Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc.

Decision Date27 March 1969
Citation247 N.E.2d 877,42 Ill.2d 345
PartiesEvelyn M. DREWICK, Appellant, v. INTERSTATE TERMINALS, INC., Appellee. No 41133.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Asher, Greenfield, Gubbins & Segall, Chicago, for appellant (Irving M. Greenfield and Irving D. Levin, Chicago, of counsel).

Van Duzer, Gershon, Jordan & Petersen, Chicago, for appellee (Louis Gershon and Horace W. Jordan, Chicago, of counsel).

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice.

A jury in the circuit court of Cook County returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Evelyn M. Drewick and fixed her damages at $105,000 for injuries she sustained when a steel ventilator-window sash fell from a building owned by Interstate Terminals, Inc., (hereafter called defendant) striking her on the head and shoulders. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and denied defendant's post-trial motions. The Appellate Court, First District, reversed that portion of the judgment holding defendant liable (97 Ill.App.2d 187, 240 N.E.2d 524), and we granted leave to appeal.

Defendant, owner of the building from which the window fell, is the wholly owned subsidiary of Interstate Dispatch and it leased the building to its parent corporation. The president and secretary of the parent and subsidiary corporations are the same persons and they have their offices in the general office section of the building. The plaintiff is an employee of the parent corporation.

Plaintiff sought recovery from Republic Steel Corporation, the manufacturer of the window; Henry Pfutzenreuter & Sons, the general contractor who accepted and installed the window; and defendant, owner and lessor of the building and window. The lessee was not made a party defendant because it is plaintiff's employer, her workman's compensation claim was allowed against it and her common-law action for damages against it was thereafter barred. There is, of course, no suggestion that the corporate veil between the lessor and lessee be pierced because this would also bar her claim against the lessor.

Plaintiff's complaint (filed prior to Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182) alleged that Republic Steel was liable because it negligently designed and manufactured the window; that Pfutzenreuter was liable because it negligently accepted and installed the defective window; and defendant was liable because it negligently accepted the building with the defective window. The plaintiff, in addition, specifically charged that defendant, as sole and exclusive owner, maintaining, supervising and controlling the premises, 'knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care or diligence could or should have known that said steel sash, or that section therefrom that fell out of and from the north wall of said building was defective or that the component parts incorporated therein and which became an integral part of said sash or window were defective and that said supports or other component parts could or might crack, fracture, break and thereby cause said sash or window to give way under its weight and to fall out' and injure plaintiff. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Pfutzenreuter and the jury found in favor of Republic Steel. She did not appeal from either of these findings against her.

Defendant contends that these findings are wholly inconsistent with the jury verdict returned against it. It is argued that in reaching these findings the court determined, as a matter of law, and the jury determined, as a matter of fact, that no defect, or, at least, no defect discoverable by a reasonable inspection, existed at the time of manufacture and installation of the window. Because even under the product liability principles announced in Suvada v. White, proof of a defect is necessary to sustain recovery against the manufacturer or those in the chain of distribution, defendant concludes that the jury verdict against it cannot stand.

This argument ignores the fact that plaintiff's case against the defendant-owner was also submitted to the jury on the basis of Res ipsa loquitur. If submission on this basis were proper, the apparent inconsistency of the verdicts in question is resolved since no attempt was made to apply the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to the other party-defendants.

Assuming that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for her safety, two additional conditions must be established for the application of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur: first, the accident must be the kind which does not ordinarily occur without someone's negligence; and second, the instrumentality which caused the injury must have been within the management or control of the defendant. (Metz v. Central Illinois Electric and Gas Co., 32 Ill.2d 446, 448--450, 207 N.E.2d 305; Erckman v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 61 Ill.App.2d 137, 145, 210 N.E.2d 42.) The purpose of this second condition is, of course, to limit the application of the doctrine to those cases where the negligence, if any, must reasonably have been that of the defendant. It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that she was injured because of the negligence of an unknown party. See Wigmore on Evidence, 1st Ed. 1905, sec. 2509.

Whether the doctrine applies in a given case is a question of law which must be decided in the first instance by the trial court. (Metz v. Central Illinois Elec. and Gas Co.) Once this decision is made, however, it becomes the function of the jury to weigh the strength of the inference of negligence arising from the facts in evidence. This inference does not vanish upon the introduction of contrary evidence by defendant but remains to be weighed with all the other...

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42 cases
  • McGuckin v. Chicago Union Station
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 30, 1989
    ...subject to a claim that the premises were under its control, an essential element of res ipsa loquitur. In Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 345, 247 N.E.2d 877, the court reached the same conclusion. The plaintiff in Drewick filed a suit against a window manufacturer ......
  • Lamkin v. Towner
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 4, 1990
    ...safe condition. (Rowe v. State Bank (1988), 125 Ill.2d 203, 220, 126 Ill.Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358; Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 345, 247 N.E.2d 877; Murphy v. Illinois State Trust Co. (1940), 375 Ill. 310, 31 N.E.2d 305.) Conversely, where a defective condition e......
  • Willis v. Morales
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 15, 2020
    ...1064.¶ 64 Res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence from otherwise inexplicable facts. Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc. , 42 Ill. 2d 345, 351, 247 N.E.2d 877 (1969). It is "simply a rule of evidence relating to the sufficiency of plaintiff's proof." (Internal quotation marks......
  • Trotter by Trotter v. Chicago Housing Authority
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 9, 1987
    ...case. The supreme court's decisions indicate that the touchstone of a landlord's liability is control. (Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 345, 247 N.E.2d 877.) Drewick was an action by a third party who was struck by a steel ventilator window sash which fell from a bui......
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