Drexel & Co. v. The Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 01 July 1863 |
| Citation | 46 Pa. 31 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
| Parties | Drexel & Co. <I>versus</I> The Commonwealth. |
R. C. McMurtrie and J. C. Bullitt, for plaintiffs in error.— The words of the act which bear directly upon the main question are substantially as follows: "That every broker and private banker shall, on or before the first Monday of December next, make a return to the auditor-general of the full amount of the profits arising from his business, during the year ending the thirtieth day of November preceding the date of such return, i. e., during the year ending the thirtieth day of November preceding the first Monday of December next." This language is so precise and explicit that to interpret it to mean anything else than a return of the business of the whole year, which ended November 30th 1861, is not to give any construction — the most forced and artificial even — to the words themselves, but to declare that the intention of the legislature is to be found not in the language employed, but in considerations drawn from a decent respect for its justice and wisdom. Such a method of interpretation cannot be sustained.
Mr. Dwarris remarks, that "recently all the judges have manifested the strongest inclination to adhere more closely in the construction of statutes to the words of the act: Dwarris on Statutes, p. 708. `Our decisions,' says Lord Tenterden, `may, perhaps, in this particular case, operate to defeat the object of the statute, but it is better to abide by this consequence than to put upon it a construction not warranted by the words of the act, in order to give effect to what we may suppose to be the intention of the legislature.' In another case, the same distinguished judge says, `The words may probably go beyond the intention, but if they do, it rests with the legislature to make an alteration; the duty of the court is only to construe and give effect to the provision.' `It is safer,' said Mr. Justice Ashurst, `to adopt what the legislature have actually said, than to suppose what they meant to say:'" Dwarris 707.
Many authorities are also cited by the same author, to show that "the same disposition has been shown, and equally salutary doctrines inculcated, with regard to extending statutes by equity." And the very satisfactory reason given for this change in the canons of judicial interpretation, by Mr. Justice Heath, is, that "the legislature is always at hand to supply deficiencies or correct mistakes."
The same doctrine has been adopted by the courts of this country. It will suffice to refer to a few of the many decisions in which the rule has been enforced: United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95; 4 Term Rep. 665; 6 Id. 286; Leach's C. L. 73: Dwarris on Statutes 736; U. S. v. Wilson, Baldwin 101; U. S. v. Ragsdale, 1 Hempstead 497; U. S. v. Warner, 4 McLean 463; Putnam v. Langley, 11 Pick. 487; Craven v. Craven, 2 Dev. Eq. Rep. 334; Ex parte Moore, 7 How. (Miss.) Rep. 668; Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 47; Bosley v. Maltingley, 14 B. Mon. 89.
Statutes which impose restrictions upon trade or common occupations, or which levy an excise or tax upon them, must be construed strictly: Sewell v. Jones, 9 Pick. 412; Mayer v. Davis, 6 W. & S. 376; Dwarris 749; Hubbard v. Johnston, 3 Taunt. 176.
This act, however, is of a penal character. "All statutes that give costs are to be taken strictly as being a kind of penalty: Cone v. Bowles, 1 Salk. 205; but this imposes a penalty in terms, and if interpreted according to the rules which govern the construction of penal statutes, it is clearly unconstitutional. It requires an absolutely perfect and complete return of the plaintiffs' receipts from their business during the five months preceding its enactment, while the evidence showed, as the judge admitted, that it was impossible for them to make any such return. No approximation to the truth, no mere estimate would have sufficed. "When the legislature imposes terms, and prescribes a thing to be done within a certain time, the lapse of even a day is fatal, because no inferior court can admit of any terms but such as directly and precisely satisfy the law: 5 Brown's P. C. 444. See also 2 Hill 373, 374. It being then impossible for the defendants below to make such a return as would have satisfied the terms of the act, they cannot be punished for their failure to make the return. The well-recognised maxims "Lex neminem ad impossibilia cogit," and "Nemo punitur sine injuria, facto seu defaulta," might alone be relied on, but such a statute is plainly within the constitutional prohibition upon ex post facto laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, nor can it be considered a "law of the land" within the meaning of the ninth section of the ninth article of the constitution.
1. It is an ex post facto law within the meaning of the constitution Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; The Cotton Planter, 1 Paine C. C. 23; Greenough v. Greenough, 1 J. 495; Le Couteux v. Supervisors, 5 Barb. 250; Fletcher v. Peck, 2 Cranch 87.
2. This act violates the obligation of the contract between the Commonwealth and the defendants below, contained in their license as brokers and private bankers. Under those licenses they had acquired vested rights which could not be divested by retrospective legislation: Howard v. The City of Savannah, R. M. Charlton's Rep.; Orton v. Brown, 6 George (Miss.) 426; Benson v. The Mayor, 10 Barb. 223. To the same effect are 3 How. 153; 16 Id. 369; 18 Id. 331; 10 Geo. 190.
3. An act which operates retrospectively to divest vested rights is not "a law of the land:" Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. 15; Houston v. Bogle, 10 Ire. Law Rep. 496; Berley v. Rampacher, 5 Duer 183; Coffin v. Rich, 45 Maine 507; Gordon v. Ingraham, 1 Grant 152; Southard v. Central Railroad Company, 2 Dutch. 13; Breed v. Cunningham, 2 Cal. 361; White v. White, 5 Barb. 474; 6 Shep. 109; Greenough v. Greenough, 1 J. 496; Reiser v. Saving Fund, 3 Wright 137; Mitford v. Learned, 16 Mass. 217.
While this court has always been vigilant to guard the right of taxation, as one of the rights of sovereignty held by the legislature in trust for the people (Mott v. Railroad Company, 6 Casey 9; Bank v. The City of Pittsburgh, 1 Wright 340), it has never hesitated to restrain the unlawful exercise of the taxing power, and it is submitted that it is both its province and its duty to protect the citizen from such oppressive and unconstitutional legislation as that contained in the act now under consideration: 3 Wright 73; 11 Johns. 77; 4 Comstock 419.
W. M. Meredith, Attorney-General.—The act is not unconstitutional. A law may be retroactive in its character and operation, and may even divest vested rights without being unconstitutional, provided it does not impair the obligation of a contract: Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. The Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. Rep. 420.
The interpretation given to the act by the learned judge below is justified both upon authority and principle.
It is conceded that this is a penal statute, and also a statute imposing a tax, and that such statutes are to receive a strict construction against the tax or the penalty, and in favour of the citizen. The authorities collected and placed upon their paper-book by the plaintiffs in error fully establish this. The court below so construed this statute.
The act directs that the first statement or return should be made on the succeeding first Monday of December after its passage, and thereafter the same day in each year. It provides that the annual returns shall be for the whole year, but the first return was not an annual return. A strict construction of the act, and one for the benefit of the parties to be affected by it, would confine the first return to the receipts received between the time of the passage of the act and the 1st December following, and that only the returns thereafter to be made should embrace the whole year.
The reason assigned by the court below for not giving this act a retroactive construction, was "to prevent its working injustice," not to the Commonwealth, but to the defendants. In Re Short's Estate, 4 Harris 67, it is held that the principle that the court should not give an act a retrospective effect unless forced to do so by the stringency of the words, is a sound one where retroaction would work injustice. See also 4 S. & R. 401; Lamberton et al. v. Hogan, 2 Barr 26; Robb v. Harlin, 7 Id. 293; Mullock v. Souder, 5 W. & S. 198; Martindale v. Warren, 3 Harris 478. The rule has been to give a retroactive operation on statutes which operate not on the right, but on the remedy; but the courts always refuse a retroactive effect to statutes which would bar an action pending, unless compelled to do otherwise by direct and positive words: Bedford v. Shilling, 4 S. & R. 401; Lefever v. Witmer, 10 Barr 506; Bolton v. Johns, 5 Id. 149. The most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the spirit of it, or the cause which moved the legislature to enact it. No statute is held to operate retroactively unless its language admits of no other construction: Neff's Appeal, 9 Harris 247.
Statutes take effect from their date, unless it be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Air-Way Elec. Appliance Corp. v. Archer
...381, 24 L.Ed. 1104; Metz v. Hagerty, 51 Ohio St. 521, 38 N.E. 11; Cincinnati v. Seasongood, 46 Ohio St. 296, 21 N.E. 630; Drexel & Co. v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. 31; Young v. Town of Henderson, 76 N.C. A tax may be laid for the double purpose of regulation and revenue. Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Oh......
-
Trefry v. Putnam
...152, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312;Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479, 491;Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93, 100;Drexel v. Com., 46 Pa. 31, 40). It is not necessary to do more than to refer to 220 Mass. 623 to 627, 108 N. E. 570, for it is plain that the Forty-Fourth Amendmen......
-
Stanley v. Gates
...act as is applicable to the calendar year. It is claimed that this renders the act invalid. In discussing this question in Drexel Company v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. 31, it was held that an income tax is imposed upon profits, capital, and that it is both constitutional and expedient, in levying......
-
Stanley v. Gates
...act as is applicable to the calendar year. It is claimed that this renders the act invalid. In discussing this question in Drexel Co. v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. 31, it was held that an income tax is imposed upon profits, not capital; and that it is both constitutional and expedient, in levying......