Drew v. Wall
| Decision Date | 27 June 1985 |
| Citation | 495 A.2d 229 |
| Parties | Louise DREW v. James WALL. 83-120-Appeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is a civil action brought by the plaintiff, the mother of the decedent, Jon Drew, to recover damages for the wrongful death of her son due to the negligence of the defendant, James Wall. The case was tried before a justice of the Superior Court and a jury. The case comes before us on the plaintiff's appeal from the Superior Court judgment granting the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
On February 18, 1976, decedent was employed as an assistant superintendent of maintenance at Harborside Park, an affiliate of P & M Enterprises, Inc., and was one of four men under the supervision of defendant. The decedent's main duties included maintaining the pumps and boilers that serviced the facilities of the shipyard's dozen tenants. These pumps in the sewer pits pumped sewerage from two or three buildings from the sewerage level of the premises to the city sewer level. On February 17, 1976, the day preceding his death, decedent learned that the electrical pumps in one sewage area had malfunctioned and water was accumulating in the pit. The defendant told decedent that the water should be pumped out, instructing him to get the necessary equipment to accomplish this task. This equipment included a pump with a hard-hose end necessary for suctioning in water, and a soft hose from the pump used to then expel the water.
The defendant further testified that he told decedent to place the gasoline-powered pump outside the pit, as decedent had done when he had performed the same job seven or eight months earlier. The decedent and fellow worker Richard King were then instructed not to go into the pit. On the afternoon of February 17, 1976, defendant visited the work site and found that decedent had violated his orders by placing the pump inside the pit. A heated discussion ensued, during which defendant ordered decedent to stay out of the pit and to let the pump keep running until it ran out of gas.
The plaintiff testified that her son came home tired and upset on the evening of February 17, complaining that the employers were cheap. He told her that since there had been insufficient hard hose to place the pump outside the pit, he had placed it in the pit in an effort to get the job done quickly. The defendant countered this testimony, stating that there was no emergency at that time requiring decedent to take such a drastic measure.
At approximately 8:30 a.m. on February 18, 1976, defendant visited the work area and found decedent and a coworker, Norbert F. Medeiros, examining the electrical pump system. At that time the pump was still in the pit but was not running. When defendant left, both workers then decided to turn on the gasoline pump while they were checking the fuses to the electrical pump in another building. When they returned, decedent went into the pit, shut the motor off, and then came out and waited with Medeiros for about forty-five minutes until the fumes dispersed. They then climbed back into the pit to repair the electrical pumps but soon became dizzy. Medeiros suggested they leave, but before they did, decedent turned the gasoline pump on again. When defendant went by the site at approximately 9:45 a.m., he saw Medeiros and decedent in the pit, lying in front of the ladder on the floor. The decedent died of carbon monoxide poisoning.
The plaintiff brought suit against defendant for the alleged wrongful death of her son, alleging that the negligence of defendant had caused her son's death. The defendant affirmatively plead the defense of assumption of the risk. At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant made a motion for a directed verdict. The trial justice granted the motion, finding that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence on the part of defendant and that, as a matter of law, decedent had assumed the risk that caused his death.
In reviewing a motion for a directed verdict, we have the obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. We must not consider the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence. Where issues exist upon which reasonable minds may differ, the jury is entitled to decide the facts of the case. Bitgood v. Allstate Insurance Co., --- R.I. ---, ---, 481 A.2d 1001, 1005 (1984); Marcotte v. Harrison, --- R.I. ---, ---, 443 A.2d 1225, 1229 (1982).
We need not address the issue of defendant's negligence because we find that decedent assumed the risk that caused his death. The doctrine of assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense that may be invoked to defeat the liability of the employer, even if the negligence of the employer has already been established. Dawes v. McKenna, 100 R.I. 317, 322, 215 A.2d 235, 238 (1965). Generally, the issue of whether a plaintiff assumed a risk is for a trier of fact to decide. If the facts suggest only one reasonable inference, however, the issue becomes a question of law and consequently may be decided by the trial justice. Rickey v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Rhode Island Resource Recovery Corporation v. Brien
-
Labrie v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc.
...like primary assumption of the risk, may be invoked as a defense by a tortfeasor to escape or to diminish liability. See Drew v. Wall, 495 A.2d 229, 231 (R.I.1985); Rickey v. Boden, 421 A.2d 539, 543 (R.I.1980). Generally, whether a plaintiff assumed a risk of harm and thereby absolved a de......
- Rhode Island Res. Recovery Corp. v. Brien
-
Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Mfg.(US), Ltd.
...not to go into the building because of the danger of a wall collapsing, assumed the risk of injury by working behind it); Drew v. Wall, 495 A.2d 229, 232 (R.I.1985) (decedent who was aware of danger posed by running internal-combustion engine in enclosed space assumed the risk of asphyxiati......