Doyle v. Engelke
| Decision Date | 24 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-0680,96-0680 |
| Citation | 219 Wis.2d 277,580 N.W.2d 245 |
| Parties | Catherine M. DOYLE and Karl Rohlich, Plaintiffs, v. Ward ENGELKE, Missionaries to the Preborn Youth for America-National, Youth for America-Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Joseph L. Foreman, Matthew Trewhella, Kelly Dykema, Timothy L. Ruchti, Kurt L. Sonnenburg, Bryan Longworth and Advocates for Life Ministries, Defendants, Wisconsin Voice of Christian Youth, Inc. and Vic Eliason, Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, Employers Insurance of Wausau, a mutual company, Intervenor-Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Intervenor-Defendant-Respondent. Matthew TREWHELLA, Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff-Third-Party Plaintiff, v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF WISCONSIN, INC., Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Milwaukee Clinic Protection Coalition, Severa Austin, Linda Mellowes, John Does and Jane Does, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Terry E. Johnson, Timothy J. Pike and Jeff M. Blessinger, and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Terry E. Johnson.
For the intervenor-defendant-co-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by J. Ric Gass, John J. Laffey, Michael D. Rosenberg, and Kravit, Gass & Weber, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by J. Ric Gass.
For the intervenor-defendant-respondent there was a brief by Arnold P. Anderson and Mohr & Anderson, S.C., Madison and oral argument by Arnold P. Anderson.
The petitioners, Wisconsin Voice of Christian Youth, Inc. and Vic Eliason (collectively WVCY) and Intervenor Employers Insurance of Wausau (Employers) seek review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals which affirmed a circuit court grant of summary judgment in favor of Intervenor St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (St.Paul) determining that it was not obligated to defend or provide coverage under its policy. 1 The petitioners contend that the circuit court erred in concluding that St. Paul's policy with WVCY (the Policy) did not cover the slander of title, third-party negligent supervision, and invasion of privacy claims against WVCY.
¶2 We determine that while St. Paul's Policy excuses it from indemnifying WVCY on slander of title claims, the Policy does not excuse St. Paul from defending the negligent supervision claim. Because Employers and WVCY have not preserved the invasion of privacy coverage claim on appeal, we do not reach it. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals.
¶3 This case derives from an anti-abortion demonstration outside a clinic near Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Shortly after the demonstration, the defendant, Ward Engelke, alleged that the plaintiff, Catherine Doyle, had cursed at and kicked his daughter, Ekaterina Engelke, in the face while she was praying outside of the clinic. Engelke's allegations were covered extensively in the print media and in broadcasts by a radio station owned by WVCY. Subsequently, two employees of WVCY, David Kanz and Louis Schierbeck, filed a false security agreement with the Secretary of State, thereby encumbering the assets of Doyle. They also served a false subpoena at Doyle's residence.
¶4 Based on these incidents, Doyle filed suit against Engelke, WVCY, and eleven other related defendants. Doyle's Third Amended Complaint, the complaint currently before us, alleges eleven different causes of action arising from the actions of Engelke, WVCY, and WVCY's employees. Based on an insurance policy covering defamation actions against WVCY, Employers has defended WVCY against Doyle's defamation and other claims.
¶5 St. Paul also insures WVCY and its employees under a number of policies, including a comprehensive general liability policy which covers "bodily injuries" caused by WVCY or its employees. During the pendency of this suit before the circuit court, St. Paul intervened as a defendant pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 803.09 (1993-94). 2 St. Paul then filed a motion for summary judgment asking the circuit court to determine that pursuant to the terms of its Policy with WVCY, St. Paul was not obligated to defend WVCY or provide coverage in the event of a judgment adverse to WVCY. Employers also intervened as a party for purposes of contesting the scope of St. Paul's duty to defend WVCY. The circuit granted summary judgment and determined that St. Paul was not obligated to defend or indemnify WVCY on any of Doyle's claims.
¶6 WVCY and Employers appealed. On appeal all of the parties concede that eight of Doyle's eleven claims are not covered by the Policy. Employers and WVCY contend, however, that Doyle's negligent supervision slander of title, and invasion of privacy claims are covered by the Policy.
¶7 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. The appellate court determined that St. Paul was not required to provide coverage for or defend Doyle's claim for negligent supervision since the Policy's intentional act exclusion applied to the actions of WVCY's employees; that Doyle's property-based slander of title action was not covered by the Policy provision covering the more common slander to personal reputation cause of action; and that WVCY's claim for coverage of Doyle's invasion of privacy claim failed due to a specific broadcast exclusion within the Policy.
¶8 We review a grant of summary judgment independently, applying the same methodology as the circuit court. See State ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis.2d 585, 591-92, 547 N.W.2d 587 (1996). Where no material facts remain in dispute, we must determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 592, 547 N.W.2d 587.
¶9 This case requires us to interpret an insurance policy to determine if coverage exists and whether the insurer is subject to a duty to defend. The interpretation of words or clauses in an insurance policy and the existence of coverage under that policy are questions of law which we review de novo. See Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 744, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990); Smith v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Wis.2d 808, 810, 456 N.W.2d 597 (1990).
¶10 In determining an insurer's duty to defend, we apply the factual allegations present in the complaint to the terms of the disputed insurance policy. See Professional Office Bldgs., Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 145 Wis.2d 573, 580, 427 N.W.2d 427 (Ct.App.1988). We liberally construe those allegations and assume all reasonable inferences. 3 See Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Badger Med. Supply Co., 191 Wis.2d 229, 241-42, 528 N.W.2d 486 (Ct.App.1995); see also Kenefick v. Hitchcock, 187 Wis.2d 218, 224, 522 N.W.2d 261 (Ct.App.1994). An insurer has a duty to defend a suit where the complaint alleges facts which, if proven at trial, would give rise to the insurer's liability under the terms of the policy. See Professional Office Bldgs., 145 Wis.2d at 580, 427 N.W.2d 427.
¶11 As a threshold matter we note that St. Paul challenges Employer's standing in this matter. St. Paul claims that because no contractual relationship exists between St. Paul and Employers, St. Paul owes no duty to Employers under the terms of Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis.2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982) and Teigen v. Jelco of Wisconsin, Inc., 124 Wis.2d 1, 367 N.W.2d 806 (1985), and no standing exists.
¶12 We find Loy and Teigen inapposite to the present situation. In those cases this court determined that a primary insurer who settled with the plaintiff and obtained a release for itself and its insured was appropriately dismissed from the underlying suit, leaving a secondary tortfeasor to defend the plaintiff's remaining claims beyond the primary insurer's limits.
¶13 In this case we acknowledge that St. Paul owes no contractual duty to Employers. However, the disputed issue in this summary judgment motion is whether St. Paul's Policy requires St. Paul to defend WVCY on claims which Employers, as another policy provider, has already begun to defend. 4 4 It was on this basis that the circuit court granted Employer's oral motion to intervene when the court also granted St. Paul's motion to intervene for purposes of determining coverage. As Wis. Stat. § 803.09 indicates:
Intervention. (1) Upon timely motion anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the movant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the movant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect that interest, unless the movant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
¶14 In this case the circuit court's resolution of St. Paul's coverage of WVCY directly affects Employers' participation in the suit under the terms of its policy. Thus, Employers has an "interest" in the "transaction which is the subject of the action" and Employers has standing before the court.
¶15 The first substantive issue we are asked to address is whether St. Paul's Policy requires St. Paul to defend WVCY against Doyle's claim that WVCY was negligent in its supervision of its employees, Kanz and Schierbeck. The circuit court concluded that St. Paul was not required to defend WVCY on this claim because Doyle's allegations against WVCY evidenced neither a "bodily injury" nor an "event," as defined in the Policy, and because coverage was otherwise barred by the intentional acts exclusion of the Policy. The court of appeals disagreed in part, determining that the complaint alleged a "bodily injury" and an "event," but still concluded that the intentional acts exclusion clause released St. Paul from any duty to defend. We reach a different result.
¶16 St. Paul's Policy provides coverage for "[b]odily injury and property damage liability." The Policy...
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