Dragoiu v. Comm'n of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13-14786 |
| Parties | MONIQUE DRAGOIU, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt 17, 22)
On November 20, 2013, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the instant suit seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's unfavorable decision disallowing benefits. (Dkt. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(b)(3), District Judge Denise Page Hood referred this matter to the undersigned for the purpose of reviewing the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's claims for period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (Dkt. 3). This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. 17, 22). Plaintiff also filed a reply brief in support of her motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 24). These motions are now ready for report andrecommendation.
Plaintiff filed the instant claim for disability insurance and period of disability benefits on August 23, 2010, alleging disability beginning January 20, 2004. (Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 111). Plaintiff's claims were initially disapproved by the Commissioner on May 18, 2011. Id. Plaintiff requested a hearing and on April 18, 2012, plaintiff appeared with counsel before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Ramona L. Fernandez who considered the case de novo. (Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 111-122). In a decision dated May 4, 2012, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. Id. Plaintiff requested a review of this decision, and the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when, after the review of additional exhibits,1 the Appeals Council on September 19, 2013, denied plaintiff's request for review. (Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 89-95); Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2004).
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS thatplaintiff's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, that defendant's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, that the findings of the Commissioner be REVERSED in part, and that this matter be REMANDED for further proceedings under Sentence Four.
Plaintiff was born in 1978 and was 32 years old on the last date insured. (Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 121). Plaintiff had past relevant work as a marketing consultant. Id. The ALJ applied the five-step disability analysis to plaintiff's claims and found at step one that between the alleged onset date and the last date insured, plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity in 2005, 2006, and 2007. (Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 114). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairs: degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, obesity, asthma, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and anxiety. (Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 114). At step three, the ALJ found no evidence that plaintiff's combination of impairments met or equaled one of the listings in the regulations. Id.
The ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a sedentary work with the following limitations:
After careful consideration of the entire record, theundersigned finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except she can only occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl or balance; no ladders/ropes/scaffolds; only occasional twisting or turning at neck; no concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases or other respiratory irritants; no work with moving machinery or unprotected heights; unskilled with simple instructions, routine changes, and no more than occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors or general public.
(Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 116). At Step Four, the ALJ found that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work. (Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 120). However, the ALJ determined that, considering plaintiff's age, education, experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist in sufficient numbers that plaintiff can perform and therefore, plaintiff had not been under a disability from the alleged onset date through the last date insured. (Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 122).
Plaintiff first argues that she meets the requirements of Listing 12.04 for affective disorders, relying on the medical records of her treating physician, Dr. Mark Werner and the Easter Seals records. Plaintiff lists the following "medical requirements" in support of her argument:
In addition, plaintiff contends that these symptoms cause her to have significant restrictions in normal activities of daily living, including driving, personal care and social functioning, significant restrictions in maintaining concentration, persistence, pace, and repeated episodes of decompensation. Plaintiff asserts that this began January 2004 and has continued through to the present. According to plaintiff, she has a medically documented history of a chronic affective disorder of at least 2 years' duration that has caused more than a minimal limitation of ability to do basic work activities, with symptoms or signs currently attenuated by medication or psychosocial support (Easter Seals) with (1) repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration, (2) a residualdisease process that has resulted in such a marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands or change in the environment would be predicted to cause the individual to decompensate, or (3) current history of 1 or more years' inability to function outside of a highly supportive living arrangement, with an indication of continued need for such an arrangement.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by not finding that she met or equaled listings 12.04 (affective disorders) including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, or 12.06 (anxiety-related disorders) Postpartum depression, postpartum psychosis, panic attacks and hypochondria. Plaintiff acknowledges that to meet the listings of 12.04 or 12.06, she must satisfy the criteria of paragraphs A and B. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sub pt. P, app. 1 §§12.04, 10.06. Paragraph A consists of a clinical finding that medically substantiates a mental disorder. Paragraph B requires plaintiff to establish at least two of the following: (1) marked restriction of activities of daily living, (2) marked difficulties in social functioning, (Plaintiff was also a victim of domestic violence) from 2004 - 2006 in Waterford, Michigan wherein her face was shoved into a mattress so that she could not breathe and she was grabbed around her neck and yanked by her hair banging her head onto the hard porcelain tiled floor) which was noted by police officers after seeing the physical marks on her body and broken items though out the home. Plaintiff sought counseling through Haven and Common Ground; (3) Marked difficulties inmaintaining concentration, persistence, and pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. (See Exhibit E). Plaintiff contends that she meets the PTSD (Post-traumatic stress disorder) requirements under the SSA's listings as she suffers from disruptive flashbacks, nightmares and memories that regularly cause her distress. According to plaintiff, her treating physician attributed the postpartum depression to the PTSD as being linked. These episodes continually interfere with daily activities, and the ability to concentrate at work. Plaintiff says that she meets the criteria in paragraph B because she has marked restrictions in activities of daily living and social functioning including holding and bathing her infant son during postpartum psychosis and continually requiring assistance in her daily living arrangements with assistant care from friends and family due to her constant and unrelenting pain.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ falsely noted as not experiencing episodes of decompensation, which is untrue. In mid 2004, plaintiff attempted to go back to her prior position at Nehoc, Incorporated where she worked as a travel agent. However, after a very short time, she was fired by the owners as they stated she was not working as she had in the past and seemed to not have the same abilities. Plaintiff suffered from debilitating mental fog, fibromyalgia joint pain, PTSD; water retention, cystic formations throughout the body creating nerve compression, severe asthma, obesity, hypothyroidism, vertigo, depression, anxietyand fatigue as well as instances of "loss of consciousness" which led to her being let go from the position. After that, again she attempted to work at a position in Farmington Hills as a marketing consultant. Once again, after a short time, she was let go because she was unable to perform at her position due to all of her limitations leading to yet another episode of decompensation which continued to repeat though she kept trying.
Plaintiff argues that, if properly considered in combination, her conditions should have equaled listings 12.04 (affective disorders) and/or 12.06 (anxiety-related disorders). Plaintiff argues that she "met" the...
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