Downey v. Sharp

• Decision Date: 20 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 19,Sept. Term, 2011.,19
• Citation: 428 Md. 249,51 A.3d 573
• Parties: Barry K. DOWNEY, et al. v. Nicholas SHARP.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

428 Md. 249

51 A.3d 573

Barry K. DOWNEY, et al.

v.Nicholas SHARP.

No. 19, Sept. Term, 2011.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 23, 2012.

Reconsideration Denied Sept. 20, 2012.

Jeffrey P. Reilly (Miles & Stockbridge P.C., Towson, MD; Scott R. Wilson of Miles & Stockbridge P.C., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioners.

Karen D. Amos, Ellicott City, MD, for Respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA, and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

ELDRIDGE, J.

This case concerns an arbitration award under the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, Maryland Code (2006 Repl.Vol., 2011 Supp.), §§ 3–201 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. More specifically, the issue is whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it vacated the award, overturned the arbitrator's denial of an easement, and directed that an easement by necessity be located over the petitioners' land.

I.

The conflict currently before this Court relates to an arbitration award dated December 22, 2008. The petitioners, Barry and Rhonda Downey, filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Howard County to confirm the arbitration award, and the respondent, Nicholas Sharp, filed a motion to vacate the same.¹ The arbitration award rejected Sharp's claim of an express easement over the adjacent property of the Downeys. Sharp further contended that, even in the absence of an express easement, he was entitled to an implied easement by necessity over the Downeys' property because, without such an easement, his property would be landlocked and inaccessible. The arbitration award also rejected Sharp's claim of an implied easement by necessity.

The evidence, submissions, arguments of counsel, etc., at the hearing before the arbitrator are not contained in the record because the parties agreed not to have the arbitration proceedings transcribed. In addition, the record does not include all of the exhibits submitted to the arbitrator. The arbitration proceedings record before this Court contains only the arbitration award, including amendments to the award, and some documentary evidence, such as copies of the original deeds and easements. The thirteen-page arbitration award addresses several of the disputes between the Downeys and Sharp relating to the existence of an express easement. The principal issue debated by the parties before this Court, however, involves a one-paragraph portion of the arbitration award, entitled “Implied Easement,” which purports to discuss Sharp's entitlement to an implied easement by necessity.²

In the arbitration award, the arbitrator briefly outlined the history of the two lots, explaining that the original owner, Ryan, had attempted to improve the “jeep trails” on the property, “without the necessary government permits,” prior to dividing the property into two lots: lot 1, which we shall call the Downey lot, and lot 2, which we shall call the Sharp lot. It seems that the Jeep Trails Easement ³ was the only viable route to gain access to the Sharp lot.⁴ The arbitrator recognized three issues related to Sharp's use of the Jeep Trails Easement, namely

“whether the easement extended to Morgan Station Road,⁵ whether the easement extended to Lot 2 [the Sharp Lot], and whether the driveway as it now exists [over the Downeys' property] is the easement created by the Jeep Trails Easement.”

The arbitrator concluded on the first issue that “the easement created by the Jeep Trails Easement does not extend to Morgan Stat[ion] Road.” He also found, with regard to the second issue, that the Jeep Trails “easement stops at [the] division line of Lot 1 and 2 and does not enter Lot 2 [the Sharp lot].” He further found that the Jeep Trails Easement is “limit[ed] ... to the ‘existing jeep trails located on Lot 1 [the Downey lot]’ of which none give access to Lot 2 [the Sharp lot] ... [or] to Morgan Station Road.” ⁶ With respect to the third issue, regarding an existing driveway over portions of both lots 1 and 2, the arbitrator decided that “substantial parts of the driveway were not built within the easement designations” and that the Downeys were entitled “ ‘to remove the existing driveway on those areas not approved’ ” by proper permits.

In short, it seems that the arbitration award determined that the “Jeep Trails Easement” functioned as a line that failed to connect to either of its two endpoints. According to the arbitrator, the “Jeep Trails Easement” did not connect to the Sharp lot or to Morgan Station Road. Furthermore, an existing driveway over parts of the Downeys' property was found to be not “within the easement designations.” ⁷

The arbitrator then indicated that he was turning to Sharp's argument that, in the absence of an express easement, Sharp was nonetheless entitled to an implied easement by necessity. The final paragraph of the award, and the only portion of the award purportedly addressing the claimed easement by necessity, reads as follows (references to exhibits deleted):

“Implied Easement

“Sharp contends that since he is landlocked, he has an implied easement by necessity. When Ryan [the original owner of both properties] created Lot 1 and 2, he immediately sold Lot 1 to Jekel [the Downeys' predecessor], created with Jekel the Riverfront Easement, then the existing Jeep Trail Easement. All of the above instruments were executed on the same day and recorded among the Land Records of Howard County. The Riverfront Easement gives almost exclusive use of Lot 2 to Jekel. The existing Jeep Trail Easement gave an easement through Lot 1 to Ryan, but it did not extend into Lot 2, the Riverfront Easement, or Morgan Station Road. Obviously, Jekel did not want any intrusion into her Riverfront Easement. Ordinarily, subsequent instruments should not be considered. Here, however, the existing Jeep Trail Easement was substituted by the Jeep Trail Easement by the same parties and concerned the same property and that also was recorded. This easement did not extend into Lot 2 to cross into the Riverfront Easement nor to Morgan Station Road. This is the operative easement and, once again, it is apparent that Jekel did not want her easement rights disturbed. Ryan, now Sharp, does not have an implied easement by necessity.”

In a letter to counsel dated shortly after the award was issued, the arbitrator informedthe parties that the final sentence of the award should be amended to “read, ‘Ryan, now Sharp, does not have an implied easement by necessity, he does not need one.’ ” The amendment added the language “he does not need one” to the final sentence of the paragraph titled “Implied Easement.”

After receiving this amendment, Sharp filed with the arbitrator a “Motion to Reconsider, Modify And/Or Correct Arbitration Award,” pointing out that “the Award is inconsistent on its face.” He stated that, by adding the words “he does not need one” to the Award, the “only implication one could draw ... is that an implied easement was not needed because an express easement already existed.” As previously pointed out, however, the arbitration award contained the finding that Sharp did not have a valid express easement.

In denying Sharp's motion to reconsider the Award, the arbitrator did not acknowledge any inconsistency in the arbitration award. The arbitrator's denial stated as follows: “Since the owner of Lot 2, presently Sharp, cannot traverse or cross Lot 1, Sharp has no access to Morgan Station Road. Lot 2 is landlocked.” The arbitrator did not further discuss the apparent inconsistencies among his finding that Lot 2 was landlocked, his finding that Sharp has no express easement, and his finding that Sharp does not need an easement by necessity.

II.

The Downeys filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Howard County to confirm the arbitration award, and Sharp filed a motion to vacate it.⁸ The Circuit Court “confirm[ed] the arbitration award in [its] entirety,” relying upon the Uniform Arbitration Act, Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 3–224 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 3–224(b) provides:

“(b) Grounds.—The court shall vacate an award if:

(1) An award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;

(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption in any arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;

(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;

(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown for the postponement, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of § 3–213 of this subtitle, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or

(5) There was no arbitration agreement as described in § 3–206 of this subtitle, the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under § 3–208 of this subtitle, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection.”

Section 3–224 further provides in subsection (c) as follows:

“(c) When award not to be vacated.—The court shall not vacate the award or refuse to confirm the award on the ground that a court of law or equity could not or would not grant the same relief.”

In the Circuit Court, Sharp argued, inter alia, that the arbitrator “exceeded his powers” and that the award was “irrational” because, without an easement over the Downeys' land, Sharp's land would be landlocked. The Circuit Court, rejecting this argument, stated that “an easement by necessity is not created simply because a parcel is landlocked.” The court continued: “[a]n owner may freely cut off access to his land,” citing Shpak v. Oletsky, 280 Md. 355, 371, 373 A.2d 1234, 1243 (1977).

Sharp noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals which, in a reported opinion, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, remanded the case with instructions to vacate several findings of the arbitration award,⁹ and with further instructions for “a...