Drake v. C. V. Hill & Co.
| Decision Date | 20 October 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 70.,70. |
| Parties | DRAKE v. C. V. HILL & CO. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Appeal from Supreme Court.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Augustus N. Drake, opposed by C. V. Hill & Co. From an adverse judgment of the Supreme Court (182 A. 480, 14 N.J.Misc. 95) in proceedings to review a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas affirming a further award by the Workmen's Compensation Bureau for increased disability, Augustus N. Drake appeals.
Affirmed.
Samuel D. Lenox, of Trenton, for appellant.
Merritt Lane, of Newark, for respondent.
The accident occurred on August 5, 1929. On April 10, 1930, following an informal award of compensation for temporary disability under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911 (Pamph.L. p. 134), as amended (Comp.St.Supps. § **236—1 et seq.), appellant filed a formal petition for compensation. The taking of testimony in this proceeding was concluded on July 14, 1930; and on December 9, 1930, the formal award was entered. One week later, December 16, appellant executed and verified, and within a week thereafter filed with the Compensation Bureau, a petition styled "petition for review under section 21 (f)" of the Compensation Act; and therein he averred that, "since the hearing," his incapacity had "greatly increased," and prayed that "the case may be reopened for the purpose of establishing" his "present condition," and for a reconsideration of the bureau's "determination as to the heart condition and incapacity arising" therefrom. On January 5, 1931, by an "amended petition" filed in the bureau, appellant made substantially the same allegation of an increase in disability "since the hearing," and prayed a review of the award so made. On the same day, he filed a notice of appeal from the judgment to the Mercer common pleas, and thereafter prosecuted the appeal to a conclusion. The deputy commissioner made an award for temporary and permanent disability. He found, however, that the claimed "heart condition" was not the result of the compensable injury suffered by appellant. The pleas conducted the inquiry prescribed by the statute, and on November 25, 1931, affirmed the judgment on the merits. Thereupon the bureau, after hearing, made a further award for "increased disability" and there was an affirmance in the pleas. This is the judgment under review.
Plainly, the object of this supplemental proceeding was a read judication of the extent of appellant's incapacity at the time of the rendition of the final judgment, and not to secure additional compensation for an increase of disability occurring thereafter. Assuming for the purposes of this case that paragraph 21 (f), section 2, of the Compensation Act, as amended by chapter 279 of the Laws of 1931 (Pamph.L., pp. 704, 705, § 2 [N.J.St.Annual 1931, § **236— 24 (f), is retroactive in its operation (as to this see Granata v. D. W. McGee Construction Co., 114 N.J.Law, 89, 176 A. 104), it relates only to an increase or diminishment of disability occurring subsequent to the rendition of the judgment. The authority to review and modify under this statute is not addressed to the correction of errors in law or in fact residing in that adjudication. The judgment of the bureau is res judicata. It is final and conclusive as to all questions of law and of fact comprehended by the determination, including those involving jurisdiction, the right to compensation, and the nature and extent of the existing disability, subject only to correction on appeal and the authority vested in the bureau to "reopen" its own adjudications and its continuing jurisdiction to modify the award of compensation to accord with an after-occurring enlargement or diminution of the incapacity so found to have ensued from the established compensable injury.
A sine qua non to revision in the exercise of the continuing jurisdiction conferred by paragraph 21 (f),...
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...Co., 5 N.J. 466, 76 A.2d 17 (1950). Including the questions of jurisdiction and the right to compensation. Drake v. C. V. Hill & Co., 117 N.J.L. 290, 187 A. 637 (E. & A.1936). The Division determined (1) that the petitioner--the plaintiff in the present action--was not the victim of an acci......
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Giacchi v. Richmond Bros. Co., A--714
...the instant petition which initiated what was essentially a new proceeding based on a new factual situation. Drake v. C. V. Hill & Co., 117 N.J.L. 290, 187 A. 637 (E. & A.1936). There was evidence offered by the employee comparing his condition at the time of the previous award with that at......
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King v. W. Electric Co.
...compensation for disability subsequently occurring. It is obvious that this is so; the point merits no discussion. See Drake v. C. V. Hill & Co., 117 N.J.L 290, 187 A. 637; De Santis v. Turner Construction Co., 122 N.J.L. 590, 1 A.2d (c) And the claim that, by reason of the bureau's approva......
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Colbert v. Consolidated Laundry
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