Dresser, Inc. v. Lowry
| Citation | 320 F.Supp.2d 486 |
| Decision Date | 27 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 03-1941-A.,No. CIV.A. 03-1729-A.,CIV.A. 03-1729-A.,CIV.A. 03-1941-A. |
| Parties | DRESSER, INC., Constance K. Parsons, D.K. Sharma, Curtis J. Hensley, Richard Fentem and Pete Leboeuf, v. Robert S. LOWRY and Lenny L. Williamson. Robert Lowry and Lenny Williamson, v. Dresser, Inc., Richard Fentem and Kurt Hensley. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Sam Zurik, III, Henry P. Julien, Jr., New Orleans, LA, Matthew W. Ray, Katie J. Colopy, Jones Day et al., Dallas, TX, for Dresser Inc., Constance K. Parsons, D. K. Sharma, Curtis J. Hensley, Richard Fentem, Pete Leboeuf, plaintiffs.
R. Bruce Macmurdo, Connie Marie Aucoin, Baton Rouge, LA, for Robert S. Lowry, Lenny L. Williamson, defendants.
RULING
Before the Court are the following Motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Remand regarding Civil Action No. 03-1941-A filed by Robert Lowry and Lenny Williamson on November 12, 2003 (Document No. 14); (2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Jurisdiction or Alternatively for Abstention filed by Robert Lowry and Lenny Williamson on October 8, 2003 (Document No. 4); and (3) Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration filed by Dresser, Inc., Curtis J. Hensley, and Richard Fentem on October 27, 2003 (Document No. 10). The matters addressed in the Motions have been thoroughly briefed, and the Court finds no need for oral argument. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' Motion for Remand regarding Civil Action No. 03-1941-A is GRANTED; Defendants' Alternative Motion for Abstention regarding Civil Action No. 03-1729-A is GRANTED; and Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration regarding Civil Action No. 03-1941-A is DENIED.
On September 15, 2003 Dresser, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Dresser") and several of its officers and employees filed a Complaint pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, bearing Civil Action No. 03-1729-A on this Court's docket. The Complaint addressed the issue of whether Dresser's Dispute Resolution Program would require Robert Lowry,1 a former Dresser employee, to submit his claims of alleged age discrimination in employment to binding arbitration.
On October 2, 2003 Robert Lowry filed a Petition in the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, Louisiana against Dresser; Richard Fentem, Chief Executive Officer of the Dresser plant; and Curtis J. Hensley, Dresser's Director of Manufacturing, in which Mr. Lowry alleged Defendants violated Louisiana's statutes prohibiting age discrimination in employment. Mr. Lowry specifically asserted he was not making any claims under potentially applicable federal laws, thus limiting his remedy to state law. The state court suit was removed on October 20, 2003 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and the matter was assigned Civil Action Number 03-1941-A. In the Notice of Removal, Defendants argued that Mr. Fentem and Mr. Hensley, Louisiana citizens, were fraudulently joined for the purpose of defeating this Court's jurisdiction.
Considering the common issues of fact and law, the actions were consolidated by Order dated October 31, 2003.
Because resolution of Mr. Lowry's Motion to Remand will necessarily impact the remaining Motions, the Court will address the fraudulent joinder issues first.
The parties do not dispute Dresser is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. Likewise, the litigants agree Mr. Lowry, Mr. Fentem, and Mr. Hensley are residents and citizens of the State of Louisiana. Therefore, if Mr. Lowry is able to establish a cause of action in state court against one or both of the Louisiana Defendants, their involvement in this litigation would serve to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction.
The pivotal issue is whether a cause of action against individuals (Mr. Fentem and/or Mr. Hensley) for aiding and abetting a corporate employer (Dresser) in its commission of discriminatory acts survived certain 1997 amendments to Louisiana's employment discrimination laws.
Louisiana first ventured into the area of employment discrimination legislation in 1978 when it enacted La. R.S. 23:971-975, titled "Age Discrimination in Employment." With the passage of La. R.S. 23:1006 in 1983, the legislature added prohibitions for employment discrimination based upon race, religion, color, sex, disability, or national origin. In 1988 the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights was created and empowered through La. R.S. 51:2231-2265 to enforce laws prohibiting discrimination in employment and public accommodations on the basis of the above-mentioned characteristics. Unfortunately, the 1988 legislature "neglected to revise and/or repeal the other statutory provisions ... [and] created mass confusion ... in determining which statutes applied to a particular situation and resolving the conflicts between the various provisions." Gerald J. "Jerry" Huffman, Jr., The New Louisiana Employment Statutes: What Hath the Legislature Wrought, 58 La. L.Rev. 1033, 1034 (1998).
In an effort to correct the deficiencies in the prior statutes, the "Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law," 1997 La. Acts. No. 1409, was passed with an effective date of August 1, 1997. This "massive" legislation, "purport[ed] to eliminate confusion by wiping out nearly all previous employment discrimination statutes in place of new Chapter 3-A of Title 23...." Huffman, supra, at 1034 (emphasis added). The problem presently confronting the Court centers around the legislature's failure to eliminate all the previous employment discrimination statutes, and the concomitant consequence of trying to read the legislative mind for signs of implied repeal of those provisions.
Prior to the 1997 changes, La. R.S. 51:971-975 prohibited an "employer" (defined generally as a person, or his agent, engaged in an industry affecting commerce who employed twenty or more workers), an employment agency, or a labor organization from discriminating against an individual in an employment context as a result of that individual's age. The provisions of Title 51 did not specifically provide a cause of action for conspiracy to aid and abet the exercise of such employment discrimination.
At the same time, La. R.S. 51:2242 — 2245, a portion of the law concerning the powers and responsibilities of the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights, prohibited an "employer" (defined generally as a person, or his agent, engaged in an industry affecting commerce who had fifteen or more employees), an employment agency, or a labor organization from discriminating against an individual in an employment context as a result of that individual's race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin.
1997 La. Acts. No. 1409 repealed La. R.S. 23:971-975 as well as La. R.S. 51:2242-2245 and replaced those articles with La. R.S. 23:301-354. Section 312 of the new "Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law" prohibits an employer (defined generally as a person with twenty or more employees who receives services from an employee and, in return, gives compensation of any kind to an employee), an employment agency, or a labor organization, from discriminating against an individual in an employment context on the basis of that individual's age.2 The provisions of Title 23 do not specifically provide a cause of action for conspiracy to aid or abet the exercise of such employment discrimination.
The pre-1997 version of La. R.S. 51:2256 is identical to the current wording of that statute, which provides, in pertinent part:
Both sides in the case currently at issue have pointed the Court to varying unpublished jurisprudential observations regarding the effect of the 1997 amendments.3 Mr. Lowry refers to Magistrate Judge Shushan's conclusion in Miller v. American General Financial Corporation, 2002 WL 2022536 (E.D.La.2002) that La. R.S. 51:2256 continues to apply in employment discrimination cases. One of the bases for the Magistrate Judge's decision included the fact that the 1997 changes define an "unlawful practice," in part, as "a discriminatory practice in connection with employment." La. R.S. 51:2232. The undersigned also notes that the 1997 amendments define "a discriminatory practice in connection with employment" as "an employment practice prohibited by R.S. 23:312 ...." Id.
In opposition to the Motion to Remand, Dresser and its named employees embrace the reasoning of Magistrate Judge Wilkinson in Trahan v. Lowe's Inc., 2002 WL 1560272 (E.D.La.2002) that the legislature's stated purposes in enacting the 1997 amendments included "consolidating the State's employment discrimination laws into one chapter [i.e., La. R.S. 23:301 and following] and removing references to employment discrimination in other sections of the law." Therefore, the provisions of Title 51 no longer apply to employment discrimination based on age. Rather, the Magistrate Judge concluded that (post-amendment) Title 51 only makes unlawful four specific discriminatory practices "(1) in public accommodations and in advertisements of public accommodations ...; (2) against breastfeeding mothers ...; (3) by financial institutions in providing financial services ...; and (4) in credit transactions ...." Id. Because La. R.S. 51:2256 prohibits conspiracies related to practices "declared unlawful by this Chapter,"Magistrate Judge Wilkinson determined that, effective August 1, 1997, a cause of action could only be stated under § 2256 for a conspiracy related to one of those four specified discriminatory practices. The undersigned notes that the...
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