Doyle v. Doyle

• Decision Date: 07 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. COA05-788.,COA05-788.
• Citation: Doyle v. Doyle, 626 S.E.2d 845, 176 N.C.App. 547 (N.C. App. 2006)
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Shannon Daniel DOYLE, Plaintiff, v. Laura Patricia DOYLE, Defendant.

626 S.E.2d 845

Shannon Daniel DOYLE, Plaintiff, v. Laura Patricia DOYLE, Defendant.

No. COA05-788.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 7, 2006.

Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 22 October 2004 by Judge Amy R. Sigmon in Catawba County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 January 2006.

David Shawn Clark, P.A., by D. Shawn Clark, Hickory, for plaintiff-appellant.

Sherwood Carter, Hickory, for defendant-appellee.

TYSON, Judge.

Shannon Daniel Doyle ("plaintiff") appeals from the trial court's order granting primary physical custody of his minor child, S.D.D. ("minor child") to Laura Patricia Doyle ("defendant"). We reverse and remand.

I. Background

Plaintiff and defendant were married in June of 2001. Defendant had five children from a previous marriage. The minor child of the parties was born on 30 September 2002, and the parties separated in November 2003. After separating, the parties alternated physical custody of the minor child pursuant to an oral agreement.

On 3 March 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in Catawba County District Court seeking custody of the minor child and child support. Defendant filed a counterclaim seeking custody and child support. Communications broke down between the parties and the oral custody agreement ceased.

On 18 April 2004, plaintiff went to defendant's residence to pick up the minor child for visitation. After plaintiff entered the residence, defendant sought to prevent plaintiff from leaving with the child and attempted to remove the child from plaintiff's arms. Defendant struck plaintiff in the groin, after which he released the minor child to defendant. Plaintiff struck defendant repeatedly on the side of her face with his fist. Defendant's son struck plaintiff in the forehead with a hammer in an attempt to get plaintiff off of his mother. Eventually plaintiff exited the residence through the front door and called 911. Both parties sustained injuries as a result of the altercation. Plaintiff suffered a concussion and a cut on his head that required six staples.

Subsequent to this incident, defendant filed a complaint and motion for a domestic violence protective order. Defendant was granted an ex parte domestic violence protective order. Plaintiff counterclaimed and requested he be granted a domestic violence protective order against defendant.

The district court entered a temporary custody order on 6 May 2004. Temporary custody of the minor child was awarded to defendant and plaintiff was awarded visitation. The court ordered both parties to obtain anger management assessments and attend parenting classes.

The parties' requests for domestic violence protective orders against each other were heard before the Honorable John Mull on 19 May 2004. Judge Mull found that defendant had initiated the 18 April 2004 altercation by kicking plaintiff in the groin. Judge Mull dismissed defendant's complaint for a domestic violence protective order, and granted plaintiff's complaint for a domestic violence protective order against defendant.

The issues of child custody, child support, and visitation were heard before the Honorable Amy R. Sigmon. Judge Sigmon entered a judgment/order for visitation, child support, and custody on 21 October 2004. Judge Sigmon specifically found that she disagreed with Judge Mull's findings in the domestic violence protective order "with regards to the nature and circumstances surrounding the altercation that occurred on April 18, 2004." The court ordered the parties to share joint legal child custody with defendant having primary physical custody and plaintiff having visitation. Plaintiff appeals.

II. Issues

Plaintiff argues: (1) the trial court violated the doctrine of collateral estoppel when it relitigated a previous judicially determined issue; (2) findings of fact Numbers 33, 67, and 78 are not supported by competent evidence; and (3) sufficient and competent findings of fact do not support the trial court's order awarding primary physical custody to defendant.

III. Collateral Estoppel

Plaintiff argues the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents Judge Sigmon from re-adjudicating an issue of ultimate fact previously determined by Judge Mull in the 19 May 2004 domestic violence protective order. We agree.

A. Elements

"Under collateral estoppel as traditionally applied, a final judgment on the merits prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior action in a later suit involving a different cause of action between the parties or their privies." Thomas M. McInnis & Associates, Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428-29, 349 S.E.2d 552, 557 (1986). Our Supreme Court has stated "`[o]nce a party has fought out a matter in litigation with the other party, he cannot later renew that duel.'" State ex rel. Lewis v. Lewis, 311 N.C. 727, 730, 319 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1984) (quoting Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898, 906 (1948)).

The following requirements must be met to bar relitigation of specific issues in a subsequent non-identical action involving the same parties:

(1) The issues to be concluded must be the same as those involved in the prior action; (2) in the prior action, the issues must have been raised and actually litigated; (3) the issues must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination made of those issues in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.

King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 358, 200 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1973). The issues resolved in the prior action may be either factual issues or legal issues.

B. Precedents

In Lewis, our Supreme Court held a father's criminal conviction for willful neglect and non-support of his minor children collaterally estopped him from relitigating the issue of paternity in a subsequent civil action for child support. 311 N.C. at 734, 319 S.E.2d at 150. Similarly, this Court recently held that collateral estoppel barred a plaintiff from relitigating in state court "identical underlying factual issues" as those resolved against her in federal court even though her state causes of action were entirely distinct from her federal causes of action. Youse v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 N.C.App. 187, 192-94, 614 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2005).

C. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating in the later custody action the question of who committed domestic violence on 18 April 2004. Judge Mull presided over the prior Chapter 50B litigation between plaintiff and defendant involving cross-petitions for domestic violence protective orders. He found that on 18 April 2004, defendant placed plaintiff in fear of imminent serious bodily injury by "initiating an assault by kicking him in the groin and later hitting him in the back; every act of aggression on this occasion was initiated by the Defendant or some member of her family, and ultimately resulted in the Defendant's son hitting the Plaintiff with a hammer, giving the Plaintiff a concussion and a cut on his forehead requiring 6 staples." Further, Judge Mull found that defendant "failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that [plaintiff] committed any acts of domestic violence against her [or] her children" and dismissed her claim. He then concluded that defendant had "committed acts of domestic violence against the Plaintiff" and ordered, among other things, that defendant attend and complete an abuser treatment program.

Judge Sigmon, who presided over the later custody action, was required to consider "acts of domestic violence between the parties, the safety of the child, and the safety of either party from domestic violence by the party and shall make findings accordingly." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-13.2(a) (2005) In accordance with that requirement, Judge Sigmon made various findings of fact regarding the events of 18 April 2004, including the following ultimate findings relating to Judge Mull's order:

43. That the parties' injuries are consistent with the Defendant's version of the altercation and are inconsistent with the Plaintiff's version of events.

44. That the Plaintiff has taken no responsibility for the altercation . . . .

. . . .

46. That subsequent to this incident, the Defendant filed criminal charges against the Plaintiff and obtained an Emergency Domestic Violence Protective Order against the Plaintiff. The Emergency Order was issued by the Honorable Judge C. Thomas Edwards. The Defendant's complaint for the domestic violence protective order was set for hearing and the criminal charges were set for district criminal court.

47. That the Plaintiff filed an answer and counterclaim to the Defendant's complaint for a domestic violence protective order in which he alleged that the Defendant had committed acts of domestic violence against him and he requested that he be granted a domestic violence protective order against the Defendant. The Court takes judicial notice of the pleadings and court orders in this file 04-CVD-1168 and the file is herein incorporated by reference.

. . . .

53. That the parties' requests for domestic violence protective orders against one another were heard on May 17, 2004 in front of the Honorable Judge John Mull during a scheduled session of domestic violence protective order hearings.

54. That at the hearing Judge Mull dismissed the Defendant's complaint for a domestic violence protective order and granted the Plaintiff's complaint for a domestic violence protective order against the Defendant.

55. That Judge Mull made findings that the Defendant and or the Defendant's minor children were the aggressors in the altercation and that the Defendant had committed acts of domestic violence against the Plaintiff.

56. That this Court, after hearing the case on its merits, respectfully disagrees with the findings of the Honorable Judge John Mull with regards to...