Drews v. Maryland
Decision Date | 01 June 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 1010,1010 |
Citation | 381 U.S. 421,14 L.Ed.2d 693,85 S.Ct. 1576 |
Parties | Dale H. DREWS et al. v. MARYLAND |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Francis D. Murnaghan, Jr., for appellants.
Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Robert C. Murphy, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied.
1
On Sunday, Lacey, who are Negroes, and Helen W. Brown, Dale H. Drews and Joseph C. Sheeham, who are white, went to Gwynn Oak Park, an amusement park in Baltimore County, Maryland. Ironically, the park was celebrating 'All Nations Day.' Shortly after 3 p. m. they were standing in a group by themselves and had, a park guard testified, attracted no attention from other patrons. The guard approached the group and told them that 'we are very sorry but the park was closed to colored, and that the colored people would have to leave the premises. * * *' Mr. Lacey answered that he was enjoying himself and would like to took around some more, and neither he nor Miss Joyner complied with the request to leave. The guard then asked all five to leave, but they refused. He testified, however, that they 'were all very polite.' During this interchange between the guard and petitioners, other patrons of the park began to gather around.
Upon the refusal of petitioners to leave, the guard summoned the Baltimore County police, who, after asking petitioners to leave, placed them under arrest. Meanwhile, the crowd surrounding the petitioners grew larger and more hostile, even going so far as to kick, spit, and yell 'Lynch them!' Neither the park officials nor the county police made any attempt to exclude from the park or arrest any of those who engaged in such conduct. Upon being informed of their arrest, the five joined arms briefly, and the three men then dropped to the ground and assumed a prostrate position. Petitioners Joyner and Brown remained on their feet. The police placed handcuffs on Miss Joyner, and escorted her and Miss Brown from the park. Though the police encountered some difficulty in pulling the women through the crowed, they left under their own power. The men, on the other hand, had to be carried out, but offered no active resistance. The only remark by any of the petitioners was made by one of the men, who, responding to mistreatment by someone in the crowd, said '* * * forgive him, he doesn't know what he is doing. * * *'
On April 5, 1960, petitioners Brown, Joyner, Drews and Sheeham were charged with 'acting in a disorderly manner, to the disturbance of the public peace, at, in or on Gwynn Oak Amusement Park, Inc., a body corporate, a place of public resort and amusement in Baltimore County' in violation of Md. Code Ann. Art. 27, § 123 (1957 ed.).2 Mr. Lacey was not prosecuted. Petitioners waived jury trial, were found guilty by the court, and each was fined $25 plus costs.3 On January 18, 1961, the Maryland Court of Appeals, defining disorderly conduct as 'the doing or saying, or both, of that which offends, disturbs, incites, or tends to incite, a number of people gathered in the same area,'4 affirmed the convictions. 224 Md. 186, 192, 167 A.2d 341, 343-344. On June 22, 1964, this Court vacated the judgments and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration in light of Griffin v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 84 S.Ct. 1770, 12 L.Ed.2d 754, and Bell v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 12 L.Ed.2d 822. 378 U.S. 547, 84 S.Ct. 1900, 12 L.Ed.2d 1032. On remand, the Court of Appeals, purporting to distinguish Griffin and Bell, reinstated and reaffirmed the prior judgments of conviction, Judge Oppenheimer dissenting. 236 Md. 349, 204 A.2d 64.
I cannot concur in the Court's refusal to review this case. (1) There is in my mind serious question as to whether the conduct of petitioners can constitutionally be punished under a disorderly conduct statute. (2) It seems to me apparent from the record that petitioners' conduct is protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, and that, under our decision in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill and Lupper v. State of Arkansas, 379 U.S. 306, 85 S.Ct. 384, 13 L.Ed.2d 300, the passage of the Act must be deemed to have abated the convictions.
In Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654, the only evidence supporting the petitioner's disorderly conduct conviction was to the effect that, after being arrested on another charge, he was 'very argumentative' with the arresting officers. We set aside the conviction on the ground that it was 'so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to render them unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Ibid. Thompson was followed in Garner v. State of Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S.Ct. 248, 7 L.Ed.2d 207, where the evidence showed that the petitioners, who were Negroes, had taken seats at a lunch counter where only white people were served, and had refused to leave upon request. For this they were convicted of disturbing the peace. For purposes of our decision, we gave the statute under which the petitioners were convicted its broadest possible readings, and assumed that it outlawed even peaceful and orderly conduct which foreseeably might cause a public commotion, id., at 169, 82 S.Ct., at 254. Nonetheless, we found the petitioners' conduct constitutionally insufficient to support the conviction.5 And in Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 12 L.Ed.2d 766, we reversed a breach of the peace conviction based on conduct similar to that involved in Garner. In doing so, we observed that
Id., at 150-151, 84 S.Ct., at 1737.
I do not find this case meaningfully distinguishable from Garner and Barr. Clearly, nothing petitioners did prior to being placed under arrest could be called disorderly conduct: their only 'sins' up to that point were being Negro or being in the company of Negroes, and politely refusing to leave the park. Nonetheless, they were arrested. Then all five members of the group briefly linked arms, and, in a further show of passive resistance, the three men dropped to the ground. They did not, the police officers testified, offer anything in the way of active resistance to either arrest or ejection. As Judge Oppenheimer observed: 'In resisting the command of the officers to leave the park, the defendants used no force against the officers or anyone else; they held back or fell to the ground.' 236 Md., at 355, 204 A.2d, at 68. Nor did they argue with the police, cf. Thompson v. City of Louisville, supra, or use profanity, cf. Sharpe v. State, 231 Md. 401, 190 A.2d 628, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946, 84 S.Ct. 350, 11 L.Ed.2d 275; indeed, the only words spoken were in the nature of a plea for forgiveness of one of the mob. All they did was refuse to assist in their own ejection from a segregated amusement park.
The two women did not even lie down. The only bit of testimony from which the trial judge could possibly have inferred disorderly behavior is the following:
'The Court: Why did you have to pull them through?
There is undoubtedly some truth to the officer's surmise; I am sure neither woman liked being ejected from the park solely because of her race or the race of her friend. I suspect that their reluctance also resulted in no small measure from a fear of being pulled through a shouting, spitting, kicking mob.
Even if it be assumed that the arrest of petitioners was lawful,6 I have great difficulty distinguishing the conduct of the women, and, to a lesser extent, that of the men, from the refusals to leave segregated establishments which were before us in Garner and Barr. I cannot see how a statute outlawing 'drunkenness and disorderly conduct'7 can be said to have given petitioners fair warning, cf. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894, that the conduct (or, in the case of the women, lack of conduct) in which they engaged was criminally punishable.8 I cannot, at least not without argument and full consideration by the Court, join in letting stand a decision which holds that police can arrest persons who are doing nothing remotely disorderly, secure in the knowledge that if the persons refuse wholeheartedly to cooperate in their own arrest and removal to a waiting squad car, their conviction for disorderly conduct will be forthcoming.9
In Hamm v. City of Rock Hill and Lupper v. State of Arkansas, 379 U.S. 306, 308, 85 S.Ct. 384, 388, we held:
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