Downs v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.

• Decision Date: 05 October 1934
• Docket Number: No. 101.,101.
• Citation: 174 A. 887
• Parties: DOWNS v. JERSEY CENT. POWER & LIGHT CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

174 A. 887

DOWNS

v. JERSEY CENT. POWER & LIGHT CO.

No. 101.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Oct. 5, 1934.

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Suit by Ephraim Downs against the Jersey Central Power & Light Company. Decree for complainant (115 N. J. Eq. 348, 170 A. 835), and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Thomas G. Haight and Walter L. McDermott, both of Jersey City, for appellant.

Morris H. Cohn, of Newark, for respondent.

HEHER, Justice.

With the exception herein noted, we concur in the findings of fact made by the learned Vice Chancellor, and his conclusion that complainant is entitled to equitable relief.

We do not, however, subscribe to the doctrine, enunciated in his opinion, that the parol evidence rule may be "applied or disregarded in courts of equity as the ends of justice required." It is elementary that if the written contract purports to contain the whole agreement, and it is not apparent from the writing itself that something is omitted to be supplied by extrinsic evidence, parol evidence to vary, contradict, or add to its terms is inadmissible. When the parties to a contract have deliberately reduced their stipulations to writing, in such terms as import a legal obligation, without ambiguity or uncertainty as to the object or extent of their respective undertakings, it is conclusively presumed that every term of their contract was included in the writing. Childs v. South Jersey Amusement Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 207, 122 A. 803.

This rule obtains in equity as well as at law. It is a rule of substantive law, and not of evidence merely. But, in the former jurisdiction, fraud, mistake, surprise, and accident furnish exceptions to this otherwise universal doctrine. To relieve against the consequences of the foregoing is one of equity's most salutary remedial functions, and, when a written contract is involved, parol evidence is always admissible to establish the basis for such equitable interposition. It is settled that in suits in equity to reform a written instrument on the ground of mistake, parol evidence is admissible to establish the fact of the mistake. This is likewise true of suits to rescind and cancel a written instrument, on the ground that, because of a mistake of one of the parties, their minds did not meet upon the same matter, and no agreement was really made; and a fortiori when the ground of relief is fraud. Runyon v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank of New Brunswick, 4 N. J. Eq. 480; Stoutenburgh v. Tompkins, 9 N. J. Eq. 332; Firmstone v. De Camp, 17 N. J. Eq. 317; Waldron v. Letson, 15 N. J. Eq. 126; Wirtz v. Guthrie, 81 N. J. Eq. 271, 87 A. 134; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.), §§ 858, 859, 1377. Another apparent exception permits the introduction of parol evidence to show that a deed absolute on its face was intended to be a security, even though there was no fraud, mistake, or accident. This is not, however, treated as an exception, but as entirely outside of the parol evidence rule. Wilbur v. Jones, 80 N. J. Eq. 520, 86 A. 769; O'Brien v. Paterson Brewing & Malting Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 117, 61 A. 437; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 1196. And, on the same principle, consideration may also be inquired into by parol. Dieckman v. Walser, 114 N. J. Eq. 382, 168 A. 588.

Here the familiar jurisdiction of equity in cases of fraud is invoked. It is elementary that a court of equity has general jurisdiction in all cases of fraud. The sole question, in such cases, is the propriety of exercising this inherent power possessed by the court. When the primary right is legal, and the jurisdiction of the law courts is concurrent, and the remedy at law is adequate, certain, and complete, equity will not ordinarily assume jurisdiction. But its right to do so cannot be questioned. Commercial Casualty Insurance Company & New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Insurance Company v. Southern Surety Co., 100 N. J. Eq. 92, 135 A. 511, affirmed 101 N. J. Eq. 738, 138 A. 919; Martin Co. v. L. Martin & Wilckes Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 89, 53, 71 A. 409 (reversed but not as to this point, 75 N. J. Eq. 257, 72 A. 294, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520, 20 Ann. Cas. 57); Eggers v. Anderson, 63 N. J. Eq. 204, 49 A. 578, 55 L. R. A. 570; Hubbard v. International Mercantile Agency, 68 N. J. Eq. 434, 59 A. 24; Dawson v. Leschziner, 72 N. J. Eq. 1, 65 A. 449; Mazzolla v. Wilkie, 72 N. J. Eq. 722, 66 A. 584; Krueger v. Armitage, 58 N. J. Eq. 357, 44 A. 167; 21 C. J. 109. In a case such as this there may be cancellation of the contract. Vreeland v. New Jersey Stone Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 188, affirmed 29 N. J. Eq. 651; Roberts v. James, 83 N. J. Law, 492, 85 A. 244, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 859; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 110, 870, 1377.

Moreover, the complaint stated, in the alternative, two inconsistent causes of action, i. e., (1) the asserted right to recover the sum paid based upon the...