Drew v. Sorensen

Decision Date30 August 1999
Docket NumberNo. 99, 24631.,99, 24631.
Citation133 Idaho 534,989 P.2d 276
PartiesCharles B. DREW, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Rick A. SORENSEN, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Williamson, Ketchum, for appellant. Ned C. Williamson argued.

Jordan P. Smith, Salmon, for respondent.

SILAK, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment against appellant Rick A. Sorensen.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts

Rick A. Sorensen (Sorensen) owns Lot 2 of the Ajax Peak Subdivision in Lemhi County. Respondent Charles B. Drew (Drew) owns the adjacent parcel designated as Lot 3. Sorensen's deed to Lot 2 states that he is entitled to "a 50 foot easement and right of way for ingress and egress for vehicular traffic from the county road across the north boundary of Lot No. 3 of said Ajax Peak Subdivision to the boundary of Lot No. 2 of said Ajax Peak Subdivision and the property here conveyed." Drew's warranty deed to Lot 3 states that the parcel is subject to the easement benefitting Lot 2. The easement was recorded in Lemhi County.

Sorensen has made Lot 2 his continual residence since purchasing the property in 1992. A one-lane dirt road runs along the easement and provides Sorensen with access to the county road. A post and rail fence ran along the south edge of the road when Sorensen purchased the land. The fence was apparently built to settle a dispute over the easement between Drew and Michael and Kathleen Zanutto, Sorensen's predecessors in interest. In 1996, Ward Witte (Witte) leased Lot 3 from Drew, intending to graze his horses on the property for personal, non-commercial purposes. Such use was in conformity with a recorded covenant which states that no animals may be kept on the property, except for household pets, horses, and cattle, "provided they are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose." In an affidavit, Witte stated that when he leased the property, he discovered that Sorensen was grazing his own horses on Lot 3, and Witte had to ask Sorensen to remove the animals so he could take possession.

In the spring of 1996, Sorensen surveyed and marked the boundaries of his easement. Later that year, Sorensen began moving the fence to the southern border of the easement. Sorensen quit relocating the fence around June 5, 1996, after Witte's employee sprayed 2-4-D, a broadleaf herbicide, within the easement. Sorensen refused to continue working on the fence because he was afraid of contamination from the "Agent Orange" he accused Witte of spraying. Drew sent a letter to Witte dated June 7, 1996, stating that Sorensen had no right to move the fence without Witte's permission. Sorensen sent Drew a letter on June 10, 1996, stating, "I told you we had problems that needed to be straightened out before you leased your property out (along with some of mine) to anyone else, for livestock grazing."

On June 15, Witte began completing the relocation of the fence. On that date, Sorensen confronted Witte, and said "at least five or six times" that he owned the easement, which was "private and exclusive to him." Witte told Drew of the confrontation, and Drew's counsel sent several letters to Sorensen, advising him that Drew would have to resort to litigation unless the conflict over the easement could be resolved amiably. Sorensen did not respond to any of the letters.

B. Procedural Background

In December 1996, Drew filed a quiet title action in the district court, claiming that he was "entitled to the use and quiet enjoyment of the Road and that portion of Plaintiff's Lot No. 3 that is subject to the easement, so long as such use and quiet enjoyment does not interfere with the Defendant's right of ingress and egress for vehicular traffic to the boundary of Defendant's Lot No. 2." Drew asked the district court to "permanently enjoin the Defendant from interfering with or taking any actions inconsistent with or in derogation of" plaintiff's property rights. Neither party requested a jury trial.

In December 1997, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On February 11, 1998, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting summary judgment in favor of Drew. On March 4, 1998, the district court entered a judgment in Drew's favor. Sorensen subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court issued a second memorandum decision and order denying reconsideration on June 16, 1998. In the June 16 opinion, the court noted that the judgment entered on March 4 was overly broad.

The court entered an amended judgment that same day, which stated that Drew was "entitled to exercise all legal uses" of his property, including "weed control, grazing of livestock and access to the adjacent county road free of gates." The judgment also stated that Sorensen was permanently enjoined from interfering with Drew's legal uses of his property, except as permitted by Sorensen's easement for ingress and egress. The district court awarded costs to Drew, but declined to award attorney fees under section 12-121 of the Idaho Code.

C. Order Being Appealed; Appealability

Sorensen filed a notice of appeal on April 15, 1998, requesting review of the district court's February 11 Memorandum Decision and Order and the judgment entered on March 4. The judgment is a final judgment appealable under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a). Under I.A.R. 17(e)(C), the notice of appeal is deemed to include and present on appeal "all interlocutory or final judgments, orders and decrees entered after the judgment, order or decree appealed from." Sorensen also filed an amended notice of appeal that included the amended judgment. Therefore, this appeal is deemed to also include the judgment entered on June 16, 1998.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The issues presented on appeal are as follows:

1. Whether the district court erred by granting Drew's request for summary judgment by relying on actions of Sorensen which either constitute the legal exercise of secondary easements or present a genuine issue of material fact.
2. Whether the district court erred in deciding the motions for summary judgment based on a prescriptive easement claim which was not raised by the pleadings.
3. Whether the district court erred in entering a judgment which is overly broad, is inconsistent with the court's memorandum decision and order, and addresses issues not raised in the pleadings.
4. Whether this Court should award Sorensen attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41.
5. On cross appeal, whether the district court erred in not awarding attorney fees to Drew under I.C. § 12-121.
6. Whether Drew is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), and I.A.R. 41.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., First Security Bank v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998)

; Richards v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 131 Idaho 476, 478, 959 P.2d 457, 459 (1998). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Murphy, 131 Idaho at 790,

964 P.2d at 657.

Generally, when considering a motion for summary judgment, a court "liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 576, 944 P.2d 709, 711 (1997). However, where the evidentiary facts are undisputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, "summary judgement is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). As long as the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment and no jury has been requested, the trial court may draw the inferences it would be allowed to draw from the evidence at trial. See Williams v. Computer Resources, Inc., 123 Idaho 671, 673, 851 P.2d 967, 969 (1993)

. When "the opposing motions seek summary judgment based upon different issues or theories dependent on a different set of material facts" the court "must examine each motion separately, reviewing the record and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it in favor of each party's opposition to the motions for summary judgment." Murphy, 131 Idaho at 790,

964 P.2d at 657. Since Sorensen did not appeal the denial of his motion for summary judgment, this Court needs only to examine whether the district court properly granted Drew's motion for summary judgment.

IV. ANALYSIS
A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting Summary Judgment Against Sorensen.
1. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment by relying on factors which either constitute the legal exercise of secondary easements or present a genuine issue of disputed material fact.

The district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Drew. The district court reasonably inferred that Sorensen "ha[d] been claiming `private and exclusive' dominion over the easement" based on three of Sorensen's actions: the relocation of the fence, the installation of a gate and a "No Trespassing" sign, and certain statements Sorensen made about the easement. Sorensen argues that the relocation of the fence and placement of the gate is the rightful exercise of a "secondary easement," which allows the dominant landowner to enter the servient estate in order to maintain, repair, or protect the easement. Sorensen also argues that one of the...

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