Drake v. Merkle
| Decision Date | 30 October 1894 |
| Citation | 38 N.E. 654,153 Ill. 318 |
| Parties | DRAKE v. MERKLE et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to circuit court, Moultrie county; Francis M. Wright, Judge.
Bill by Mary L. Drake against Aaron Merkle and others for partition. The bill was dismissed at the hearing, and complainant brings error. Reversed.
Robert M. Peadro, for plaintiff in error.
John R. & Walter Eden, for defendants in error.
This was a bill in chancery brought by Mary L. Drake against Aaron Merkle and others for partition. On January 5, 1856, Joseph Hendricks, the complainant's grandfather, died intestate, being seised in fee at the time of his death of a tract of land in Moultrie county containing 100 acres. Hendricks left surviving him a widow, who died in 1879, and his two daughters, Mary E. Wright and Hannah J. Merkle; the latter being the wift of defendant Aaron Merkle, she having been married to him in the year 1855. As the fruit of their marriage, two children were born, Joseph C. Merkle and Mary L. Merkle (now Mary L. Drake, the complainant). On the 10th day of June, 1858, Mary E. Wright sold and conveyed her undivided one-half interest in the land to Daniel Brown; and on January 26, 1858, Brown and Mrs. Merkle made partition of the land in the following manner, viz.: Mrs. Merkle conveyed to Brown her interest in the south 30 acres, and Brown conveyed to Aaron Merkle his interest in the north 70 acres. Mrs. Merkle died intestate February 25, 1868, leaving her surviving her husband and her two children. It is claimed by the bill that Aaron Merkle procured the conveyance of Brown's undivided half of the north 70 acres to himself without his wife's knowledge or consent, and that down to the time of her death he concealed from her the fact that the conveyance had been made to him. It is claimed, therefore, that he took the title in trust for his wife and her heirs at law. Merkle, on the other hand, by his answer, alleges that the conveyance by Brown to him was made to him in accordance with the agreement in that behalf between Brown, Mrs. Merkle, and himself, and that as a part consideration for the conveyance he paid Brown a large sum of money, as the difference in value between Brown's interest in the 70 acres and Mrs. Merkle's interest in the 30 acres. Joseph C. Merkle, the complaint's brother, died intestate January 15, 1882, leaving him surviving, as his heirs at law, his father, the complainant, his sister of the full blood, and three brothers and one sister of the half blood, all four of whom were then and still are minors. The bill claims that Joseph C. Merkle, at the time of his death, was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the 70 acres, and that the complainant was at the same time the owner of the other undivided one-half interest, both interests being subject to the life estate of Aaron Merkle, as tenant by the curtesy, and that upon the death of Joseph C. Merkle the several parties became and now are entitled to interests in the property in the following proportions, vez.: The complainant, eight-fourteenths;Aaron Merkle, two-fourteenths; and the four minor children of Aaron Merkle, each, one-fourteenth,-all of these interests being subject to Aaron Merkle's tenancy by the curtesy. The bill prays for a decree declaring that Aaron Merkle took and now holds the title conveyed to him by Brown in trust for his wife and her heirs, and ascertaining and declaring the interests of the several parties in the land as above stated, and for a partition thereof between them according to their respective rights and interests. The master, on reference to him to take proofs, and report the same with his finding, reported that Aaron Merkle was vested with an estate for life in the premises, as tenant by the curtesy, and therefore that the complainant was not entitled to partition during his lifetime; also, that it was not satisfactorily shown that it was agreed and intended that the premises were to be conveyed by Brown to Mrs. Merkle, instead of her husband; and also that the statute of limitations was a bar to the relief sought concerning that conveyance. The master therefore concluded and recommended that the bill be dismissed at the costs of the complainant. Exceptions to his report were overruled, and a decree was thereupon entered dismissing the bill at the complainant's costs, without prejudice to a suit for partition after the termination of the life estate. To reverse this decree the complainant now brings the record to this court by writ of error.
Two questions only are presented by the record: (1) Whether Aaron Merkle holds the title conveyed to him by Brown in trust for the heirs of Mrs. Merkle; and (2) whether the complainant, as tenant in common of an undivided interest in the reversion, after the life estate of her father, can maintain a suit for partition against the other tenants in common of the reversion before the expiration of the life estate.
The first of these questions is principally one of fact, as to which the evidence is somewhat conflicting, and its decision is important only as determining the relative interests of the complainant and the other parties to the suit in the land in controversy. The undisputed facts show that, whichever way the question is decided, the parties to the suit are all tenants in common of the reversion, and...
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Deadman v. Yantis
...to partition is well-established law in this state. Scoville v. Hilliard, 48 Ill. 453;Hartmann v. Hartmann, 59 Ill. 103;Drake v. Merkle, 153 Ill. 318, 38 N. E. 654;Ruddell v. Wren, 208 Ill. 508, 70 N. E. 751;Miller v. Lanning, 211 Ill. 620, 71 N. E. 1115;Dee v. Dee, 212 Ill. 338, 72 N. E. 4......
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Baskins v. Krepcik
...is true although the whole premises are subject to a life estate which is unexpired. Scoville v. Hilliard, 48 Ill. 453; Drake v. Merkle, 153 Ill. 318, 38 N.E. 654. Partition among remaindermen does not necessarily affect the estate of a life tenant, as the remainder, if not divisible, may b......
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Thomas v. Stoakes
...may be sold on execution or partitioned during the existence of the life estate. Scoville v. Hilliard, 48 Ill. 453;Drake v. Merkle, 153 Ill. 318, 38 N. E. 654;Miller v. Lanning, 211 Ill. 620, 71 N. E. 1115;Deadman v. Yantis, 230 Ill. 243, 82 N. E. 592,120 Am. St. Rep. 291. The decree is sup......
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Dee v. Dee
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