Draper Mach. Works, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources
| Decision Date | 05 September 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 57499-5,57499-5 |
| Parties | DRAPER MACHINE WORKS, INC., a Washington Corporation, d/b/a Salmon Bay Marina, Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Christa L. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for appellants.
Lane, Powell, Spears, Lubersky, Gail E. Mautner, Michael L. Cohen, Michael B. King, Paul D. Swanson, Seattle, for respondent.
The issues in this case concern the Department of Natural Resources' statutory authority to collect rent for use of state-owned waterways and Draper Machine Works' right to maintain a marina in such a waterway. The trial court concluded the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has no authority to enter into rental agreements for use of waterways and therefore declared void a lease of waterway between Draper Machine Works (respondent) and DNR. It further held that respondent has an equitable right to occupy the waterway and therefore entered a summary judgment order to that effect in favor of respondent. We reverse and remand.
In 1896 respondent's predecessor bought uplands (land above high tide) and tidelands (lands between ordinary high and extreme low tide) from the State. These lands were located on the south side of Salmon Bay. Salmon Bay is a body of water that runs generally east-west between Puget Sound on the west and Lake Union on the east. At that time, Salmon Bay was connected to Puget Sound. See Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 460, 116 P. 19 (1911). Respondent's predecessor's tidelands extended north, out to a waterway line which had been established in 1894. On the other (north) side of the waterway line was the Salmon Bay waterway which had been established by the State to provide unimpeded navigation through the Bay. Coterminous with the waterway line was a federal pierhead line which was established at essentially the same time and served essentially the same function as the waterway line relative to unimpeded navigation. This unimpeded navigation was necessary because the state and federal governments had decided to run the Lake Washington Ship Canal through Salmon Bay and Lake Union.
The ship canal was eventually completed and in 1949 the federal government moved the federal pierhead line north of its prior location, so that the federal pierhead line was no longer coterminous with the state waterway line. The federal government does not dredge landward of its pierhead lines. 33 U.S.C. § 628 (1988). This left a stretch of waterway between the waterway line and the federal pierhead line (referred to herein as the intervening waterway) which was no longer being dredged and which was no longer considered by the federal government to be necessary for navigation in the ship canal.
Respondent, which had purchased the abutting tidelands 1 and uplands from its predecessor in 1945, sought to purchase this intervening waterway area in 1957. The State refused to sell. In 1959 respondent tried again, this time seeking to lease the intervening waterway. The State, through DNR, agreed and entered into a 10-year "lease" of "unplatted tidelands" with respondent which was renewed in 1969. This renewal expired in 1984. Respondent has constructed boat moorage facilities on its own tidelands and on this intervening area of the waterway (mostly on the waterway).
In 1979 DNR sought an increase in rent to bring the rent for the intervening waterway up to fair market rental. Respondent objected, stopped paying rent, and filed an action in 1980 seeking quiet title to the intervening waterway and return of rent "wrongfully" paid to DNR. DNR counterclaimed seeking to compel respondent to pay its rent, and moved for summary judgment dismissal of respondent's claim. In 1983 the King County Superior Court granted partial summary judgment to DNR, holding that the State, not respondent, owned the intervening waterway. The only issue left open was DNR's counterclaim for unpaid rent.
In 1984, respondent filed a "Reply and Request for Additional Relief". In this pleading it asserted, ostensibly as defenses to DNR's counterclaim, additional rights to relief which had not been pleaded in its original complaint. Namely, it asserted that it had an equitable "right of access" across the waterway under Commercial Waterway Dist. 1 v. Permanente Cement Co., 61 Wash.2d 509, 512-13, 379 P.2d 178 (1963), which in effect gave it the right to occupy the waterway with its moorage slips. It also asserted that the "leases" it had entered into with DNR were not authorized by statute and were therefore void. It therefore again sought return of the rent it had already paid DNR.
In 1990 respondent moved for summary judgment on these grounds, and also sought denial of DNR's counterclaim for unpaid rent. DNR filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the "right to occupy" issue. The trial court granted respondent's motion and denied DNR's. In granting respondent's motion, however, the trial court only allowed respondent to recover the rent it had paid for the 3 years prior to 1984. This was because the court felt the action to recover the improperly paid rent was an action on an unwritten contract and therefore covered by the 3-year statute of limitations, and respondent's claim for refund of the improperly collected rents dated from the 1984 "Reply and Request for Additional Relief" rather than the 1980 complaint.
DNR appealed the trial court's decision as to the invalidity of the lease and respondent's "right of access". Respondent cross-appealed the trial court's application of the 3-year statute of limitations and its use of 1984 as the date from which the statute began to run. Certification to this court was accepted.
The parties raise a number of issues. Because of our disposition of this case, however, we need only address two of them: whether DNR has authority to collect rent under RCW 79.93.010 and .040, and whether respondent's "right of access" claim is properly before us on the facts of this case. Both of these questions are questions of law which we review de novo on appeal of a summary judgment order. DuVon v. Rockwell Int'l, 116 Wash.2d 749, 753, 807 P.2d 876 (1991).
Respondent argues that RCW 79.93.010 precludes DNR from collecting rent for respondent's occupation of the disputed portion of the waterway. RCW 79.93.010 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the department of natural resources simultaneously with the establishment of harbor lines and the determination of harbor areas in front of any city or town, or as soon thereafter as practicable, to ...
... establish one or more public waterways not less than fifty nor more than one thousand feet wide, beginning at the outer harbor line and extending inland across the tidelands belonging to the state. These waterways shall include within their boundaries, as nearly as practicable, all navigable streams running through such tidelands, and shall be located at such other places as in the judgment of the department may be necessary for the present and future convenience of commerce and navigation. All waterways shall be reserved from sale or lease and remain as public highways for watercraft until vacated as provided for in this chapter.
(Italics ours.)
DNR counters with RCW 79.93.040, which provides in pertinent part:
If the United States government has established pierhead lines within a waterway created under the laws of this state at any distance from the boundaries established by the state, structures may be constructed in that strip of waterway between the waterway boundary and the nearest pierhead line only with the consent of the department of natural resources and upon such plans, terms, and conditions and for such term as determined by the department. However, no permit shall extend for a period longer than thirty years.
The department may cancel any permit upon sixty days' notice for a substantial breach by the permittee of any of the permit conditions.
If a waterway is within the territorial limits of a port district, the duties assigned by this section to the department may be exercised by the port commission of such port district as provided in RCW 79.90.475.
(Italics ours.) DNR contends that rent is one of the "terms and conditions" allowed for by RCW 79.93.040.
To resolve this apparent conflict between statutes, we must attempt to give effect to the Legislature's intent in enacting them, as expressed in the statutes. Martin v. Meier, 111 Wash.2d 471, 479, 760 P.2d 925 (1988). We also must attempt to read the two statutes so as to give each effect and to harmonize each with the other. Avlonitis v. Seattle Dist. Court, 97 Wash.2d 131, 138, 641 P.2d 169, 646 P.2d 128 (1982).
In order to understand the legislative intent in enacting these two statutes, it is necessary to put this dispute in the context of the larger picture of the State's overall management of its aquatic lands. Washington, unlike most states, claims absolute fee simple ownership of the land underlying its waters. Const. art. 17, § 1; Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 64, 65 L.Ed. 500, 41 S.Ct. 237 (1921); Davidson v. State, 116 Wash.2d 13, 16, 802 P.2d 1374 (1991). This land is divided into a number of categories, depending on the land's location and function.
Tidelands are lands located under tide-influenced water, between the line of ordinary high and extreme low tides. RCW 79.90.030, .035. Shorelands are basically the freshwater equivalent of tidelands. RCW 79.90.040, .045. Both shorelands and tidelands, while originally owned by the State, can usually be sold and leased to individuals. RCW 79.90.090, .100. The general rule is that lands lying waterward of shorelands and tidelands cannot be sold or leased.
Harbor areas are areas reserved for wharves and other...
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