Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 00 C 2450.

Citation160 F.Supp.2d 891
Decision Date30 March 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00 C 2450.,00 C 2450.
PartiesElizabeth DOYLE; Youngsook Namkoong, Plaintiffs. v. CAMELOT CARE CENTERS, INC., a Delaware corporation; Jess McDonald, director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), in his individual capacity; Edward Cotton, director of the Division of Child Protection ("DCP") for DCFS, in his individual capacity; Matthew Franklin, head of the DCFS Administrative Hearing. Unit, in his individual capacity; Linda Everette-Williams, head of the DCFS's State Central Register, in her individual capacity; Michael Maloney, formerly a DCFS licensing supervisor, in his individual capacity; Joseph Becerra, a DCP supervisor, in his individual capacity; Marilyn O'Leary, a DCP supervisor, in her individual capacity; Peggy Everling, an acting DCP supervisor, in her individual capacity, Toni McWilliams, a DCP investigator, in her individual capacity; Linder Harrington, a DCP investigator in her individual capacity, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Jeffrey Bensley Gilbert, Johnson, Jones, Snelling & Gilbert, Chicago, IL, Robert E. Lehrer, Diane L. Redleaf, Lehrer & Redleaf, Chicago, IL, for Elizabeth Doyle and Youngsook Namkoong.

Keri B. Halperin, Seyfarth Shaw, Chicago, IL, Edward C. Jepson, Jr., Charis A. Runnels, Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, Chicago, IL, for Camelot Care Centers, Inc.

Daniel Jeremiah Spillman, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Chicago, IL, Barbara Lynn Greenspan, Attorney General's Office, Chicago, IL, James C. Stevens, Jr., Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Jess McDonald, Edward

Cotton, Matthew Franklin, Linda Everette-Williams, Michael Maloney, Joseph Becerra, Marilyn O'Leary, Peggy Everling, Toni McWilliams and Linder Harrington.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PALLMEYER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Elizabeth Doyle and Youngsook Namkoong (collectively "Plaintiffs"), two child care professionals, bring this action seeking compensatory and punitive damages against their former employer, Camelot Care Centers ("Camelot"), and various officials and employees of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS" or "State Defendants") in their individual capacities.1 Plaintiffs allege that State Defendants and Camelot violated their right to due process when they indicated Plaintiffs as guilty of neglect based on a low evidentiary standard, terminated them based on that indicated report, and effectively blacklisted them from working with children until the reports were later expunged. Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants failed to give them formal notice of the indicated report, gave them only redacted investigative files, and failed to hold a prompt hearing to appeal the indicated findings. The State Defendants now move to dismiss the suit against them, contending that it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that, even if it is not, they are shielded from liability by absolute or qualified immunity. Camelot also moves to dismiss the action against it, claiming that it is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 and that it did not deprive Plaintiffs of any constitutional right when it terminated them. For the following reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Camelot Care Centers ("Camelot"), a for-profit child welfare agency incorporated in Delaware, operates child welfare programs in a number of states, including Illinois. (Complaint ¶¶ 1, 10.) In Illinois, Camelot is a "Purchase of Service" ("POS") agency, that is, an agency with which the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") contracts to perform various state functions in connection with DCFS's duties, such as the care of state wards. (Id. ¶ 1.) DCFS meets the full cost of caring for and treating all the wards enrolled in Camelot's foster care program. (Id. ¶ 38.)

In May of 1998, Plaintiffs Elizabeth Doyle and Youngsook Namkoong worked for Camelot in its therapeutic foster care program. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 8, 9, 39.) At that time, Plaintiffs were indicated by DCFS as perpetrators of neglect of a child in their care and were terminated from their positions. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 56-57.) The events leading up to the decision to indicate Plaintiffs as perpetrators of neglect were as follows:

In December of 1997, K.F. was enrolled in Camelot's therapeutic foster care program. (Id. ¶¶ 3(a), 42.) On December 17 or December 18, 1997, K.F. took an overdose of Tylenol and had to be hospitalized for four days. (Id. ¶ 3(b).) On January 8, 1998, K.F.'s boyfriend, Kurt Anderson, called the DCFS Child Abuse Hotline and reported that K.F. had taken the overdose both because of her foster parents and because of Doyle's neglect of K.F. (Id.)2

After Anderson's call to the Hotline, DCFS line investigators Toni McWilliams and Linder Harrington investigated the circumstances leading to K.F.'s overdose. (Id. ¶¶ 3.b., 53.) Based on their investigation, and employing the standard of whether "credible evidence" existed to indicate Plaintiffs of neglect, McWilliams and Harrington recommended to their supervisors that Doyle and Namkoong be indicated for "medical neglect" and "substantial risk of physical injury" of K.F. (Id. ¶¶ 3(b), 54.) The supervisors, Joseph Becerra, Marilyn O'Leary and Peggy Everling, approved the findings. (Id.)3

DCFS failed to send Plaintiffs formal written notification of the indicated report. Doyle learned through her own attorney on May 6, 1998, that she had been indicated for neglect of K.F. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 61(a).)4 On May 6, 1998, Doyle spoke with her supervisor, Sue Roselle, at Camelot and informed Roselle of DCFS' decision to indicate her. (Id. ¶ 55.) Roselle, in turn, spoke to DCFS Licensing Supervisor Michael Maloney on at least two separate occasions the next day. (Id.) According to Roselle, Maloney advised Camelot that it could no longer employ Doyle because of the indicated report. (Id.) Roselle terminated Doyle on May 8, 1998, and terminated Namkoong on May 11, 1998, after she returned from an approved vacation. (Id. ¶¶ 56, 57.)

Once DCFS investigators decide that credible evidence of abuse or neglect exists, it maintains a record of that so-called "indicated" finding in the State Central Register. (Id. ¶ 3(b).) That finding will also stand as the final administrative determination unless the indicated person is successful in overturning the finding in the administrative appeals process. (Id.) In Plaintiff's case, the indicated report was not formally registered until May 18, 1998. (Id. ¶ 60.) According to Plaintiffs, the State Defendants did not afford them any written notice of the indicated report against them, nor were they given any opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision maker to contest the finding or their termination prior to the issuance of the report. (Id. ¶¶ 3(d), 61(a).) Camelot also did not afford them any hearing before terminating them. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that "DCFS has long had in effect policies that discouraged or effectively prohibited child care employers from continuing to employ any child care employee who had been registered as guilty in an indicated report" and that Camelot has developed and enforced policies that parallel some DCFS policies. (Id. ¶ 59.) These policies include, in most cases: "suspending, terminating, or taking other adverse employment action against any [Camelot] employees (in child contact positions) immediately upon being notified by DCFS that the employee is under investigation for child abuse or neglect, or has been registered as guilty in an indicated report." (Id. ¶ 32(a).) In addition, Camelot does not make an independent assessment of whether the facts and circumstances giving rise to the investigation and/or indicated report warrant the investigations, the report, or the adverse action before taking action against the employee, nor does it afford its employees any hearing either prior to or after the adverse action. (Id. ¶ 32(a)(b).)

Nearly eight months after the indicated report was entered into the State Central Register, each Plaintiff was afforded an administrative hearing to challenge the indicated findings against her. (Id. ¶ 61(c)(ii).) Plaintiffs allege that, before this time, they received redacted case files that made it difficult for them to comprehend the charges against them. (Id. ¶ 61(b).) They also allege that some of the evidence which was relied on in the administrative appeals process was withheld from them. (Id.)

Namkoong's administrative hearing, which began on January 19, 1999, ended in a settlement on July 22, 1999. (Id. ¶ 61(c)(ii).) As part of the settlement, the Department expunged the indicated report, effective May 18, 2000. (Id. ¶ 61(c)(ii).) Doyle was afforded an administrative hearing on January 27, 1999. (Id. ¶ 61(c)(i).) The hearing was adjourned on numerous occasions by DCFS and did not conclude until May 6, 1999. (Id.) On August 13, 1999, the administrative law judge issued a recommended decision denying Doyle's request to expunge the indicated finding against her. (Id. ¶ 61(c)(i).) Doyle appealed the final administrative decision to the Kane County Circuit Court, and, on March 13, 2000, Doyle's indicated report was expunged by agreed order. (Id.)

According to Plaintiffs, before hiring a new employee, "virtually all child care employers (because they are licensed by DCFS, because they have contracts with DCFS, or for other reasons) are required to check or do check the [Central State Register] for indicated reports as part of a routine background checking process" and that "DCFS policies ... strongly discourage or effectively prohibit these [agencies] from hiring anyone" after a background check exposes either a pending investigation or an indicated report. (Id. ¶ 31(g).)

Alleging they were unable to obtain acceptable substitute employment until the records...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Birdo v. Gomez
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 17 Octubre 2016
    ...the district court." Walsh v. Mellas , 837 F.2d 789, 799 (7th Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted); Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc. , 160 F.Supp.2d 891, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2001), aff'd , 305 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The qualified immunity defense...can be waived if the defendant either......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT