Draper v. Coombs

Decision Date24 June 1986
Docket NumberNo. 83-4026,83-4026
PartiesRobert DRAPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Davis S. COOMBS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Robert A. Draper, pro se.

Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Don G. Daniels, Olympia, Wash., Harry Auerbach, Portland, Ore., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon (Portland).

Before SCHROEDER, FARRIS and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiff brought this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action pro se against the State of Washington, two Washington State Troopers, Clark County, Washington and several county officials, the City of Portland, and three Portland police officers. Although he asserted a number of claims, his primary contention is that he was extradited from Oregon to Washington in violation of federal and state extradition statutes. He also challenges the legality of the towing of his automobile after his arrest. The district court dismissed some of his claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the remaining ones. We hold that the plaintiff properly pleaded section 1983 claims based on his extradition in violation of the federal and state extradition statutes and for the towing of his automobile pursuant to an unconstitutional municipal ordinance, and that the award of summary judgment on those claims was improper except with respect to the claims against the State of Washington.

I. FACTS

In July 1980, Robert A. Draper, accompanied by three passengers, was driving his automobile south on Interstate Highway 5 in the State of Washington toward the Oregon border. While still in Washington, Washington State Patrol Trooper Coombs attempted to stop the automobile because Draper was driving erratically and in excess of the speed limit. He continued to drive in that manner, with Trooper Coombs in pursuit, across the state line into Oregon.

Trooper Coombs pursued Draper to Portland, Oregon where he subsequently forced Draper to stop. Coombs detained Draper and the passengers and awaited the arrival of police officers from the City of Portland whom he had called for assistance. When Portland Police Officers John Goff and John Garvey arrived at the scene, the officers from the two jurisdictions discussed the question whether Draper would be taken into custody by Coombs for return to Washington or would be arrested by the Portland police officers and initially detained in Oregon. In hopes of clarifying the apparent uncertainty as to the proper procedure to be followed, Coombs conferred with his superior, Sergeant Cook, while the Portland officers conferred with their superior, Sergeant Dick. Following these consultations, Coombs arrested Draper for "attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle" and transported him to Clark County Jail in Washington.

After Draper's arrest, the Portland officers ordered Draper's automobile towed away by Sam's Towing, a private towing company. Later that same day, Draper's daughter, one of the three passengers in his car at the time of the arrest, attempted to recover the automobile from the towing company. Sam's required her to pay $53.95, in towing and other charges, before it would release the automobile. After the charges were paid, Sam's released the automobile.

Draper was convicted in Washington state court under a Washington statute for attempting to elude a Washington trooper. 1 He was sentenced to serve a five year term in the Washington State Penitentiary.

Draper filed this pro se action seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) from the State of Washington, Trooper Coombs and Sergeant Cook, Clark County, Washington and several county officials ("Clark County defendants"), the City of Portland, Portland Police Officers Goff and Garvey, and Sergeant Dick. The district court first dismissed the claims against the Clark County defendants and then those against the State of Washington. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment on the claims against the remainder of the defendants.

II. THE IMMUNITY OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON AND THE WASHINGTON STATE TROOPERS UNDER THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. Section 1983 Claims Against the State of Washington

The district court dismissed Draper's 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claims against the State of Washington. Because the eleventh amendment 2 bars the federal courts from considering such claims, we affirm their dismissal. 3 We have emphasized that "[u]nder the Eleventh Amendment, states that have not consented to suit are immune from [42 U.S.C.] Sec. 1983 suits in federal court." McConnell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 117 (9th Cir.1981) (citing Ouern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)). Draper alleges that, by enacting Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 4.92.010-4.92.200, the State of Washington waived any immunity that it might enjoy. However, we have previously held that those provisions do not expressly and unequivocally waive Washington's eleventh amendment immunity. McConnell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 117 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1981). Accordingly, we must reject Draper's argument.

B. Section 1983 Claims against the Washington State Troopers

Draper's section 1983 claims allege that, by extraditing him to Washington from Oregon without a hearing, Washington State Trooper Coombs and Sergeant Cook, among others, violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights, as well as his rights under state law. "The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when 'the state is the real, substantial party in interest.' " Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 359, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945)); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 810, 83 L.Ed.2d 803 (1985). Although Cook and Coombs do not specifically urge that the eleventh amendment bars the claims against them, the eleventh amendment "is a limitation on federal subject-matter jurisdiction" that we are obligated to consider fully. Demery v. Kupperman, id. at 1149 n. 8.

If found to have violated an individual's federal constitutional or statutory rights, a state official may be held personally liable for damages. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686-87, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d at 1146. Here, Draper seeks only to recover damages from Trooper Coombs and Sergeant Cook personally. The State of Washington therefore is in no way "the real substantial party in interest." 4 Accordingly, Draper is not barred by the eleventh amendment from seeking damages under section 1983 from Cook and Coombs personally. 5

III. DRAPER'S SECTION 1983 CLAIM BASED ON THE EXTRADITION FROM OREGON TO WASHINGTON

Draper pleaded 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claims against the Washington State Troopers and the Portland police officers contending that they failed to follow the extradition procedures required by federal and state law. After holding that his claims were otherwise legally sufficient, the district court dismissed them on the ground that Draper's subsequent criminal conviction demonstrated that he had suffered no actual damages. We agree with the district court that Draper properly stated section 1983 claims for the law enforcement officers' failure to comply with the federal and state extradition statutes, statutes that implement a clause of the United States Constitution. We hold, however, that an absence of actual damages would not be fatal to those claims.

A. Section 1983 Claim for Violation of Federal Statute

Draper bases one of his section 1983 claims on the Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution, 6 and its implementing statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3182 (1982). Section 3182 provides that

[w]henever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.

The Washington and Portland law enforcement officers do not dispute the fact that they failed to comply with the minimal procedures set forth in section 3182. Rather, the defendants argue that, for a variety of reasons, a section 1983 action cannot be based on a violation of section 3182. We disagree.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws " by a person acting under color of state law. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has held that "laws" in section 1983 includes federal statutes and that a violation of a federal statute may, at least in some instances, serve as the basis for a section 1983 action. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980).

The extradition statute implements a provision of the United States Constitution. The Constitutional provision and the implementing statute were "intended to...

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