Dozier v. State

Decision Date23 March 1976
Docket NumberNo. 373S46,373S46
Citation264 Ind. 329,343 N.E.2d 783
PartiesMorris E. DOZIER, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Bruce H. Klang, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PRENTICE, Justice.

Defendant (Appellant) was convicted as an accessory before the fact 1 to murder in the second degree. 2 He was sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than fifteen (15) nor more than twenty-five (25) years. The sole issue raised on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant contending that scrutiny will reveal that the defendant was convicted upon less evidence of participation than was present in Pace v. State, (1967) 248 Ind. 146, 224 N.E.2d 312, where we reversed an accessory conviction for want of evidence.

On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. If the evidence supportive of the verdict, and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, would permit a reasonable trier of fact to infer the existence of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Birkla v. State, (1975) Ind., 323 N.E.2d 645; Foster v. State, (1974) Ind., 320 N.E.2d 745; Jethroe v. State, (1974) Ind., 319 N.E.2d 133; Kimble v. State, (1974) Ind., 319 N.E.2d 140.

"There can be no doubt of the general rule of law, that a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is legally responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or necessarily flow from it, and that, if he combines and confederates with others to accomplish an illegal purpose, he is liable criminaliter for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of the common design, as one of its probable and natural consequences, even though it was not intended as a part of the original design or common plan. * * *" Breaz v. State, (1938) 214 Ind. 31, 34--35, 13 N.E.2d 952, 953; followed in White v. State, (1941) 219 Ind. 290, 37 N.E.2d 937.

The defendant contends that the foregoing quoted principle was modified by our statement in Pace v. State, supra, as follows:

'* * * We do not intend to draw any hard and fast rules in this area of the law. Each case must be reviewed on its own facts; * * *.' 248 Ind. 146 at 149, 224 N.E.2d at 314.

We fail to see any modification. In Pace, we found no evidence or reasonable inferences demonstrating that the defendant aided and abetted in the crime, notwithstanding that he was driving the vehicle at the time and in which the crime was committed; and we were merely saying that each sufficiency challenge must be decided upon its own evidence.

Very little of the evidence in this case is disputed. It reveals that the defendant, pursuant to an agreement with Ralph Williams and Charles Frith, rented an automobile and drove his cohorts from Indianapolis to Anderson, parked the vehicle around the corner from a pawn shop and entered the shop alone, where he remained for fifteen or twenty minutes, talked to the owner and then left. After he departed, Williams and Frith entered the shop carrying a sawed-off shotgun, walked to the back of the shop, shot the owner in the head and killed him, removed a black box from the vault and ran to the automobile, where the defendant was waiting with the engine running. The three departed in the automobile and were arrested a few minutes later by a police officer who had been alerted.

Malice may be shown by evidence that the defendant deliberately used a deadly weapon in such a way as likely to produce death, Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686; and in such a case, the purpose to kill may be inferred from the act of killing. Taylor v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 264, 295 N.E.2d 600.

An accessory is liable for the acts of a principal although he did not personally participate in them. Burton v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790; Cline et al. v. State, (1969) 253 Ind. 264, 252 N.E.2d 793.

In view of these principles, the jury was warranted in finding from the foregoing recited evidence that Frith or Williams killed the shop owner with the intent and malice requisite to second degree murder. They were further warranted in inferring that the defendant was an accessory to the armed robbery committed by the others and hence an accessory to the murder.

This opinion could be ended at this point. However, to assure the defendant's recognition that the argument presented by his reply brief has not been overlooked, we shall continue. He admits to having been involved in criminal activity with Williams and Frith, but he contends that his liability does not extend to the murder, because the criminal activity in which he participated was not one from which the murder was a probable or a natural consequence.

The defendant testified that he went to Anderson with the others for the purpose of shoplifting and that he entered the shop to determine if any valuable merchandise was readily accessible. Finding that the merchandise was not susceptible to being easily shoplifted, he started to return...

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21 cases
  • Byrer v. State, 3-1080A322
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • July 27, 1981
    ...inferred, see Williams v. State (1979), Ind., 395 N.E.2d 239; Pinkler v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 467, 364 N.E.2d 126; Dozier v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 329, 343 N.E.2d 783; Kyles v. State (1979), Ind.App., 391 N.E.2d 642; Smithers v. State (1979), Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 466; Dolan v. State (197......
  • Jacks v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • September 26, 1979
    ...are justified in Inferring intent from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to cause death or injury. Dozier v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 329, 343 N.E.2d 783; Pinkerton v. State, (1977) 258 Ind. 610, 283 N.E.2d 376. Allowing the jury to draw an inference from facts presented to it......
  • Morris v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • July 7, 1977
    ...occasions that malice can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death. See, e. g., Dozier v. State, (1976) Ind., 343 N.E.2d 783; Chatman v. State, (1975) Ind., 334 N.E.2d 673; Jones v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 456, 255 N.E.2d 105. While it may be argued that ......
  • Bigbee v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • June 30, 1977
    ...personally participated in the commission of each element of the felony. Coleman v. State (1976) Ind., 354 N.E.2d 232; Dozier v. State (1976) Ind., 343 N.E.2d 783, 785; Pruitt v. State (1st Dist. 1975) Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 874, We turn now to the crux of Bigbee's argument, namely, his conte......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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