Downs v. State

Decision Date16 January 1952
Docket NumberNo. 17666,17666
Citation208 Ga. 619,68 S.E.2d 568
PartiesDOWNS v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where the preliminary examination of witnesses offered by the State shows that a confession by the defendant was freely and voluntarily made, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury, such evidence is prima facie admissible for the jury's consideration. The fact that an alleged confession is made while the defendant is under arrest and accused of crime does not prevent the evidence from going to the jury.

2. The statement made by the defendant was sufficient to authorize the court to charge the law as to confessions.

3. It was not error to admit in evidence the shotgun offered by the State.

4. The court did not err in failing to charge the law as to the weight of circumstantial evidence.

5. The verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder is supported by the evidence.

E. S. Rowland, J. W. Claxton, Wrightsville, E. L. Stephens, Sr., Dublin, for plaintiff in error.

W. W. Larsen, Jr., Sol. Gen., Dublin, Price & Spivey, Swainsboro, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., J. R. Parham, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

ALMAND, Justice.

Lanier Downs and Carl Moore were jointly indicted for murder, in being charged that they did on November 26, 1950, kill and murder one Harvel H. Moye by shooting him with a certain shotgun, 'which the said Lanier Downs and Carl Moore then and there held, giving to the said Harvel H. Moye then and there a mortal wound' from which said Moye died. The defendants were separately tried. Lanier Downs was found guilty by the jury with a recommendation to mercy, and was sentenced by the court to life imprisonment. He filed a motion for a new trial on the general grounds and four special grounds, which was overruled, and in the present bill of exceptions assigns error on the order overruling the motion for a new trial as amended.

1. The first special ground of the motion complains that the court erred in permitting Howard L. Youmans to testify to certain incriminatory statements made by the defendant, to wit: 'Well, I'm the man that done it.' 'If I hadn't seen him at this filling station Friday, he'd have been living today.' It is contended that the court erred in admitting this testimony, for the reason that Joe Durden, another witness for the State, testified that the defendant on trial was induced to make said statement in the hope of reward, in that Youmans, to whom the statement was made, had stated to the defendant 'that it will go light with you,' and therefore that the said alleged statements were not freely and voluntarily made.

The record discloses that, when Youmans was testifying for the State, on direct examination, he stated that, while the defendant was under arrest and in jail, he asked the witness, 'Is he dead?,' and after the witness had answered in the affirmative, the defendant replied, 'Well, there's one more son-of-a-bitch accounted for,' and 'Well I'm the man that done it,' and after the defendant had pulled up the sleeve of his coat and showed the witness where he had shot him in the arm, the defendant said, 'If I hadn't seen him at this filling station Friday, he'd have been living today.' The witness Youmans testified that these statements were freely and voluntarily made, that the witness did not promise the defendant anything, or put him in fear of bodily harm or injury, and that these statements were made in the presence of Chief Carter and Joe Durden. Chief Carter stated that he was present when the above statements were made to Youmans, that they were freely and voluntarily made, and no one promised the defendant anything if he made the statements, and that the defendant told them that they had gotten the right man. When this testimony as to these statements was given, counsel for the defendant made no objection until after the cross-examination of the State's witness, Joe Durden. On the cross-examination of Durden, in response to questions by counsel for the defendant as to what Youmans said to the defendant before he made the statements above set out, Durden testified as follows: 'The only thing I remember him (the witness Youmans) saying about was that the truth would make it lighter, that is all I remember about that. He did not say, 'I will make it lighter on you,' but he said that it probably would make it lighter on you * * * He said something about the truth will pay--I can't tell you just exactly. I don't remember whether he said the truth will pay or it will go light on you, to be honest with you I can't recall just exactly the phraseology he used.'

After the state had rested its case, counsel for the defendant objected to any admissions or incriminatory statements testified to by the witness Youmans, on the ground that they were not freely and voluntarily made, and the court reserved its ruling on this objection until after the defendant had rested his case; and, after argument, during the absence of the jury, the court overruled the objections of the defendant and allowed the testimony of Youmans to remain in evidence.

Where the preliminary examination of witnesses offered by the State shows that a confession by the defendant was freely and voluntarily made, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury, such evidence is prima facie admissible for the jury's consideration. Bradberry v. State, 170 Ga. 859(4), 154 S.E. 344. The fact that an alleged confession is made while the defendant is under arrest and accused of crime does not prevent the evidence from going to the jury. Smith v. State, 139 Ga. 230(1), 76 S.E. 1016.

The fact that one of the witnesses for the State, on cross-examination, testified that the officer to whome the alleged confession was made testified as to circumstances which might be construed as holding out some hope of benefit and inducement for the defendant to make an incriminatory statement, would not of itself...

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18 cases
  • Jackson v. Denno, 62
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 22, 1964
    ...he must not let the confession go before the jury. See also State v. Pulliam, 87 Ariz. 216, 349 P.2d 781. GEORGIA: Downs v. State, 208 Ga. 619, 68 S.E.2d 568 (admissible where no evidence of involuntariness offered at preliminary examination); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 48 S.E.2d 377 (b......
  • Edwards v. State, s. 19845
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • October 11, 1957
    ...v. State, 94 Ga. 1, 21 S.E. 128; Nix v. State, 149 Ga. 304, 100 S.E. 197; Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770(1), 48 S.E.2d 522; Downs v. State, 208 Ga. 619, 68 S.E.2d 568. These grounds are without 2. It is clearly shown by the evidence that the homicide was committed in the execution of a prearr......
  • Cobb v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • November 10, 1966
    ...guns was the weapon with which the deceased was shot and killed. See Powers v. State, 172 Ga. 1(15), 157 S.E. 195; Downs v. State, 208 Ga. 619(3), 622, 68 S.E.2d 568; Seymour v. State, 210 Ga. 571(6), 81 S.E.2d 808; Wilson v. State, 215 Ga. 782(2), 113 S.E.2d 8. Appellant also contends in h......
  • Ramsey v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • April 9, 1956
    ...this fact with a confession, and a confession is direct evidence. Richardson v. State, 207 Ga. 373(1), 61 S.E.2d 489; Downs v. State, 208 Ga. 619(1), 68 S.E.2d 568; Booker v. State, 210 Ga. 34(2, 3), 77 S.E.2d While it was not error for the trial judge to fail to charge on the law of circum......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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