Drawbridge v. Schenectady Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.

• Docket Number: 1:21-CV-117 (FJS/CFH)
• Decision Date: 01 August 2023
• Parties: TIMOTHY DRAWBRIDGE, TIMOTHY J. DRAWBRIDGE, SR. and JOSEPHINE T. DRAWBRIDGE, Plaintiffs, v. SCHENECTADY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, SCHENECTADY COUNTY, and NORTHEAST PARENT AND CHILD SERVICES, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

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TIMOTHY DRAWBRIDGE, TIMOTHY J. DRAWBRIDGE, SR. and JOSEPHINE T. DRAWBRIDGE, Plaintiffs, v. SCHENECTADY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, SCHENECTADY COUNTY, and NORTHEAST PARENT AND CHILD SERVICES, INC., Defendants.

No. 1:21-CV-117 (FJS/CFH)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

August 1, 2023

Cometti Law Firm P.O. Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Goldberg Segalla, LLP Attorneys for Defendants Schenectady Department of Social Services and Schenectady County

Black Marjieh & Sanford LLP Attorneys for Defendant Northeast Parent & Child Society, Inc.

Mario D. Cometti, Esq.

Johathan M. Bernstein, Esq. Maria K. Dyson, Esq.

Sheryl Sanford, Esq. Cassandra Chiaramonte, Esq. Corinne M. Scotti Esq.

Frederick J. Scullin, Jr. Senior United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court are the following motions: (1) Defendants Schenectady County and Schenectady County Department of Social Services' (collectively "Defendant County") motion to dismiss Count IV of the Amended Complaint asserting negligence as time barred pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) Defendant County's motion to dismiss with prejudice Counts I, II, III and IV of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all cross-claims, punitive damages, as well as any and all claims that Plaintiffs Timothy J. Drawbridge, Sr. and Josephine T. Drawbridge (collectively "Plaintiff Grandparents") have asserted; and (3) Defendant County's motion to dismiss the entire complaint against Defendant Schenectady County's Department of Social Services as duplicative.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary matters

Plaintiffs have stated that they have no objection to Defendant County's motion to dismiss Count IV of the Amended Complaint, which asserts a state-law claim of negligence, as time barred. Nor do Plaintiffs have any objection to Defendant County's motion to dismiss all of the claims against Defendant Schenectady County's Department of Social Services ("DSS"). Accordingly the Court grants Defendant County's motion to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims against DSS because DSS is not a suable entity and Plaintiffs' state-law negligence claim against Defendant County as time-barred.

B. Defendant County's motion to dismiss the claims of Plaintiff Grandparents

In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant County through its Department of Social Services ("DSS") refused Plaintiff Grandparents access to their granddaughter during all relevant state-court proceedings. See Dkt. No. 44, Plaintiffs' Opposition Memorandum of Law, at 21 (citing [Amended Complaint at ¶]¶ 75-77). Specifically, they assert that, "[d]espite repeated requests by [Plaintiff] Father, . . . [Plaintiff] Grandparents were precluded from seeing their Granddaughter, when prior to the relevant proceedings they would see her substantially. Thus [Defendant] County expressly prohibited [Plaintiff] Grandparents from exercising their relationship with the[ir granddaughter], utilizing the egregious circumstances and legal proceedings brought against [Plaintiff] Father as a basis." See id. at 22. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that, "[a]t all times relevant herein, [Plaintiff Grandparents] had constitutional rights, including the right to enjoy time and associate with their Grandchild." See Dkt. No. 11, Amended Complaint, at ¶ 127. Finally, in general terms, Plaintiffs assert that "each of the employees and personnel of Schenectady County DSS conspired, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of Equal Protection of the law, substantive and procedural due process." See id. at ¶ 133.

In Finch v. City of New York, 591 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the plaintiff grandmother brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming damages for due process violations that she alleged the defendant and its employees committed by not placing her grandchild into her custody and restricting her visitation rights with her grandchild.

The court began its analysis by noting that "[c]ourts '"examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient."'" Finch, 591 F.Supp.2d at 358-59 (quoting Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 998 (quoting Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989))). Furthermore,

[t]he court determines what process is due by considering three factors: first, the private liberty or property interest that will be affected by the official action, second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the value of any alternative or substitute procedural safeguards, and third, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. at 359 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

Finally, the court concluded that "the lack of federal case law identifying or defining a grandparent's constitutional right to visit her grandchildren suggests that [defendant] did not deny [plaintiff] any constitutionally protected liberty interest"; and, therefore, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment concerning the plaintiff's claimed damages for restricted visitation See id. at 362. Other courts that have addressed this issue have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Brown v. Ives, 129 F.3d 209, 211 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding grandfather's due process right to family integrity is not clearly established); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir 1995) (holding grandparents had no substantive due process right to grandchildren); Wiley as next friend of C.S.B. v. Dunbar, No. 6:20-CV-01059-ADA-JCM, 2021 WL 4622424, *5 (W.D. Tex. July 28, 2021) (noting that "[s]everal federal courts have held that a non-custodial grandparent does not possess either a substantive due process right to family integrity and association or a liberty interest in visitation" (citations omitted)); Buck v. Greenlee, No. 3:10-cv-540-RJC-DSC, 2011 WL 4595262, *7 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 30, 2011) (stating that "Grandparents have no constitutional right to visitation" (citation omitted)), aff'd, 465 Fed.Appx. 244 (4th Cir. 2012)); Garmhausen v. Holder, 757 F.Supp.2d 123, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that "[t]he Grandparents cannot assert a cause of action under Bivens related to the grandparental visitation order because they lack a constitutional right upon which to base their claim. The Supreme Court has held that grandparents do not have a recognized liberty interest in visitation as against an unwilling mother. (citing Traxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000))); Bellet v. City of Buffalo, No. 03-CV-27S, 2009 WL 2930464, *5 n.7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009) (stating that "[t]here is no constitutional right to visitation by grandparents" (citation omitted)).

Based on the above-cited case law, the Court finds that Plaintiff Grandparents have no constitutional right to visitation with their granddaughter. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant County's motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff Grandparents' claims against it.

C. Defendant County's motion to dismiss Counts II and III of the Amended Complaint

In Count II of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that "each of the employees and personnel of Schenectady County DSS conspired, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of Equal Protection of the law, substantive and procedural due process." See Dkt. No. 11, Amended Complaint, at ¶ 133.

As Defendant County notes in its motion to dismiss Count II, such a cause of action is barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. See Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 18-CV-03845 (JMA) (JMW), 2023 WL 2667076, *8 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2023) (explaining that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine ''posits that officers, agents and employees of a single corporate or municipal entity, each acting within the scope of his employment, are legally incapable of conspiring together'" (quoting Cruz, 2009 WL 2567990, at *6 (citing Hermann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[T]here is no conspiracy [under Section 1985] if the conspiratorial conduct challenged is essentially a single act by a single corporation acting exclusively through its own . . . officers[] and employees, each acting within the scope of his employment."))). Therefore, the Court grants Defendant County's motion to dismiss Count II of Plaintiffs' complaint.

In Count III of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, they allege another § 1983 conspiracy claim. See Dkt. No 11 at ¶¶ 138-145. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs allege that, "[a]fter the February 27, 2018 MDT Meeting Schenectady County DSS employees reached an agreement amongst themselves to frame [P]laintiff Timothy Drawbridge with allegations of neglect of his Child and for alleged violations of the 5/3/17 Order, and to thereby deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights ...." See id. at ¶ 139. They further allege that, "[i]ndependently, before and after the March 2018 Neglect Petitions, each of the employees and supervisors of the Schenectady County DSS further conspired, and continue to conspire, to deprive Plaintiff of exculpatory materials to which he was lawfully entitled and which would have led to his more timely exoneration of the false charges of neglect and violation as described in the various Paragraphs of this Complaint." See id. at ¶ 140. Finally, they allege that "the employees and including...