Dreger v. New York State Thruway Authority

Citation609 N.E.2d 111,593 N.Y.S.2d 758,81 N.Y.2d 721
Parties, 609 N.E.2d 111 Walter DREGER et al., Appellants, v. NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY, Respondent. Patricia CHARBONNEAU, as Administratrix of the Estate of Roland Charbonneau, Deceased, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. Janet DALTON, as Administratrix of the Estate of Jackson C. Dalton, Deceased, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
Decision Date16 December 1992
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division in each case should be affirmed, with costs.

In each of these actions a claim against the State or the Thruway Authority was dismissed for failure to serve a copy of the claim on the Attorney-General in the manner prescribed by Court of Claims Act § 11. In Dreger, 177 A.D.2d 762, 575 N.Y.S.2d 743, the claimant served the Thruway Authority but neglected to serve the Attorney-General. In Charbonneau and Dalton, 178 A.D.2d 815, 577 N.Y.S.2d 534, copies of the claims were mailed to the Attorney-General but were not sent by certified mail as the statute requires. Because of these failures, the actions were subsequently dismissed and are now time-barred. Pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10(6) and CPLR 205(a), however, a party whose "timely commenced" action has been dismissed and is now time-barred may apply to the court for permission to recommence the action, provided the action was not dismissed for failure to prosecute or under other circumstances not relevant here. The question on appeal is whether these claimants failed to meet the statutory timely commencement requirement because of their failure to serve the Attorney-General properly.

The Court of Claims Act contains no recommencement provision of its own, but section 10(6) expressly incorporates the time limitations and tolling provisions of CPLR article 2, and section 9(9) requires that Court of Claims practice follow Supreme Court practice, unless other provisions are expressly made. Thus, these actions may be recommenced if they qualify for recommencement under CPLR 205(a). Claimants rely on our decision in Finnerty v. New York State Thruway Auth., 75 N.Y.2d 721, 551 N.Y.S.2d 188, 550 N.E.2d 441, where we held that the requirement of service on the Attorney-General could not be waived by the State because it implicated subject matter jurisdiction. They contend that it has long been the rule that recommencement under CPLR 205(a) or its predecessor is possible when a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was the basis for the dismissal of the prior action (George v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231, 390 N.E.2d 1156; Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E. 594). Inasmuch as Finnerty stated that failure to serve the Attorney General resulted in a loss of subject matter jurisdiction, they contend they are entitled to seek recommencement of their actions.

Resolution of these cases does not turn on whether proper service on the Attorney-General is characterized as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction or a condition precedent. CPLR 205(a) allows recommencement only where the prior action was "timely commenced." Accordingly, we look not to the characterization of the grounds for dismissal, but to the narrow question of what constitutes timely commencement. We have consistently held that, for purposes of CPLR 205(a) actions prior to the 1992 CPLR amendments (see, L.1992, ch. 216, §§ 2, 4), timely commencement requires literal compliance with the relevant statutes governing notice (Parker v. Mack, 61 N.Y.2d 114, 117, 472 N.Y.S.2d 882, 460 N.E.2d 1316; Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 288, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766, 461 N.E.2d 1253; see, CPLR 304 et seq.).

Court of Claims Act § 11 establishes a notice requirement in addition to that which may be applicable under other statutes: serving a copy of the claim or notice of intention on the Attorney-General, either personally or by certified mail with a return receipt requested (see, MacFarland-Breakell Bldg. Corp. v. New York State Thruway Auth., 123 Misc.2d 307, 472 N.Y.S.2d 1004, aff'd 104 A.D.2d 139, 484 N.Y.S.2d 166 [governmental entity separate from State must be served in addition to Attorney-General]. Under section 11, both filing with the court and service on the Attorney-General must occur within the applicable limitations period, and there is no basis for believing that the Legislature intended filing to independently constitute commencement. Because suits against the State are allowed only by the State's waiver of sovereign immunity and in derogation of the common law, statutory requirements conditioning suit must be strictly construed (Lurie v. State of New York, 73 A.D.2d 1006, 423 N.Y.S.2d 969, aff'd 52 N.Y.2d 849, 437 N.Y.S.2d 77, 418 N.E.2d 670). Accordingly, where, as here, claimants have not met the literal requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11, their actions are not timely commenced, and relief under CPLR 205(a) is not available.

KAYE, Judge (dissenting).

As this Court has long recognized, a CPLR 205(a) request to recommence a dismissed action must be liberally viewed: "[t]he statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a hearing in court till he reaches a judgment on the merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not to be frittered away by any narrow construction" (Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 539, 109 N.E. 594 [Cardozo, J.]. Today's decision ignores that mandate.

CPLR 205(a) allows recommencement of "timely commenced" actions that are later dismissed. As an action brought under the CPLR prior to July 1, 1992 could only be "commenced * * * by service of a summons" (CPLR 304), a defect in service meant the action had never been commenced and therefore could not be recommenced under CPLR 205(a) (see, e.g., Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766, 461 N.E.2d 1253). This result, compelled by the...

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