Doyle v. McKean's Estate

• Decision Date: 15 July 1938
• Docket Number: 11-1939
• Citation: 200 A. 715,132 Pa.Super. 285
• Parties: Doyle et ux., Appellants, v. McKean's Estate et al
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

200 A. 715

132 Pa.Super. 285

Doyle et ux., Appellants, v. McKean's Estate et al

No. 11-1939

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 15, 1938

Argued May 5, 1938

Appeal from decree of C. P. Allegheny Co., April T., 1937, No. 261 in case of Victor Lynch Doyle et ux. v. Susan Lynch McKean Estate et al.

Petition for declaratory judgment.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

Order entered distributing fund at issue between plaintiffs and defendants, before Gray, T. M. Marshall and Smith, JJ opinion by T. M. Marshall, J. Plaintiffs appealed.

Error assigned was action of lower court in dividing the fund between plaintiffs and defendants.

Decree affirmed.

Abraham Fishkin, for appellants.

Edward J. Steiner, with him Emanuel D. Jaffe and John F. Steel, for appellees.

Before Keller, P. J., Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Parker and Rhodes, JJ.

OPINION

Baldrige, J.

This appeal involves the interpretation of the will of Susan Lynch McKean.

The testatrix died June 2, 1900, leaving a husband, William McKean, and seven children, to wit: Amelia McKean, Sue McKean Doyle, Eugenia McKean, Jack McKean, Margaret Schuster, Genevieve Easley, J. Lynch McKean. She was seized at the time of her death of certain real estate in Freeport, Armstrong County. In her will she provided, inter alia, as follows: "First: I bequeath the house and contents on High and Seventh Streets to my daughter Amelia as long as she lives as home for herself and father and any of the daughters that remain single, in case of Amelia's death her father still remain with single daughter. Second: At the death of Amelia and father, house and contents to be equally divided among remaining heirs."

The daughter, Amelia McKean, died May 21, 1932, surviving her father and all of her brothers and sisters, except Sue McKean Doyle. On October 20, 1933, Mrs. Doyle and her husband, conveyed all of their interest in the real estate of which the testatrix died seized to Victor Lynch Doyle and Rachel E. Doyle. All of the surviving parties interested in the property above mentioned agreed to its sale for $ 2,775. Twelve hundred dollars was paid in cash and a mortgage for the balance of the consideration was given to Edward F. Lehmann as trustee. He holds the cash and the mortgage, awaiting the final determination of this suit.

Victor Lynch Doyle and his wife claim the entire fund as Sue McKean Doyle, whose interest they acquired, is the last survivor of the children, and they contend that the words in the will, "remaining heirs," mean those living at the time of the death of the last life tenant.

The appellants presented a petition for a declaratory judgment under the Act of May 22, 1935, P. L. 228 (12 PS § 847 et seq.). The learned court below, after carefully tracing the various interests of the different heirs as they shifted from time to time due to the deaths of the several children of the testatrix, determined that the fund in the hands of the trustee should be distributed as follows: Olive Lane, Frank Schuster, Jean Wynn, and Wayne Easley are each entitled to three-twentieths of the fund, or $ 180; Victor and Rachel Doyle to eight-twentieths, or $ 480; and that the mortgage held by the trustee be distributed to the parties in the same proportions as the cash fund, concluding that the words "remaining heirs" refer to those heirs other than life tenants living at the time of the death of the testatrix. We think that was the correct solution of this controversy.

The will was executed prior to the Act of June 29, 1923, P. L. 914 (21 PS § 11), which provides that when there is a remainder over under a will after a life estate, the will shall be construed, unless otherwise provided, as meaning the person or persons living at the time of the termination of the life estate. But it expressly states (21 PS § 12) that the act shall take effect the 31st day of December, 1923, and shall not apply to wills of persons dying before that date. It, therefore, has no bearing on this case.

Of course, our duty in interpreting this will is to try to ascertain the intention of the testatrix from the language she has used. It is very apparent that her primary purpose was to have the home maintained for the benefit of her husband and daughter, Amelia, or any other single daughter. If an uncertainty exists as to her further intention, the law leans toward equality. The Supreme Court said in Groninger's Est., 268 Pa. 184, 189, 110 A....