Doyle v. Coyne-Fague

• Decision Date: 03 November 2022
• Docket Number: C. A. 1:21-CV-00479-MSM-LDA
• Parties: DANIEL E. DOYLE, JR, Petitioner, v. PATRICIA A. COYNE-FAGUE, in her official capacity as Director of the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS FOR THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

DANIEL E. DOYLE, JR, Petitioner,
v.
PATRICIA A. COYNE-FAGUE, in her official capacity as Director of the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS FOR THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND Respondent.

C. A. No. 1:21-CV-00479-MSM-LDA

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

November 3, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARY S. MCELROY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The petitioner, Daniel E. Doyle, Jr., an inmate at the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institute, has filed with this Court a Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. The respondent, Patricia A. Coyne-Fague, in her capacity as Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, has moved to dismiss the petition.

For the following reasons, the respondent's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED, and Mr. Doyle's petition for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is DENIED and DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts of this case are adapted from State v. Doyle, 235 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2020), unless otherwise noted.

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The petitioner was the executive director of the Institute for International Sport (“the Institute”), a Rhode Island nonprofit corporation formed in 1987 with the goal of “expanding the opportunities for young people around the world to participate in sports activities in order to improve and develop their capabilities[.]” Doyle, 235 A.3d at 489. The Institute operated primarily through grants obtained by the State of Rhode Island and private donations. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2.)

Sometime in the early 2000s, the petitioner decided that the Institute required a second building, to be called the “Leadership Building,” to supplement the existing “Hall of Fame Building.” Doyle, 235 A.3d at 490. In addition to securing funds from private donors, the petitioner, in 2007, secured funds from the State of Rhode Island. Id. The total of $575,000 of these state funds came in the form of two grants from the Rhode Island General Assembly's Joint Committee on Legislative Services (“JCLS”). Id.

In 2009, Marisa White, the director of JCLS, noticed that the Leadership Building remained under construction, long after she believed it should have been completed. Id. Her concerns led to a JCLS investigation, which was referred to the office of the state Auditor General. Id. After the Auditor General issued a report on his findings in 2012, a grand jury investigation resulted in an eighteen-count indictment, charging the petitioner with seven counts of embezzlement in violation of R.I.G.L. § 11-41-3, one count of obtaining money under false pretenses under §§ 1141-4 and 11-41-5, five counts of forgery in violation of R.I.G.L. § 11-17-1, and five

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counts of giving false documents to an agent, employee, or public official in violation of R.I.G.L. § 11-18-1. Id.

On December 5, 2016, at the conclusion of a three-month trial, a jury returned guilty verdicts on all eighteen counts. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1-2.)

Among his pretrial pleadings, the petitioner filed a motion in limine that the Rhode Island Supreme Court described as a “broad-based attack against a significant amount of the state's evidence and a host of prosecution witnesses.” Dolye, 235 A.3d at 492. Specifically, the petitioner argued that this evidence, which ultimately spanned two weeks of the trial, was inadmissible under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because it related solely to his bad character. Id. The trial justice issued a preliminary ruling denying the motion, finding that “facially, the state's planned evidence appeared relevant, and not in contravention of Rule 404(b).” Id. at 492-93. The trial justice further stated that she would decide during trial whether the evidence should be admitted in accordance with Rule 404(b). Id. at 493. Much of this evidence concerned the JCLS grant and the audit that followed.

On Appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the petitioner had not preserved specific objections to the prior bad acts evidence and therefore held that the issue was not properly before the court pursuant to its well-settled “raise or waive” rule. Id. at 494-95. But the petitioner asserts to this Court that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's finding of waiver constituted a “clearly unreasonable interpretation of the facts” presented at trial. (ECF No. 7 at 8.) He avers that contrary to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding that he failed to preserve his

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objections by relying on a continuing objection that the trial justice granted him, the trial record reflects that it was defense counsel who offered the continuing objection format to the court to accommodate the witnesses and the jury. Id. at 9-10. Moreover, he asserts that he in fact “objected to the introduction of all the Rule 404(b) witnesses and their attendant exhibits, and the trial court repeatedly thanked him for graciously allowing it to proceed with a continuing objection.” Id. at 11.

Despite determining that he had waived his objection to the prior bad acts evidence, the Rhode Island Supreme Court proceeded to consider the petitioner's 404(b) arguments to “make clear that, were the issue properly before the Court, it is without merit.” Doyle, 235 A.3d at 495. The court held that the trial justice correctly determined “that the testimony elicited from the state's witnesses was independently relevant for a complete and coherent presentation of the events underlying the numerous and complex crimes in this case.” Id. at 496. The court explained that

the JCLS grant money was paid to the Institute and the circumstances surrounding the grant were highly relevant. The defendant stands convicted of embezzling a whopping amount of money from the Institute, over several years, and engaging in a monumental scheme to obfuscate inquiry into his charged misconduct. The evidence in this case established that defendant lied to the Auditor General during the audit that was precipitated by the JCLS; he submitted false and forged documents to the auditor and drafted phony correspondence in the name of third parties without their knowledge or consent This is evidence of defendant's intent and motive to prolong his “far-flung chicanery” and coverup, as well as his consciousness of guilt. It is so interwoven with the charged misconduct as to be independently relevant. The trial justice admitted this evidence at trial because the failure to complete the Leadership Building, which led to the grant audit, resulted in the grand jury investigation and this indictment. The defendant's subterfuge during the audit was highly relevant on the crucial element of defendant's intent and constituted evidence that the incomplete building was not the result of poor bookkeeping or mistake. In fact,

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defendant's conduct can fairly be ascribed to the entirety of the reasons that underlay Rule 404(b) as proof of defendant's motive, intent, plan, scheme, and opportunity.

Id. at 496-97.

Also at trial, the State presented Detective Courtney Elliot of the Rhode Island State Police to provide opinion testimony as a lay witness. Id. at 498. Detective Elliot, a member of the Financial Crimes Unit and a certified fraud examiner, joined the state police investigation into the Institute in 2012 and was tasked with determining which of the petitioner's “expenses from various accounts held by the Institute were personal and what expenses were legitimate business expenses chargeable to the Institute.” Id. Detective Elliot testified that that the petitioner “had incurred $145,332.36 in personal expenditures on his American Express card which was paid by the Institute.” Id. at 499.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 701 by allowing Detective Elliot to offer an opinion about the nature of the petitioner's credit card charges. Id. Rule 701 provides:

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions is limited to those opinions which are (A) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (B) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

Id.

While Detective Elliot's opinions were “informed by her qualifications and experience,” it also was “rationally based on the perceptions derived” from her review of thousands of documents and interviews with parties involved in those transactions. Id. at 500. These opinions, the court held, “were helpful to a clear understanding of

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her testimony and the determination of facts at issue.” Id. Furthermore, the court disagreed with the petitioner that Detective Elliot should have been qualified as an expert...