Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 September 1997
• Citation: Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 662 N.Y.S.2d 535, 231 A.D.2d 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
• Parties: , 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 7536 Caryn DRATTEL, etc., et al., Appellants, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 535

662 N.Y.S.2d 535

231 A.D.2d 326, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 7536

Caryn DRATTEL, etc., et al., Appellants, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, et al., Respondents et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Sept. 15, 1997.

Harry H. Lipsig & Partners, P.C., New York City (Arthur H. Bryant, Alan M. Shapey, and Brian I. Isaac, of counsel), for appellants.

Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, New York City (Eric A. Portuguese and Steven B. Prystowsky, of counsel), for respondents.

Mayer, Brown & Platt, Washington, DC (Kenneth S. Geller, Erika Z. Jones, John J. Sullivan, and Lily Fu Swenson, of counsel), for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., amicus curiae.

Before O'BRIEN, J.P., and THOMPSON, PIZZUTO, FRIEDMANN and GOLDSTEIN, JJ.

O'BRIEN, Justice Presiding.

The plaintiff Caryn Drattel was injured in an automobile accident while driving her 1991 Toyota Tercel. At the time of the collision, she was wearing both a shoulder harness and a lap belt. The plaintiffs commenced this action against the manufacturer and distributors of the Tercel (hereinafter referred to collectively as Toyota) and against the owner and driver of the other vehicle. The allegations in the complaint included claims that the Tercel was defectively designed and failed to provide adequate protection to its occupants in the event of a collision. The plaintiffs intended to prove, inter alia, that a safer alternative design included a driver's side air bag.

Toyota moved, inter alia, for partial summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint to the extent that it relied upon the absence of an air bag. Toyota argued that any claims based on the absence of an air bag were preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (hereinafter the Safety Act) (49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq.) and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (hereinafter Standard 208) (49 CFR 571.208).

The preemption clause of the Safety Act states:

"When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter" (49 U.S.C. § 30103[b][1] ).

Standard 208 gives automobile manufacturers three possible ways to comply with the minimum safety standards for passenger restraints. The installation of air bags is an option but it is not mandatory.

The trial court, based upon the decision of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Panarites v. Williams, 216 A.D.2d 874, 629 N.Y.S.2d 359, concluded that the plaintiffs' common-law claims, insofar as they were based on the absence of an air bag, were preempted by Federal law (see also, Gardner v. Honda Motor Co., 145 A.D.2d 41, 536 N.Y.S.2d 303). Because Standard 208 gives automobile manufacturers the choice of whether to install air bags or a different passive restraint system, the court reasoned that permitting such common-law claims would, in effect, impose a standard which was not "identical" to the Federal standard. We disagree and reinstate the complaint against Toyota in its entirety.

Preemption of State-law causes of action should not be assumed but requires clear evidence that such was Congress' intent (see, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996)). Upon consideration of the purpose of the Safety Act, its language and its legislative history, we conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt State common-law claims.

The statute was enacted to reduce traffic accidents and the death and injuries from such accidents (see, 49 U.S.C. § 30101; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474, 477 (C.A.D.C.1986), cert. denied New York v. Dole, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1616, 94 L.Ed.2d 800 (1987); Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2nd Cir.1969)). The safety standards for manufacturers, promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, are intended to provide minimum standards for equipment performance (see, 49 U.S.C. § 30102[a][9]; Association of Intern Auto. Mfrs. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602 (2nd Cir.1996)).

The express preemption clause uses the term "standard" (49 U.S.C. § 30103[b][1] ), which the Supreme Court, Kings County, interpreted to encompass the general duties imposed by State common law. The issue of whether the term "standard" includes State common law was left open by the United States Supreme Court in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 1487, n. 3, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995). We conclude that the term "standard" refers to specific statutory or regulatory enactments (see, e.g., Perez v. Mini-Max Stores, 231 A.D.2d 162, 661 N.Y.S.2d 659), and is more limited in scope than the word "requirement" which has been construed to include State common-law duties (see, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,supra; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992); Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb, 230 A.D.2d 77, 656 N.Y.S.2d 16; Warner v. American Fluoride Corp., 204 A.D.2d 1, 616 N.Y.S.2d 534). Certainly, Congress could have explicitly included State common law in the preemption clause if that was its intent (see, e.g., CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 662, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1736-37, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) [the broad phrases in the preemption clause in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, which referred to any State "law, rule, regulation, order or standard", included legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law] ).

In any event, even if the preemption clause could be considered ambiguous, when it is considered in conjunction with the statute's savings clause and legislative history, it is clear that Congress did not intend to preempt State common-law claims (see, Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 140 N.H. 203, 665 A.2d 345 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1072, 116 S.Ct. 773, 133 L.Ed.2d 726 (1996)). The savings clause provides that compliance with a Federal safety standard "does not exempt a person from liability at common law" (49 U.S.C. § 30103[e] ). The legislative history confirms that Congress did not intend compliance with the Federal minimum safety standards to shield automobile manufacturers from common-law liability (see, Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 650 F.Supp. 922, 926-927 (E.D.N.Y.1987)).

Toyota contends that even if State common-law claims are not expressly preempted by the Safety Act, the doctrine of implied preemption precludes such claims (see generally, Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, supra). A Federal statute impliedly preempts State law "when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively * * * or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law" (Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, supra, 514 U.S. at 287, 115 S.Ct. at 1487; see also, Guice v. Schwab & Co., 89 N.Y.2d 31, 39, 651 N.Y.S.2d 352, 674 N.E.2d 282, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1250, 137 L.Ed.2d 331). Implied conflict preemption exists when it is impossible for a person to comply with both State and Federal requirements or when State law interferes with the accomplishment of Congress' objectives (see, Guice v. Schwab & Co., supra).

Where, as here, the language of the preemptive and savings clauses establish Congress' intent to exclude common-law claims from the statute's preemptive reach, it is not necessary to consider implied preemption (see, Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327 [Ind.1996]; Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., supra; see also, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra). Toyota's argument fails, in any event, because the savings clause and the legislative history establish that Congress did not consider it necessary, in order to accomplish its statutory objectives, to shield automobile manufacturers from State common-law tort claims. Moreover, a finding in the plaintiffs' favor that a driver's side air bag was a safer design alternative (see, Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 450 N.E.2d 204), would not conflict with Standard 208, which permits automobile manufacturers to choose among alternative passive restraint systems (see, Wilson v. Pleasant,supra).

Accordingly, the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, that branch of Toyota's motion which was for partial summary judgment dismissing the complaint to the extent that it alleged that Toyota was negligent in failing to supply a driver's side air bag is denied, and the complaint against Toyota is reinstated in its entirety.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the motion of the defendants Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., and Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., which was for partial summary judgment dismissing the complaint to the extent that it alleged that they were negligent in failing to supply a driver's side air bag is denied, and the complaint against those defendants is reinstated in its entirety.

FRIEDMANN and GOLDSTEIN, JJ., concur.

PIZZUTO, Justice (dissenting).

The Federal law permits a manufacturer of automobiles to satisfy Federal passive restraint standards by the installation of air bags or other stated devices, such as specified types of seat belts (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 49 CFR 571.208) (hereinafter Standard 208). There is no allegation here that the respondents have failed to comply with these Federal standards. With regard to these standards, 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) states, in pertinent part:

"Preemption--(1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical...