." Stachowski v. Sysco Food Servs. of Baltimore, Inc ., 402 Md. 506, 515–516, 937 A.2d 195 (2007) (quoting Remsburg v. Montgomery , 376 Md. 568, 579, 831 A.2d 18 (2003) ). The parties agree on the facts, leaving the interpretation of § 9–503(e) as the sole legal issue before us. "The standard of review of a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment on the law is de novo, that is, whether the trial court's legal conclusions were legally correct." D'Aoust v. Diamond , 424 Md. 549, 574, 36 A.3d 941 (2012) (quoting Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A ., 373 Md. 672, 684, 821 A.2d 22 (2003) ); see also Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Danner , 388 Md. 649, 658–59, 882 A.2d 271 (2005) (citing Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore , 387 Md. 1, 5–6, 874 A.2d 439 (2005) ) (noting that "the standard of review in a workers’ compensation claim disposed of at summary judgment by the Circuit Court is de novo ").
The purpose and design of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act factor into our interpretation of its provisions. As part of our review, "we recognize that the Act is a remedial statute." Deibler , 423 Md. at 61, 31 A.3d 191 (citing Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos , 388 Md. 718, 724, 882 A.2d 817 (2005) ). "The purpose of the Act is ‘to protect workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries by providing workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.’ " Id . (quoting Howard County Assoc. for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Walls , 288 Md. 526, 531, 418 A.2d 1210 (1980) ). "Therefore, we have been consistent in holding that the Act must be ‘construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.’ " Id . (quoting Lagos , 388 Md. at 724, 882 A.2d 817 ).
Our approach follows the general principles of statutory interpretation. "First, if the plain meaning of the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and consistent with both the broad purposes of the legislation, and the specific purpose of the provision being interpreted, our inquiry is at an end." Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co ., 366 Md. 467, 473, 784 A.2d 569 (2001) (citing Marriott Employees v. Motor Vehicle Admin ., 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455 (1997) ). "Second, when the meaning of the plain language is ambiguous or unclear, we seek to discern the intent of the legislature from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior case law, and the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based." Id . (citing DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp ., 342 Md. 432, 437, 677 A.2d 73 (1996) ). "Last, applying a canon of construction specific to the [Workers’ Compensation] Act, if the intent of the legislature is ambiguous or remains unclear, we resolve any uncertainty in favor of the claimant." Id . (citing Baltimore v. Cassidy , 338 Md. 88, 97, 656 A.2d 757 (1995) ). "This Court, however, may not stifle the plain meaning of the Act, or exceed its purposes, so that the injured worker may prevail." Id . (citing Morris v. Bd. of Educ ., 339 Md. 374, 384, 663 A.2d 578 (1995) ).
(Footnote omitted.)
When we are considering the meaning of a term that is not defined in a statute, we often "turn to a dictionary that is contemporaneous with the drafting and enacting of the language in the statute." Lowery v. State , 430 Md. 477, 491, 61 A.3d 794 (2013). Accord Hayden v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources , 242 Md. App. 505, 524-25, 215 A.3d 827 (2019). "Although dictionary definitions do not provide...
