Drayton v. United States

Decision Date04 August 2020
Docket NumberNo. 2:98-cr-0751-DCN-2,2:98-cr-0751-DCN-2
Parties Hezekiah Bernard DRAYTON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

William Kenneth Witherspoon, US Attorneys Office, Columbia, SC, for Petitioner.

ORDER

DAVID C. NORTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on petitioner Hezekiah Bernard Drayton's ("Drayton") motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ECF No. 183. The government filed a motion for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 190. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part and denies in part Drayton's motion and grants the government's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2000, the government charged Drayton and his co-defendant George Moultrie ("Moultrie") in a six-count superseding indictment based on Drayton and Moultrie's participation in a May 25, 1998 armed robbery of a restaurant in North Charleston. ECF No. 74. The indictment named Drayton in five counts. On June 6, 2001, after a trial, a jury convicted Drayton on four of the counts charged against him: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) ("Count 1"); Hobbs Act Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 2 ("Count 2"); use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and 2 ("Count 4"); and felony possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 924(a)(2), and 924(e) ("Count 6").1

Prior to trial, the government filed an information informing Drayton of the government's intention to seek a mandatory life sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), which mandates that the court impose a life sentence upon "certain violent felons" where the convicted defendant has two previous convictions of "serious violent felonies" or one or more previous convictions of a "serious violent felony" and one or more convictions of a "serious drug offense." ECF No. 53. The government's information listed the following offenses as applicable previous convictions:

(1) Assault with Intent to Ravish, in the Court of General Sessions for Charleston County, South Carolina (September 12, 1967).
(2) Armed Robbery, in the Court of General Sessions for Charleston County, South Carolina (September 12, 1967).
(3) Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, in the Court of General Sessions for Richland County, South Carolina (March 30, 1976).
(4) Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature, in the Court of General Sessions for Richland County, South Carolina (on or about January 28, 1980).
(5) Possession of Cocaine for Distribution, in the Court of General Sessions for Charleston County, South Carolina (July 13, 1989).
(6) Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature, in the Court of General Sessions for Charleston County, South Carolina (July 13, 1989).
(7) Conspiracy and Drug Trafficking, in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina (October 3, 1995).

Id. at 1. On March 7, 2002, the court sentenced Drayton to an imprisonment term of life on Counts 1 and 2 and 360 months on Count 6, to run concurrently. The court further imposed an imprisonment term of 60 months on Count 4, to run consecutively with Drayton's sentence on Counts 1, 2, and 6.

On June 9, 2016, Drayton filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 183. On July 25, 2016, the government responded with a motion for partial summary judgment. ECF No. 190. In part, Drayton's motion seeks relief from his convictions based on the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). At that time, Johnson’s effect outside of the ACCA was unclear. On January 5, 2017, the court stayed the case, finding that forthcoming decisions in the Fourth Circuit would likely be instructive as to whether Drayton's § 924(c) conviction remained valid in light of Johnson. ECF No. 200. On March 12, 2020, the court lifted the stay and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing on how post- Johnson changes in the law affected Drayton's motion. ECF No. 205. On April 17, 2020, Drayton filed a supplemental § 2255 motion in response to the court's request. ECF No. 208. Unable to access the law library at his prison due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Drayton's supplemental brief requests that the court provide him with the materials necessary to research the relevant developments in the law. The government filed a response to Drayton's request on July 27, 2020. ECF No. 209. The motions are now ripe for the court's review.

II. STANDARD

Federal district courts are charged with liberally construing petitions filed by pro se litigants to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9–10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980). Pro se petitions are therefore held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Liberal construction, however, does not mean that a court may ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) :

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

The petitioner must prove the grounds for collateral attack by a preponderance of the evidence. See King v. United States, 2011 WL 3759730, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 24, 2011) (citing Miller v. United States, 261 F.2d 546, 547 (4th Cir. 1958) ). In deciding a § 2255 petition, the court shall grant a hearing, "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

III. DISCUSSION

Drayton's motion asserts three grounds for relief. First, Drayton argues that his life sentence is no longer valid under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). Second, Drayton contends that his conviction under § 924(c) is no longer valid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson. Third, Drayton argues that his conviction under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), is no longer valid, also based on Johnson. The court addresses each ground in turn.

A. Drayton's Life Sentence under § 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)

Drayton argues that he is entitled to relief on his life sentence because his two previous South Carolina convictions for Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature ("ABHAN") cannot serve as predicate offenses under § 3559(c) and, without those offenses, Drayton does not have the requisite convictions to trigger § 3559(c). 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) mandates that the court impose a life sentence upon "certain violent felons" where the defendant is presently convicted of a "serious violent felony" and has two previous convictions of "serious violent felonies" or one or more previous convictions of a "serious violent felony" and one or more convictions of a "serious drug offense." In response, the government agrees that Drayton's ABHAN convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses for the purposes of § 3559(c) and additionally concedes that three more of Drayton's previous convictions do not qualify as predicate crimes under the statute. The government explains that Drayton's assault with intent to ravish and armed robbery convictions from 1967 constitute a single conviction for the purposes of § 3559(c) because they "appear to have happened on the same day." See ECF No. 190-1 at 8; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A) (requiring that a person "has been convicted ... on separate prior occasions ..."). Further, the government also "concedes that Drayton's convictions for ... possession of cocaine for distribution[,] and conspiracy and drug trafficking do not count under the statute." ECF No. 190-1 at 8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F) and (H) ). Based on its concessions, the government concludes that Drayton's "sentences on Counts 1, 2[,] and 4 should be vacated and he [should be] resentenced under the correct sentencing guidelines." Id. at 8–9.

The court resolves the first ground of Drayton's motion in favor of Drayton without assessing the legal accuracy of the government's position that Drayton's previous convictions do not trigger § 3559(c). The government bases its concession on its assessment that five of Drayton's previous convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses under § 3559(c), but the record does not give the court sufficient information to determine the legal correctness of the government's position for two reasons. For one, the government does not provide an explanation for its conclusion that Drayton's convictions for "possession of cocaine for distribution" and "conspiracy and drug trafficking" do not qualify as "serious drug offenses" under § 3559(c)(2)(H). Moreover, the record is bereft of information from which the court could conduct an independent analysis and determine whether these convictions qualify as "serious drug offenses." Second, the government eliminates five of Drayton's previous convictions as potential predicate offenses under § 3559(c) but fails to explain why the remaining two crimes, one of which is a violent crime and one of which is a drug crime, fail to satisfy § 3559(c) ’s requirement that a defendant have at least one "serious drug offense" and one "serious violent felony".2 H...

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