Drake v. Norfolk Steam Laundry Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 March 1923
• Citation: 116 S.E. 668
• Parties: DRAKE . v. NORFOLK STEAM LAUNDRY CORPORATION.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

116 S.E. 668

DRAKE .

v.NORFOLK STEAM LAUNDRY CORPORATION.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

March 15, 1923.

Rehearing Denied April 5, 1923.

Error to Circuit Court of City of Norfolk.

Action by Carolyn F. Drake against the Norfolk Steam Laundry Corporation. Verdict for plaintiff was set aside, and judgment entered for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and rendered.

Jonathan W. Old, Jr., and N. T. Green, both of Norfolk, for plaintiff in error.

S. Burnell Bragg, of Norfolk, for defendant in error.

KELLY, P. An automobile truck owned by the Norfolk Steam Laundry Corporation and driven by a colored man named Solomon Wilson collided with a Ford sedan in which Mrs. Carolyn F. Drake was a passenger. Mrs. Drake was severely injured, and brought this action for damages against the laundry corporation. There was a verdict in her favor, but the trial court set it aside and entered a final judgment for the defendant, and thereupon Mrs. Drake obtained this writ of error.

The alleged negligence of the truck driver is not seriously controverted. The sole question before us is whether the defendant can be held liable under the doctrine of respon-cleat superior for the consequences of the driver's negligent management of the truck.

Disregarding some very serious conflicts of evidence which must be considered as settled adversely to the defendant by the verdict, and stating the facts as the jury would have been warranted in finding them, the case is this: The defendant corporation operates a steam laundry on the north side of Main street between Chapel and Fenchurch streets in the city of Norfolk. In the rear of the block on Bermuda street (north of and parallel with Main street) it has a garage in which it keeps some of its trucks. South of Main street, in Foster's lane (which enters Main at right angles some distance east of the laundry), it has a stable in which are kept its horses and wagons and three of its trucks. The accompanying sketch, taken from a map used at the oral argument of this case, and conceded to be approximately correct, shows the situation. The figure 1 indicates the stable, 2 the laundry, 3 the point of collision, 4 the tailor shop (referred to below):

Solomon Wilson was an employee of the defendant corporation. He had been continuously In its service for eight or nine years, having lost only three days from his work during that time. He was known as the "stable man, " and his principal duty was to take care of the horses and wagons and the three trucks kept at the stable. He was not one of the truck drivers, but he was neverthe less often called upon as a general utility man, and had several times driven trucks for the defendant from Ocean View to Norfolk. It frequently happened that a truck would be left standing in front of the laundry at the close of the day's work, and in such cases it was not unusual for him to drive the truck to the stable and put it away. He had been doing this with the knowledge and sometimes at the request of the defendant for some time prior to the accident, and was warranted in regarding it, as he says he did regard it, a part of his duty.

The accident to Mrs. Drake occurred between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Just before moving the truck which collided with the Drake car Wilson had, at the express direction of the defendant's manager, unloaded another truck, driven it to the Bermuda Street garage, and put it away. He then returned to the laundry. There was at that time standing in front of the laundry and headed west on Main street one of the trucks which was regularly kept overnight at the stable, and it was this latter truck which Wilson was driving when the accident occurred. The regular driver of this particular vehicle was settling up his wage account with the laundry foreman, and Wilson remarked, either to the foreman or to the driver in the foreman's presence, that he "was going up Church street to get a suit of clothes before he put it [the truck] away." The foreman offered no objection. The suit of clothes re-ferred to was one which Wilson had left with a tailor on Church street about 6 1/2 blocks north from the laundry.

The truck in question could not be turned in Main street, and in order to reach the stable in Poster's lane, which, as shown above, was east of him, Wilson was obliged to start west and drive around a block or more, either to the north or to the south of the laundry. He could have gone west on Main street to Reid's lane, then south to Water street, and then east to Foster's lane; or he could have gone west on Main to Fenchurch, then north to Bermuda, then east to Chapel, then south to Main, and then east] to Foster's lane. The latter would perhaps have been the shorter route.

What Wilson actually did was to drive west on Main to Fenchurch, then north to Holt, then west to Church; and he was proceeding north on the latter street when the accident happened. The tailor shop was a block or two further north, between Charlotte and Wood streets, and his purpose was to get his clothes from the shop and come back to the stable at Foster's lane by way of Wood, Chapel, and Main streets.

Either of the nearer routes above indicated would have first taken Wilson, as he actually proceeded, west on Main street and in the opposite direction from the stable. One of these routes, perhaps the better one, would have taken him a short distance north on Fenchurch, still further away, and still in the opposite direction from the stable. Either route would have been somewhat indirect and circuitous. He would have taken one of these nearer routes if he had not wanted to stop at the tailor shop; but it is to be remembered that he had charge of the truck as the defendant's employee for the purpose of putting it away fori the night. His relationship as such employee accounted for his being at the wheel, and it was both the primary and ultimate object of his trip to put the truck in the stable. It was not a case of a driver taking a vehicle for purposes of his own, either with or without authority from the owner, but a case of going out of the way for purposes of his own on an errand which began and was to end in the service of the owner; and the deviation from the more direct route, though made for the convenience and accommodation of the driver, appears in this case to have been made with the knowledge and acquiescense of the owner's foreman. If the collision had not occurred, the entire trip, including the stop for the suit of clothes, would have been completed in not exceeding 15 minutes.

The foregoing are the facts as shown by the evidence which tend to support the verdict, and upon such facts we must decide the case. The evidence for the defendant was in many respects to the contrary, and would, if fully credited, entitle the defendant to a verdict and judgment; but the jury settled in favor of the plaintiff all conflicts in the evidence.

The general rule of law applicable to the case may be regarded as reasonably well settled. As said by Judge Saunders, speaking for this court in Kidd v. DeWitt, 128 Va. 438, 443, 105 S. E. 124, 125:

"The rule 7>r condition of liability is simple enough, and readily stated, but it is often a vexatious and perplexing question to determine whether upon some particular state of facts the master is charged with liability. The basis of liability is that one who...