Dragon v. State, 873S156

• Decision Date: 30 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 873S156,873S156
• Citation: 262 Ind. 394,316 N.E.2d 827
• Parties: David Earl DRAGON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 827

316 N.E.2d 827

262 Ind. 394

David Earl DRAGON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 873S156.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Sept. 30, 1974.

Mark A. McIntosh, Huntington, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., John E. Meyer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

ARTERBURN, Chief Justice.

On November 13, 1972, an affidavit was filed in Huntington Circuit Court charging Appellant with rape (Count I) and kidnapping (Count II) arising out of a single incident. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to both counts. On March 1, 1973, a jury found Appellant guilty on both counts.

The primary contention made by Appellant in this appeal is that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant the jury finding that beyond a reasonable doubt the Appellant was sane at the time he committed the kidnapping and rape. Appellant's basis for this contention is that a psychiatrist called by the State testified that Appellant:

'knew what the code of society was--he knew at that time--what his own code of behavior was--but the forces within him were such that he was unable to conform either to the code--either to his own or to society or society's moral code that was involved.'

Appellant reasons that this testimony places his conduct within the ambit of Hill v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429, wherein we adopted as the definition of insanity the American Law Institute's formulation which is as follows: 'a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.' Hill, supra, 253 Ind. at 614, 251 N.E.2d at 436.

The Hill case went on to point out that the jury as the trier of fact must make the ultimate determination as to the criminal responsibility of a defendant. 'The jury, as the trier of facts, remains the sole sentinel in the protection of both the rights of the accused and the welfare of society, enabled finally to consider all relevant facts pertaining to the defendant's mental state at the time the act was committed, and being thereby better qualified to render its ultimate moral judgment under the law.'

Hill, supra, 252 Ind. at 616--617, 251 N.E.2d at 438.

Thus, insanity as an issue for an appellate court is not a special category. Whenever a sufficiency of evidence challenge is made, this Court does not weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. We look to the evidence most favorable to the State and the reasonable inferences therefrom. When there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the verdict, it will not be disturbed. Blackburn v. State (1972), Ind., 291 N.E.2d 686 and cases cited therein. Consequently, without reciting testimony, we need only point out that in addition to the one psychiatrist upon whose partial testimony Appellant relies, five other medical witnesses testified about the insanity issue. Three of these witnesses testified that Appellant was at the time of the incident sane within the terms of the Hill definition. Furthermore,...