Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1998
• Citation: 677 N.Y.S.2d 17,92 N.Y.2d 35,699 N.E.2d 376
• Parties: , 699 N.E.2d 376, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,444, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 5953 Caryn DRATTEL et al., Respondents, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 17

677 N.Y.S.2d 17

92 N.Y.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 376,

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,444,

1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 5953

Caryn DRATTEL et al., Respondents, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 16, 1998.

Lester, Schwab, Katz & Dwyer, New York City (Eric A. Portuguese, Harold Lee Schwab and Steven B. Prystowsky, of counsel), for appellants.

Lipsig, Shapey, Manus & Moverman, P.C., New York City (Arthur H. Bryant, Alan M. Shapey and Brian J. Isaac, of counsel), for respondents.

Mayer, Brown & Platt (Kenneth S. Geller, Washington, DC, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., amicus curiae.

Coben & Associates (Larry E. Coben, Scottsdale, AZ, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), and John C. Cherundolo, New York City, for New York State Trial Lawyers Association, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

This Court must determine whether the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 preempts a State common-law action. The lawsuit is against a manufacturer, based on the theory of defective design due to the absence of an air bag in a 1991 Toyota Tercel. We conclude that the plaintiffs' common-law claim was not preempted by the Congressional Safety Act under any of the propounded theories.

Supreme Court granted defendant Toyota Motor Corporation's motion for partial summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, denied the motion and reinstated the complaint against the Toyota defendants in its entirety. The Appellate Division granted Toyota leave to appeal, certifying the standard question as to the correctness of its order. Because our answer is that the intermediate appellate court ruled correctly, we now affirm its order.

I.

Plaintiff Caryn Drattel was injured while driving her 1991 Toyota Tercel. At the time of the accident, she was wearing both a shoulder harness and a lap seat belt. Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer and distributors of the automobile (as well as the owner and driver of the other vehicle). Plaintiffs alleged defective design and failure to provide adequate safety protection, particularly because of the absence of a safer alternative design--a driver's-side air bag.

Supreme Court found that plaintiff's State claims were preempted by Federal law. The court relied principally on a Fourth Department, Appellate Division, case which found express preemption (see, Panarites v. Williams, 216 A.D.2d 874, 629 N.Y.S.2d 359; see also, Gardner v. Honda Motor Co., 145 A.D.2d 41, 536 N.Y.S.2d 303, lv. dismissed 74 N.Y.2d 715, 543 N.Y.S.2d 401, 541 N.E.2d 430). The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed in the instant case, finding that plaintiffs' claims were not preempted (231 A.D.2d 326, 662 N.Y.S.2d 535). The court concluded that based upon the language and purpose of the Safety Act, and its legislative history, Congress did not intend to preempt State common-law claims (id., at 328, 662 N.Y.S.2d 535). Two Justices dissented; they agreed with Supreme Court and urged the view that Congress intended to preempt common-law claims (id., at 330-334, 662 N.Y.S.2d 535).

II.

In 1966, Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (former 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. [recodified in 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. (1994) "without substantive change"] ). Congress expressly declared that the purpose of the Safety Act was "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents" (former 15 U.S.C. § 1381; see, S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2709, 2720 [noting that the Act reflects "the soaring rate of death and debilitation on the Nation's highways"] ). Congress determined that in order to achieve this stated goal it was "necessary to establish motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and equipment in interstate commerce" (former 15 U.S.C. § 1381).

Congress defined the term "safety standard" as "a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance, which is practicable, which meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which provides objective criteria" (former 15 U.S.C. § 1391[2] [emphasis added] ). Solely at issue in the instant case is Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (49 CFR § 571.208). It gives automobile manufacturers three options to comply with the minimum safety standards, the installation of air bags being just one of the alternatives.

The Safety Act includes two sections that are critical to resolving this case. First, the preemption clause states:

"Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment[,] any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard " (former 15 U.S.C. § 1392[d] [emphasis added] ).

Correspondingly, a savings clause exception to the already limited preemption clause is also expressly included:

"Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this title does not exempt any person from any liability under common law " (former 15 U.S.C. § 1397[k] [emphasis added] ).

Within that matrix, we now turn to the particular preemption problem in this case. Toyota, as appellant, contends that the Safety Act expressly preempts nonidentical State standards, including standards emanating out of State tort law. Alternatively, Toyota argues that plaintiffs' claim is impliedly preempted by Federal law. It advances a number of theories in this regard: (1) a common-law tort standard requiring air bags would destroy the options and flexibility at the heart of the Federal statute; (2) no-airbag claims would destroy the Federal goal of uniform national standards; (3) the assertion of an express preemption clause does not bar a traditional implied preemption analysis; and (4) the general savings clause does not preserve common-law claims that conflict with Federal law.

Plaintiffs counter that the express preemption provision, savings clause and legislative history of the Safety Act preserve their claims. Additionally, plaintiffs contend that the implied preemption question should not even be reached because Congress expressly preserved the pursuit of common-law State claims. Alternatively, plaintiffs urge that their claims are not impliedly preempted, in any event, because they do not conflict with the Safety Act or accompanying regulations.

III.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that Federal laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; * * * any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding" (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. [2] ). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by * * * Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress' " (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, quoting Rice v. Santa Fe El. Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447). The High Court has "oft-repeated" that " '[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' " of every preemptive analysis (Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700, quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179). Pointedly, this Court has also summarized the guiding principle that a "preemption question is ultimately one of congressional intent" (Guice v. Schwab & Co., 89 N.Y.2d 31, 39, 651 N.Y.S.2d 352, 674 N.E.2d 282, cert. denied 520 U.S. 1118, 117 S.Ct. 1250, 137 L.Ed.2d 331).

Congressional preemptive intent may be discerned in three ways: (1) expressly in the language of the Federal statute; (2) implicitly, when the Federal legislation is so comprehensive in scope that it is inferable that Congress intended to fully occupy the "field" of its subject matter; or (3) implicitly, when State law actually "conflicts" with Federal law (Guice v. Schwab & Co., 89 N.Y.2d 31, 39, 651 N.Y.S.2d 352, 674 N.E.2d 282, supra ). The last category may be triggered when it is impossible to comply with both Federal and State laws, or when the State law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" (City of New York v. Job-Lot Pushcart, 88 N.Y.2d 163, 170, 643 N.Y.S.2d 944, 666 N.E.2d 537, cert. denied sub nom. JA-RU v. City of New York, 519 U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 186, 136 L.Ed.2d 124; see, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581; Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237).

IV.

We address express preemption first. A trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases must be discussed, analyzed and harmonized to fit a proper resolution of the instant dispute into the complex universe of principles and precedents (see, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, supra; Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116...