Drexler v. Walters
Citation | 290 F. Supp. 150 |
Decision Date | 23 September 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 4-67 Civ. 390.,4-67 Civ. 390. |
Parties | William E. DREXLER, Plaintiff, v. Joe A. WALTERS, Individually, and as Referee and Receiver, James P. Rorris and Robert W. Dygert, and Dygert and Gunn, a partnership, and Faye V. Peterson, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
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Jerome Daly, Savage Minn., for plaintiff.
Thomas A. Keller, III, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant Joe A. Walters.
Harold J. Carroll, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant James P. Rorris.
Melvin D. Heckt, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants Robert W. Dygert and Dygert & Gunn, Minneapolis, Minn., a partnership.
Robert W. Dygert, Esq., Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant Faye V. Peterson.
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss. The complaint, though somewhat unclear and generally conclusionary, attempts to state a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For reasons stated below, the motions to dismiss as to all defendants are granted.
The complaint alleges that defendant Joe A. Walters, acting as Referee and Receiver by appointment of the District Court, Hennepin County, State of Minnesota in a divorce action pending in that court entitled Peterson v. Peterson (#566224), together with defendant Faye V. Peterson and her attorneys, James P. Rorris and Robert W. Dygert, did wrongfully invade plaintiff's mailbox and take away plaintiff's mail therefrom under color of State law. This conduct is alleged to have violated plaintiff's constitutional rights as protected by the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and recovery of damages.
By motion, defendants contend that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, that this court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, that the allegations of the complaint are sham and frivolous and that the events complained of were done pursuant to, and are hence an improper and unwarranted attack upon, the orders of the Minnesota district court.1
From the pleadings and records it appears that plaintiff was attorney for one Palmer A Peterson, a practicing physician and surgeon, who became a defendant in a State court divorce action brought by his wife, defendant Faye V. Peterson, who was represented by defendants Rorris and Dygert as attorneys. Apparently after rather lengthy proceedings, the Hennepin County District Court in which that action was pending appointed defendant Walters Receiver of all the personal estate of Palmer A. Peterson and also appointed him Referee. The court's order, dated January 11, 1965 recited that Walters should have "all the power and authority of a Receiver under the statutes and common law of Minnesota" and as Referee should have "all the power and authority granted by Rule 53 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure or any other applicable rules or statutes of the State of Minnesota."
Specifically the court empowered the Receiver as follows:
Pursuant to his appointment, Walters sequestered the personal estate of Palmer A. Peterson. In doing so he subpoenaed Sigurd A. Bertelsen, Post-master, St. Paul, and all the contents of Airport Post Office Box #1503 which was in plaintiff's name, but allegedly used by Palmer Peterson, plaintiff's client, as a reception point for his medical patients' accounts receivable which Peterson allegedly desired to keep hidden because of the State court's alimony order. On March 23, 1965 (following a hearing on February 17, 1965), Judge Kane ordered that all mail accumulated to that date be opened and the payments on Peterson's accounts receivable be turned over to the Receiver. This apparently was done. These actions constitute the gravamen of plaintiff's present complaint.
Since plaintiff claims both injunctive relief and recovery of damages, several questions are presented.
The motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as against defendant Walters, as Referee and Receiver must be granted on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R. Civ.P. 12 (b) (6). Plaintiff's complaint (Paragraph IV) affirmatively alleges that defendant Walters "is and has been acting as a Referee and Receiver of the District Court, Hennepin County, State of Minnesota." Plaintiff further alleges that defendant committed the specific acts complained of while acting in those capacities (Paragraph VII). As against an officer of the Minnesota State Courts, this court can grant no relief, injunctive or for damages, and hence the complaint is dismissed as to Walters.
It is the rule in Minnesota that a receiver is an officer or representative of the court which appointed him subject to the control of that court. Peterson v. Darelius, 168 Minn. 365, 368, 210 N.W. 38, 39 (1926). Likewise, a referee is a subordinate of the appointing court. See Carson v. Smith, 5 Minn. 78 (1860).
Further, Minnesota courts have long recognized the rule that judges and those acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial2 capacity are immune from civil liability for damages. The policy behind the rule is to insure that such officers will act upon their convictions free from any apprehension of possible consequences. Cf. Gammel v. Ernst and Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W. 2d 364, 368, 54 A.L.R.2d 316 (1955). The desirability of such freedom of judicial action applies equally to court-appointed referees and receivers, and brings them within the cloak of judicial immunity.
Plaintiff does not allege that defendant Walters acted beyond the scope of his appointment as referee and receiver, nor does he allege that the Hennepin County District Court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit for which Walters was appointed. In any event, and even if he had, the shield of judicial immunity has been held to extend to all judicial and quasi-judicial acts, however erroneous. Roerig v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 231, 175 N.W. 542 (1919). Any other rule would render ineffective the policy behind the immunity. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that the allegedly wrongful acts of the defendants were in violation of his civil rights in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and that this court has jurisdiction to award relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. These statutes do not disturb and create any exception to the rule of judicial immunity.3
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act gives no indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common law immunities. In the absence of such clear intent the court will not presume one. As the Supreme Court has broadly stated:
"This court early held that judges of courts of superior or general authority are absolutely privileged as respects civil suits to recover for actions taken by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, irrespective of the motives with which those acts are alleged to have been performed, Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646, and that a like immunity extends to other officers of government whose duties are related to the judicial process." Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 569, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1338, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434. (1959).
Against such immunity, there is no claim for damages here upon which relief can be granted against defendant Walters.
The motion to dismiss as against the other defendants must be granted. It is clear from the recent federal decisions that attorneys who participate in state court litigation are not acting under color of state law.4 The attorney's status as an officer of the court does not make him an officer of the state within Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.5 The court believes this rule is controlling here and thus plaintiff's complaint for damages against all defendants must be dismissed on this ground. Further, the defendant Faye v. Peterson the plaintiff in the divorce case clearly is not a state officer or acting under color of any statute * * * of any state.
Plaintiff in addition to claiming damages, asks this court to enjoin all defendants from interfering in any way with his airport mailbox #1503 and for a permanent injunction upon the...
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