Downs v. Poulin
Court | Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US) |
Writing for the Court | Before WILLIAMSON; RUDMAN; MARDEN; SULLIVAN |
Citation | 216 A.2d 29 |
Parties | Edward W. DOWNS, Guardian of the Estate of Marina DiMarco, a Minor, v. Thomas POULIN, Executor of the Estate of Lorraine P. DiMarco and George W. Goodblood. |
Decision Date | 11 January 1966 |
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v.
Thomas POULIN, Executor of the Estate of Lorraine P. DiMarco
and George W. Goodblood.
Philip S. Bird, Waterville, for plaintiff.
Roger A. Welch, Waterville, for Thomas Poulin.
Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Chandler, by Bruce W. Chandler, Waterville, for George W. Goodblood.
Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN and RUDMAN, JJ.
RUDMAN, Justice.
On report. This is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, Thomas Poulin, Executor of the estate of Lorraine P. DiMarco, reported to the Law Court upon the following agreed statement of facts:
'On February 6, 1964, Marina DiMarco, age nine, was living with her mother, Lorraine P. DiMarco, in Fairfield Center, Maine. On that date, while allegedly taking Marina to school at Mount Merici Academy in Waterville, Maine, a head on collision occured between the automobile operated by Lorraine, in which Marina was sitting in the front seat as the only passenger, and a truck operated by George W. Goodblood. After the accident Lorraine was in the hospital until her death on March 1, 1964. Marina DiMarco was severely injured as a result of the accident. This action was brought July 15, 1964, by the Guardian of the unemancipated minor, Marina DiMarco, against the estate of her late mother, Lorraine DiMarco, and against George W. Goodblood for damages arising from injuries sustained by the minor allegedly as a result of the negligence of the mother and as a result of the negligence of George W. Goodblood, or as a result of the negligence of either or both.'
The underlying question for decision is whether an unemancipated minor child can maintain an action against a parent for
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bodily injuries caused by the negligence of the parent.We are not aware of a common law rule that an unemancipated child could not maintain an action against his parent for damages for personal injuries as a result of the parent's ordinary negligence. 'But there is substantial decisional authority (commencing with Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L.R.A. 682) that it is not permitted, on the theory that it is disruptive of the family peace, destructive of the enforcement of discipline, and therefore against public policy. We recognize the wisdom of these rulings as the state and society are vitally interested in the integrity of, and harmony in, the family.' Briggs v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa.Super. 50, 170 A. 871, 872. Among the jurisdictions approving this rule are: Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438; Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 298, 25 N.E.2d 766; Norfolk Southern Railroad Co. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841; Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198; Castellucci v. Castellucci, 188 A.2d 467 (R.I.); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551; Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236; Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147; Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 A. 153; McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664, 64 L.R.A. 991; Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302; Villaret v. Villaret, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 169 F.2d 677; Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788, 68 L.R.A. 893; Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind.App. 566, 142 N.E. 128; Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763; Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751; Smith v. Henson, 214 Tenn. 541, 381 S.W.2d 892; Badigan v. Badigan, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 174 N.E.2d 718; Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16; Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12, 31 A.L.R. 1135; Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753; Traczyk v. Connecticut Company et al., 24 Conn.Sup. 382, 190 A.2d 922; Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765; Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888; Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570; Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170; Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676; Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37; Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29; Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P.2d 572; Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okl.); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771.
The great weight of authority, unquestionably sustains the proposition that an unemancipated minor child cannot sue his parent for the negligent act of such parent causing the child to suffer personal injuries.
This principle was touched upon in Skillin v. Skillin, 130 Me. 223, 225, 154 A. 570, in which the court said:
'The right of the plaintiff to recover depends on the ordinary rules governing liability for negligence, and on whether or not she was of age and emancipated.' (Emphasis supplied)
The New Hampshire Court in Rines v. Rines, 97 N.H. 55, 80 A.2d 497, 498 said:
'We interpret this as meaning that the Maine law is in accord with the great weight of authority in other common law states and forbids suits between parent and child under such circumstances as are before us here.'
In 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 61b(2), p. 787, we find the following rule:
'Generally speaking, an unemancipated minor child has no right of action against a parent or a person standing in loco parentis for the tort of such parent or person unless a right of action is authorized by statute, and the child may not, even after reaching majority, maintain an action for a tort committed by the parent while the child was an unemancipated minor.
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* * *' Ibid., 39 Am.Jur., Parent and Child, §§ 89, 90.It is said by Cooley on Torts, 4th Ed. § 174, under the title of 'Wrongs to Child':
'A minor child has no civil remedy against its parent, or either of them, * * * for injuries resulting from negligence.' See Matarese v. Matarese, supra, and cases cited.
In the formal relationship of a parent and child, it is likely that circumstances may arise resulting in some injury to the child, which injury may be caused by the negligence of the parent.
In the instant case, the parent was in the performance of a parental duty in providing transportation for the child to the school where she was enrolled as a student, and should not be subject to an action by the child for an injury sustained in the course of the parent's performance of a parental duty.
In Cannon v. Cannon, supra, facts comparable to the case at bar, the court said:
'In the case now before us, * * * we deal with that natural kinship between parent and child which involves legal duties peculiar to that relationship, and as to which both reason and authority dictate our adherence, * * *.
'The law requires of parents that they provide care, maintenance and guidance for their unemancipated minor child. To that end they are entitled to his custody. Such duties and rights may be enforced by legal process. Thus has the law recognized in the family something more than a social unit, something more practical than a spiritual concept. It has sanctioned the family relationship--particularly the relationship of parent and child--as...
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Rousey v. Rousey, No. 84-669.
...most frequently cited by the courts has been the need to preserve domestic tranquility and family unity. See, e.g., Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29, 30 (Me. 1966), overruled, Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639 (Me. 1979); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 481, 13 N.E.2d 438, 439 (1938), overru......
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Barlow v. Iblings, No. 52664
...State Supreme Courts recently have refused to follow their lead in restricting or abrogating the doctrine. See Downs v. Poulin (Me.), 216 A.2d 29 (1966), and many citations; Nahas v. Noble, supra, 77 N.M. 139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966); Rickard v. Rickard (Fla.), 203 So.2d 7 The logic and reasoni......
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Skinner v. Whitley, No. 97
...policy is to be determined by the legislature and not by the court.' 3 Lee, North Carolina Family Law, § 248. Accord, Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me.1966); Castellucci v. Castellucci, 94 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467 [281 N.C. 485] For the reasons stated, defendant's motion for summary judgment w......
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Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 81-958
...immunity have relied upon the existence of interspousal immunity to support the parental immunity doctrine. Downs v. Poulin (Me.1966), 216 A.2d 29; Luster v. Luster (1938), 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438. By the same token, when a jurisdiction has abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immuni......
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Rousey v. Rousey, No. 84-669.
...most frequently cited by the courts has been the need to preserve domestic tranquility and family unity. See, e.g., Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29, 30 (Me. 1966), overruled, Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639 (Me. 1979); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 481, 13 N.E.2d 438, 439 (1938), overru......
-
Barlow v. Iblings, No. 52664
...State Supreme Courts recently have refused to follow their lead in restricting or abrogating the doctrine. See Downs v. Poulin (Me.), 216 A.2d 29 (1966), and many citations; Nahas v. Noble, supra, 77 N.M. 139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966); Rickard v. Rickard (Fla.), 203 So.2d 7 The logic and reasoni......
-
Skinner v. Whitley, No. 97
...policy is to be determined by the legislature and not by the court.' 3 Lee, North Carolina Family Law, § 248. Accord, Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me.1966); Castellucci v. Castellucci, 94 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467 [281 N.C. 485] For the reasons stated, defendant's motion for summary judgment w......
-
Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 81-958
...immunity have relied upon the existence of interspousal immunity to support the parental immunity doctrine. Downs v. Poulin (Me.1966), 216 A.2d 29; Luster v. Luster (1938), 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438. By the same token, when a jurisdiction has abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immuni......