Doyle v. Doyle

Decision Date22 July 2011
Docket NumberNo. 20090989.,20090989.
Citation258 P.3d 553,2011 UT 42
PartiesDouglas Patrick DOYLE, Petitioner and Appellant,v.Robin Elaine DOYLE, Respondent and Appellee.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Steve S. Christensen, Matt Anderson, Benjamin K. Lusty, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.Suzanne Marelius, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 Robin Doyle petitioned the trial court for a modification of the custody of her son, Hyrum. After a two-day bench trial, the court granted her petition, transferring custody from the child's father, Doug Doyle, to Robin. Doug appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Doug then sought certiorari here on the issues affirmed by the court of appeals.

¶ 2 On certiorari, Doug contends that the trial court made three critical errors that were affirmed by the court of appeals. First, he asserts that the trial court inappropriately allowed presentation of evidence regarding both changed circumstances and best interests before affirmatively ruling that circumstances had changed. Second, Doug argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of changed circumstances. Third, Doug suggests that the trial court inappropriately granted Robin relief on an issue (child support modification) that she did not ask for.

¶ 3 We disagree and affirm the decision of the court of appeals. This court long has required that district courts determine that circumstances have materially and substantially changed before determining whether it would be in the best interests of the child to modify custody. Yet we have never required courts to conduct separate hearings regarding the two types of evidence. And we decline to do so now. We agree with the court of appeals that the trial court in this case appropriately received evidence regarding changed circumstances and best interests. We also agree that the court then correctly found a change in circumstances. Only then did it determine that it was in Hyrum's best interests to transfer custody from Doug to Robin.

¶ 4 Finally, we agree with the court of appeals that the trial court had ample authority to raise the issue of child support. Moreover, because the trial court raised that issue and provided Doug with the opportunity to oppose modification, we reject his argument that he was somehow prejudiced or surprised by the court's ruling on that issue.

I

¶ 5 Doug and Robin Doyle are the parents of Hyrum Doyle. Hyrum has various physical and learning disabilities, some of which stem from a degenerative nerve disorder. In 2004, when Hyrum was eight years old, the Doyles sought a divorce before the Third District Court (Judge Frank Noel). The court entered a divorce decree on February 28, 2005, awarding sole legal and physical custody of Hyrum to Doug.

¶ 6 At the time of the divorce decree, Robin lived in Colorado, while Hyrum lived with Doug in Salt Lake City. The divorce court noted that Doug at times treated both Robin and Hyrum abusively. The court specifically referred to one incident “in which Doug slapped Hyrum and in which Doug verbally abused Hyrum.” Despite this incident, the court concluded that Doug had subsequently demonstrated a change in his parenting and had shown a “sincere desire to improve and be a good father.” While “naturally concerned,” the court “fe[lt] that the likelihood of abuse directed to” Hyrum was “unlikely in the future in light of Doug's sincere efforts and success in improving his parenting abilities.”

¶ 7 The court also noted that Doug and Hyrum shared a loving relationship, that Hyrum had “thrived” in his father's care, and that he was “happy and contented in Doug's custody.” The court further concluded that the evidence “suggests that [Hyrum] has established a network of friends and relationships in which he is happy, and that he is actively involved in scouting and church activities.” Based on these findings, the court awarded sole legal and physical custody of Hyrum to Doug, while also indicating that Robin and Doug were equally capable of meeting Hyrum's needs.

¶ 8 The court's decree also contemplated that Doug and Robin would cooperate with each other in sharing time with Hyrum. The court ordered, for example, “that Robin be given reasonable telephone visitation with Hyrum, not to be interfered with by Doug.” The court also found “that it will be a very serious violation of the divorce decree if either party unreasonably interferes with the other party's access to the child, or the other party's attempts to develop a loving relationship with the child.”

¶ 9 The finding of equal parenting ability was significant enough to the divorce court that it inserted an unusual condition into the divorce decree: “in the event” Robin “relocates to the Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical custody and shall share time equally.” Relying on this unusual condition, Robin moved from Denver to Salt Lake City in May 2005. Doug filed a motion to set aside the judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the automatic change of custody provision in the original divorce decree impermissibly allowed custody to be prospectively changed based upon a future triggering event. The district court (Judge Deno Himonas) granted Doug's motion, concluding that the divorce decree's provision allowing for an automatic change of custody was unlawful because a “change of custody requires notice and a hearing and cannot occur automatically upon a specified event.” See Utah Code Ann. § 30–3–10.4(1) (Supp.2010) 1 (requiring a hearing before a court may modify a custody order). The district court amended the divorce decree and excised the automatic change in custody provision, leaving Doug with custody of Hyrum. Robin did not appeal the district court's order.

¶ 10 On October 11, 2005, Robin petitioned to modify the custody award under Utah Code section 30–3–10.4, maintaining that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances because (1) she now resided in the Salt Lake Valley, in the same neighborhood as Doug and Hyrum; (2) she had relocated in reliance on the now-invalidated joint custody provision; and (3) Hyrum's best interests require stability in his custodial arrangement, including a stable relationship with Robin. Robin's petition did not request a modification of the original child support order. Trial on the petition to modify custody was eventually set for October 2 and 3, 2007.

¶ 11 Before trial, Doug moved to bifurcate the trial into separate hearings—the first to address whether a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred and, if so, the second to consider whether a custody modification would serve Hyrum's best interests. The trial court (Judge Denise Lindberg) denied Doug's motion for separate hearings but agreed that the law required the court to first determine whether there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances before reaching the best interests question. Because it would be “unreasonable to expect” witnesses “who [are] very busy ... to come in and testify twice at different points in the proceedings,” Judge Lindberg deemed evidence concerning changed circumstances and best interests to be admissible in a single hearing.

¶ 12 Doug objected specifically to a custody evaluation report by Dr. Valerie Hale, the court-appointed custody evaluator. In a pretrial motion, Doug asserted that Dr. Hale's report should be excluded because some of the information in the report went to the issue of best interests, which in his view could not be considered at the initial phase of the trial. The court denied the motion based on its prior ruling on the bifurcation issue.

¶ 13 Robin presented evidence on the first day of trial. The court received testimony from several witnesses, including Robin; Dr. Hale, including testimony regarding her disputed report; and various officials from Hyrum's school.

¶ 14 Robin testified that since the divorce, Hyrum's anxiety had increased, prompting her to begin taking him to counseling, which Doug opposed; that Doug insisted on making one-hour minimum phone calls to Hyrum each day, despite his age and physical discomfort at such long calls; that Doug had had five or six different jobs since the divorce; that Doug had struck Hyrum so firmly that it left a handprint, that he spanked him, threatened to punch him, and on one occasion shook him so hard that Hyrum called Dr. Hale to inform her of the incident; that Doug took Hyrum out of special education classes and speech therapy classes; and that Doug had excluded Robin from meetings with Hyrum's school teachers and alienated the school and administrators with onerous demands.

¶ 15 Dr. Hale testified that in Hyrum's initial interview he was “immature and distressed”; that he wanted substantially more time with Robin; that he wanted to live with Robin in Colorado, but that feeling was “top secret”; that he was “punished a lot” and said that “at my dad's, I feel like I am behind bars, I can't say a lot of things, he yells at me”; that Doug defended his use of spanking despite recommendations by the divorce court and Dr. Hale not to spank; that her meetings with school personnel confirmed that Doug interfered in the teaching of his son, barred the school from giving information to Robin, and was so aggressive and threatening to personnel as to require police to be on standby; that Hyrum felt pressured and had difficulty doing homework with Doug, but that Robin was able to get him to do his homework with less stress; that Robin helped Hyrum buy gifts for Doug, but that Doug would not help him buy gifts for Robin; that Doug unplugged the phone while Hyrum and Robin were speaking; that Hyrum often does not want to go back to Doug's home, but that he never does not want to go back to Robin's home; that he fights...

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