Doyle v. Rumsey

Decision Date10 April 2023
Docket Number2:22-cv-00127-GZS
PartiesMICHAEL A. DOYLE, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES RUMSEY, et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

George Z. Singal United States District Judge

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants Charles Rumsey,[1] Town of Cumberland, and Town Council of Cumberland, Maine (together the “Town Defendants) (ECF No. 31). Having considered the parties' submissions made in connection with the Motion (ECF Nos. 32-35, 37), the Motion is GRANTED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint the Court is required to “interpret the pro se complaint liberally.” Sause v. Bauer, 138 S.Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018). Nonetheless, to survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “In evaluating whether a complaint states a plausible claim, [the Court] perform[s] [a] two-step analysis.” Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cardigan Mtn. Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015)). First, the Court “must separate the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).” Morales-Cruz v. University of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Second, the Court “must determine whether the ‘factual content . . . allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “This standard is ‘not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.' Saldivar, 818 F.3d at 18 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “If the factual allegations in the complaint are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture, the complaint is open to dismissal.” Squeri v. Mount Ida Coll., 954 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Barchock v. CVS Health Corp., 886 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2018)).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) “bears a strong family resemblance to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Kando v. Rhode Island State Bd. of Elections, 880 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2018). In addition to the factual allegations in the complaint, the Court may consider “facts drawn from documents fairly incorporated in the pleadings and facts susceptible to judicial notice.” Sevelitte v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 55 F.4th 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

In accordance with this standard, the Court describes the relevant allegations gleaned from Plaintiff's pro se Complaint and the incorporated documents in the following section.

II. THE COMPLAINT

In 2020, Plaintiff Michael Doyle, who identifies himself as a reporter and a veteran, attended a school board meeting of the Maine School Administrative District # 51 (“MSAD 51”) and “used his public forum time” to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. (Compl. (ECF No. 1), PageID #s 5 & 7.)

MSAD 51 School Board Member Ann Maksymowicz “chose to remain seated,” which Doyle found “insulting and conspicuously offensive.” (Id., PageID # 5.)

In response, Doyle designed and posted a sign opposing Maksymowicz's reelection. Maksymowicz thereafter replicated the format of Doyle's sign and “converted it to a sign supporting her reelection.” (Id.) Doyle also placed a sign “on the school fence” where another sign supporting the MSAD 51 School Board had been hung. (Id., PageID # 7.) Doyle's sign was removed by an MSAD 51 employee. (Id., PageID # 17.) Thereafter, on May 15, 2021, Doyle received a criminal trespass warning from the Cumberland Police Department. (Id., PageID # 7; Town Defs. Ex. A (ECF No. 32).) As noted on the warning, Doyle was not allowed to enter any MSAD 51 property “unless prior authorization [was] obtained from Mr. Porter,” the Superintendent of MSAD 51. (Town Defs. Ex. A.)

Doyle then attempted to attend a public MSAD 51 School Board meeting. (Id., PageID # 7.) He was “immediately arrested and yanked by his left arm . . . while handcuffed.” (Id.; see id., PageID # 17 (asserting Doyle was “drag[ged] out of a School Board meeting” by “Sgt. LaChance”).) During this arrest, Doyle, who already had a stent, suffered a cardiac episode that required him to be rushed to the hospital, resulting in various medical expenses. (Id., PageID # 7.)

At some point after Maksymowicz had parodied Doyle's sign opposing her reelection, Doyle stated a prediction “that something of Ann's will be stolen and destroyed so that she can't get it back.” (Id., PageID # 5.) On February 22, 2022, the local Chief of Police, Charles Rumsey, served Doyle with a summons for harassment of Maksymowicz in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 506-A. (Id., PageID # 4.) Beyond this specific allegation, Doyle also claims that the Cumberland Police Department fingerprinted him twice and served him with a notice barring him from school grounds because of “a series of complaints” by Maksymowicz. (Id., PageID # 7.) According to Doyle, the notice “was subsequently withdrawn by the Chief and cancelled by email.” (Id., PageID # 8.)

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Complaint presses four counts as to the Town Defendants: (1) “Violation of Plaintiff's 4th Amendment Rights,” which references the summons he received; (2) “Violation of Plaintiff's . . . 5th and 14th Amendment Rights,” under which Doyle asserts a deprivation of due process associated with the removal of his sign from the school fence as well as his other police contacts; (3) “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,” which references the incident in which Doyle was handcuffed and then required emergency medical care; and (4) “Malicious Prosecution.” (Id., PageID #s 8-20.) The Town Defendants seek dismissal, or alternatively judgment on the pleadings, as to all four claims.

A. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure was violated when Defendant Rumsey wrongfully summoned Plaintiff for attempting to peacefully utilize his rights under the First Amendment.” (Compl., PageID # 13.) However, service of a summons alone does not effect a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, a liberal reading of the Complaint, which this Court affords Plaintiff as a pro se litigant, points to separate allegations involving an arrest.

Generally, [a] warrantless arrest by a law enforcement officer is a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment ‘where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.' French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 124 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)). “Probable cause exists when police officers, relying on reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances, have information upon which a reasonably prudent person would believe the suspect had committed or was committing a crime.” Charron v. Cnty. of York, 49 F.4th 608, 615-16 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to survive the pending motion, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that he was arrested without probable cause.

Here, Doyle's arrest occurred after he entered a MSAD 51 building to attend a board meeting. Because he had previously received a criminal trespass warning regarding MSAD 51 property, any officer who saw him on MSAD 51 grounds would have had probable cause to believe that he was engaged in a criminal trespass. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(E) (“A person is guilty of criminal trespass if . . . that person . . . [e]nters any place in defiance of a lawful order not to enter that was personally communicated to that person by the owner or another authorized person.”). In short, Count I does not allege a plausible claim against any Town Defendant related to either a summons or the arrest described in the Complaint.

B. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. More specifically, he asserts a “right to be free from summons for harassment absent probable cause” and that the Town Defendants “failed to provide training to its police officers, generally, on the elements and recent changes in Maine law regarding harassment.” (Compl., PageID #s 14 & 16.)

To the extent that Plaintiff invokes his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, Count II fails to state a viable claim as to the Town Defendants since they are not federal actors. See Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause . . . applies only to actions of the federal government-not to those of state or local governments.'” (citation omitted)); Doyle v Falmouth Police Dep't, No. 2:14-CV-259-JDL, 2015 WL 470715, at *5 (D. Me. Feb. 4, 2015) (citing Martinez-Rivera and explaining that “the protections of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause do not apply to the actions of state or local governments”). To the extent that Count II attempts to state a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, it similarly fails as a matter of law. [B]ecause the Fourth Amendment protects against seizures of the person, a § 1983 claim for pretrial deprivation of liberty is properly analyzed under the framework of the Fourth Amendment, rather than...

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