Drinkard v. Ingram

• Decision Date: 01 January 1858
• Citation: Drinkard v. Ingram, 21 Tex. 650 (Tex. 1858)
• Parties: SMITH DRINKARD v. WILLIAM INGRAM AND ANOTHER.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

21 Tex. 650

SMITH DRINKARD

v.WILLIAM INGRAM AND ANOTHER.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1858.

A court of equity will in no case interpose to relieve a party from the consequences of his own neglect or laches.

Applications for new trial upon such grounds will be refused.

Neither will a court of equity relieve a party against the fault or negligence of his attorney.

But where a party occupies a merely defensive attitude upon the record, as where he is sued upon a judgment from another state, and he resists a recovery upon the ground that the judgment sued on, was fraudulently obtained, he is entitled to interpose this defense without showing that he has been guilty of no laches.

If it be shown that a judgment was obtained by fraud, it cannot afford the basis of a recovery, though it may have been rendered upon a just demand, and for which a judgment might have been rightfully rendered.

A question of fraud, especially of fraud in fact, should be left to the jury for their decision, and a charge of the court which drew the conclusion of fraud from the evidence, and virtually decided the question was erroneous, as charging on the weight of evidence, however just the conclusion of the court may have been.

Error from Smith. Tried below before Hon. J. H. Reagan.

This suit was brought by appellant to recover the amount of a judgment rendered in his favor against the appellees in the circuit court of Alabama.

The suit in Alabama was trover to recover a negro slave, or his value; two trials were had there. On the first, plaintiff recovered a judgment for $58.90, and the defendant asked for and obtained a new trial, and at the succeeding term another trial was had and a verdict and judgment were rendered for plaintiff for $927.50.

The appellees in their answer set up, “that if any new trial was granted in the cause in Alabama, it was done without their consent, contrary to their wishes or instructions, and to defraud them;” and that they paid off the first judgment and costs to Thomas Smith, deputy sheriff, etc. They set up title to the negro in Mrs. E. Ingram, and say that the suit in Alabama, though in form of trover, was only intended to recover about $70 damages for the services of the negro, which had been hired by Drinkard of Mrs. Ingram, and which negro she had taken possession of before the expiration of the time for which he was hired, and that the judgment was obtained by fraud, combination, etc.

The plaintiff filed special exceptions to this answer, which were overruled by the court.

The facts proved on the trial are not material to a proper understanding of the opinion.

The court charged the jury as follows: “If the facts proven show that Mrs. Ingram, one of the defendants, hired the negro boy to Lee, and that Lee hired him to the plaintiff; that the boy by some means came into the possession of Mrs. Ingram; that Drinkard was entitled to the services of the boy for eight months after his return to his mistress, and that his services for that length of time were worth seventy dollars; and if you believe that the suit, though brought in the form of trover, that is, for the boy or his value, was in reality only a suit for the recovery of the services of the boy; and if the plaintiff, with such a cause of action, managed to obtain a judgment for nine hundred and twenty-eight dollars, this gross and unreasonable disproportion between the amount of the demand and the judgment, especially where it is apparent that it is the result of mere form in legal proceedings, and not of right established by testimony, is such a departure from the principles of common reason, and common right, as shows that the judgment is a fraud upon defendants, and will warrant you in finding for them.”

There was a verdict and judgment for defendants.

The plaintiff filed, among others, the following assignments of error:

1st. The court erred in overruling plaintiff's exceptions to the answer.

2d. The court erred in its charge.

3d. In refusing a new trial.

J. C. Robertson, for plaintiff in error.

I. According to the authorities, English and American, the rule is that when a defendant at law, after judgment, seeks the aid of a court of chancery, in a matter which would have formed a good defense at law, he must show that his failure to avail himself of his defense at law is not attributable to any negligence or want of diligence on his part, but to fraud, accident, or the act of the opposite party, unmixed with any negligence or fault on his part. French v. Garner, 7 Port. 549;McGrew v. Tombeckbee Bank, 5 Port. 547;Mock v. Condiff, 6 Id. 24; Lee & Morton v. Insurance Bank, 2 Ala. 20; Collum v. Casey, 1 Ala. 351; Sturnett & Townsend v. The Bank, 9 Ala. 120; Foster v. Bank, 17 Id. 672; Powell v. Stuart, 17 Id. 719; Perine v. Carlisle, 19 Id. 686; Talliaferro v. Bank, 23 Id. 755; McGowen v. Young, 2 Stuart & Port. 160; Foster v. Wood, 6 Johns. Ch. 87;Duncan v. Lezon, 3 Id. 351;Lansing v. Eddy, 1 Id. 51; The Auditor v. Nichols, 2 Mansford, 139.

II. A valid excuse, for not defending at law, must not only be alleged but must be proved. 7 Leigh, 227;French v. Garner, 7 Port. 549.

III. The fraud or neglect of the parties' own attorney is not a ground for relief against the opposite party, although the attorney may be liable for his fraud or neglect to his own client. For injuries resulting to clients from negligence or inattention on the part of their attorney, courts cannot redress against the other party to the suit. Redress must be sought in a new action against a new party. Barrow v. Jones, 1 J. J. Marsh. 470.

IV. The charge of the court below, if written in concise language, would read thus: “Gentlemen of the jury, go out and find for the defendants.”

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