Downing, Application of
| Decision Date | 17 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 13996,13996 |
| Citation | 652 P.2d 193,103 Idaho 689 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Application of Timothy P. DOWNING, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, In the Matter of the Application of Peter J. HARRISON, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, In the Matter of the Application of Alvin H. PENNY, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioners-Appellants, v. STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Charles Johnson, III, of Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., Idaho Falls, for petitioners-appellants.
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., James F. Wickham, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent.
The appellants in this case instituted habeas corpus proceedings to challenge their commitment to State Hospital South at Blackfoot under I.C. § 18-214. SUBPARAGRAPH (1)1 of that section states the following:
"(1) When a defendant is acquitted on the ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, the court shall order him to be committed to the custody of the director of the department of health and welfare to be placed in an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment."
Each of the appellants was charged with the commission of a criminal offense, and each pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Each of the appellants was also acquitted on that basis and was automatically committed, without further hearing, to the care of the director of health and welfare pursuant to I.C. § 18-214.
Following their commitments, appellants sought release through habeas corpus proceedings initiated in the Seventh Judicial District on the ground that automatic commitment violated their rights to due process and equal protection of the law as guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and Art. 1, §§ 1, 13 and 18, of the Idaho Constitution. In essence, they argued that having been acquitted of criminal conduct, they could not be committed to a mental institution and thereby deprived of their liberty, except upon judicial determination supported by adequate proof that they were then "presently" mentally ill and dangerous. The district court granted the writs of habeas corpus and held a hearing on the matter. However, rather than reaching the merits of the claims, the district court ruled that habeas corpus proceedings were inappropriate for review of the questions presented and ordered that the writs be quashed. Appellants now appeal that order quashing the writs. This case was consolidated for purposes of argument with Supreme Court Cases Nos. 13995 and 14153.
The initial question to be answered is whether the district court erred in quashing the writs without reaching the merits of the claims presented. Each of the appellants was committed by a court in a judicial district other than the Seventh Judicial District. The Seventh Judicial District, however, is the district in which the appellants are restrained of their liberty. The district court quashed the writs on the authority of this Court's recent decision in Flores v. Lodge, 101 Idaho 533, 617 P.2d 837 (1980), which held that habeas corpus relief was inappropriate where the petitioner has an adequate remedy in the committing court pursuant to that court's continuing jurisdiction under I.C. § 18-214. We hold that Flores v. Lodge, supra, is not applicable to the case at bar.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a statutory remedy, but rather a remedy recognized and protected by Art. 1, § 5, of the Idaho Constitution. Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 231, 392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964). Nevertheless, "[h]abeas corpus is not a corrective remedy, but is concerned only with defects in a proceeding which operate to render a judgment rendered, or process issued, therein absolutely void." Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 474, 491 P.2d 733, 738 (1971); Stokes v. State, 90 Idaho 339, 342-43, 411 P.2d 392, 393 (1966). Consequently, habeas corpus is not available to review errors which could have been raised on appeal, except "to cure certain errors occurring at a trial which are of such a nature as to deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed with the cause or to render void the proceedings and judgment of conviction [or commitment] as, for example, where an accused has been denied a fundamental constitutional right." Wilson v. State, 90 Idaho 498, 501, 414 P.2d 465, 466 (1966); see Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 474-75, 491 P.2d 733, 738-39 (1971). Furthermore, habeas corpus is an extraordinary writ, and its use will therefore be inappropriate where other adequate remedies are available. Flores v. Lodge, 101 Idaho 533, 617 P.2d 837 (1980); Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 231, 392 P.2d 279, 281 (1964).
A fundamental requirement of due process is that a person threatened with the deprivation of life, liberty or property be given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Simmons v. Board of Trustees of Independent School Dist. No. 1, 102 Idaho 552, 554, 633 P.2d 1130, 1132 (1981). Thus, the appellants' claim that they have been denied a hearing on the question of whether they should have been committed to a mental institution is cognizable under habeas corpus proceedings, notwithstanding their failure to appeal, as long as there are no other adequate remedies available. The specific question to be answered in this case is therefore whether the procedures for release under I.C. § 18-214 constitute an adequate remedy so as to preclude the availability of habeas corpus relief, as was the case in Flores v. Lodge, supra.
In Flores v. Lodge, supra, the petitioner had repeatedly, but unsuccessfully petitioned the committing court (Third Judicial District) for conditional release pursuant to I.C. § 18-214. Release was denied on the basis that Flores "had not progressed to a point that he [could] be discharged or released without danger to himself or others." 101 Idaho at 533, 617 P.2d at 837. Thereafter, he sought release through habeas corpus proceedings instituted in the Fourth Judicial District. The bases for his claim were (1) that he was being held in custody without the care and treatment to which he was legally entitled and (2) that I.C. § 18-214 did not provide a remedy for persons who have been denied a conditional release by a committing court. 101 Idaho at 534, 617 P.2d at 838. In essence, it was concluded in Flores that habeas corpus relief was unavailable due to the continuing jurisdiction of the committing court over the question of release of the person committed. While we adhere to that position, we think the opinion in Flores requires some clarification.
I.C. § 18-214 gives the committing court the final responsibility of determining whether "the committed person may be discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or others." I.C. § 18-214(3). The director of health and welfare must apply to the court for release of a person committed to his custody if at any time the director is of the view that the committed person may be discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or others. I.C. § 18-214(2). The person committed may also personally petition for release within certain time constraints. Thus, continuing jurisdiction is given to the committing court for the purpose of determining whether the committed person has met the standards for release. As concluded in Flores, it is inappropriate for a co-equal court to review, by means of habeas corpus or otherwise, a committing court's decisions on whether a committed person has met the standards for release. Petitioner Flores' contention that I.C. § 18-214 provided no remedy for persons who have been denied conditional release by the committing court was unfounded, since the obvious avenue for redress was and is an appeal of the order denying release.
Flores also contended that he had not received the care and treatment to which he was entitled, and therefore should have been released. The lack of appropriate care and treatment, however, is not a condition for release under I.C. § 18-214. Thus, while such a claim may present grounds for judicial action compelling hospital officials to provide required care and treatment, such a claim does not present grounds for release and is, therefore, a question which ordinarily falls outside of the § 18-214 continuing jurisdiction of the committing court over the release of the committed person. Nevertheless, Flores asserted the lack of proper care and treatment as a basis for release, and such claim necessarily invoked the committing court's continuing jurisdiction to review the release of committed persons pursuant to the standards of I.C. § 18-214. Consequently, Flores' application for a writ of habeas corpus was improper.
The present situation, however, is distinguishable. Appellants here urge that their commitments were constitutionally defective from the outset, and therefore void. A person who has been committed pursuant to an order which is void is not subject to the restrictive release procedure of I.C. § 18-214, but rather is entitled to both apply for and obtain release at any time without reference to the standards and time constraints of I.C. § 18-214. An application for release upon the basis of an invalid commitment order therefore falls outside of the committing court's continuing jurisdiction under I.C. § 18-214 and is properly brought by means of an application for writ of habeas corpus in the district court where the person is restrained. I.C. § 19-4203(2); cf. I.C. § 66-347. Since the appellants' claim is grounded on the assertion that their original commitments were invalid for lack of procedural due process, review by means of habeas corpus is their appropriate remedy. Nevertheless, we conclude that the order quashing the writs of habeas corpus was correct, because we find that appellants' commitment pursuant to I.C. §...
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