Droney v. Droney

• Decision Date: 01 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 539,539
• Citation: Droney v. Droney, 651 A.2d 415, 102 Md.App. 672 (Md. App. 1994)
• Parties: Mary Ann DRONEY v. John H. DRONEY. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 672

102 Md.App. 672

651 A.2d 415

Mary Ann DRONEY v.John H. DRONEY.

No. 539, Sept. Term, 1994.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 3, 1995.

Jay B. Shuster, Baltimore, for appellant.

Brian J. Murphy, Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MOYLAN, HARRELL and HOLLANDER, JJ.

HOLLANDER, Judge.

This case presents for our consideration the novel question of whether a mobile home may ever change its character from that of a motor vehicle--an item of personalty--to a fixture upon realty.We answer that it can; whatever the mobile home may once have been, its character was transformed here by the actions of the parties in affixing it to the realty.Based on the undisputed facts of this case, we hold that the mobile home in question lost its vehicular status and became a fixture upon the land when the parties removed its wheels, bolted it to the ground, attached utility lines, and made other significant changes and improvements to it.Accordingly, we perceive no error in the trial court's determination that Mary Ann Droney, appellant, committed a contempt of court by failing to transfer the home to her former husband as part of a divorce settlement.We explain.

Factual Summary

Ms. Droney and John H. Droney, appellee, married on October 3, 1959.In 1969, the Droneys purchased land in Garrett County, Maryland (the "Property").Thereafter, in 1987, they purchased a "double-wide" mobile home, which was financed and subject to a recorded security interest.The mobile home was transported to the Property, where the Droneys removed its wheels and bolted it to concrete pilings.The parties made substantial renovations to the mobile home--water, electric, and septic lines were hooked up, gutters and downspouts were attached, a 2,000-pound stone fireplace was installed, new siding was added to the exterior, front and rear decks were built, and shrubs were planted.Although the home apparently was never moved after it was attached to the pilings, the home remained titled as a vehicle with the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA").

On October 3, 1988, Ms. Droney initiated divorce proceedings.By July, 1990, the parties had reached a settlement as to the disposition of their property.Essentially, the parties agreed that Mr. Droney would transfer to Ms. Droney his interest in land located in Baltimore County, which was improved by a house, and Ms. Droney was to transfer her interest in the Property to Mr. Droney, plus $1,000.Accordingly, on January 22, 1991, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County(Judge H. Kemp McDaniel, presiding) entered a Judgment of Absolute Divorce.The Judgment, after reciting that it had been entered "upon the agreement of the parties," ordered the parties, inter alia, to transfer to each other the interests each had in certain real estate.It provided as follows:

* * * * * *

2.It is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that Mary Ann Droney shall deed all of her right, title and interest in and to all real estate owned by the parties in Garrett County, Maryland....

3.That John H. Droney shall deed unto Mary Ann Droney all of his right, title and interest in and to a parcel of real estate located in Baltimore County, Maryland....

4.That both John H. Droney and Mary Ann Droney are herewith denied alimony, past, present and future pursuant to their expressed waivers thereof as expressed in open court on June 12, 1990.

5.That both John H. Droney and Mary Ann Droney are herewith denied any marital award pursuant to their expressed waivers thereof as expressed in open court on June 12, 1990.

6.That judgment is granted in favor of John H. Droney against Mary Ann Droney in the amount of $1,000.00.Said payment shall be paid by Mary Ann Droney unto John H. Droney immediately.

(Emphasis added).

On November 15, 1991, Ms. Droney signed over to Mr. Droney a deed for the Property.Mr. Droney's subsequent attempt to transfer the Property to a third party led to his discovery that the home did not fully belong to him.When Mr. Droney sought to close out his outstanding loan and the vendee attempted to secure a mortgage on the Property, the lending banks determined that the "mobile" home remained designated as a vehicle and was still titled in the MVA records in the names of both Mr. and Ms. Droney; only the land itself had been transferred by Ms. Droney.The banks insisted that Mr. Droney separately transfer his interest in the home to the vendee, to be sure that title to the Property was clear.Mr. Droney then asked Ms. Droney to transfer title to the home to him, based on his understanding of their divorce agreement, but she refused.Because of Ms. Droney's refusal to transfer title to the home, as well as her failure to pay the $1,000, Mr. Droney filed a Petition for Contempt on February 26, 1992.

At the contempt hearing on November 18, 1992(Judge John G. Turnbull, presiding), Ms. Droney argued that the Judgment only obligated her to transfer her interest in the "real estate," and that the mobile home was a motor vehicle, not "real estate."There, as here, she contended that the certificate of title for the home, as well as the recorded security interest, conclusively demonstrated that the home was a "vehicle," and could not be considered part of the "real estate" that she had agreed to transfer.She also alleged that she was not in contempt for failure to pay the judgment because she did not have the funds to do so.Notwithstanding Ms. Droney's arguments, the court found Ms. Droney in contempt of court for failing to comply fully with the terms of the Judgment.It did not, however, impose a sentence.

On December 3, 1992, the court issued an Order (the "1992 Order"), in which the court found Ms. Droney in contempt of the Judgment as to both paragraphs 2 and 6.Nevertheless, the court declined to impose a sentence.The court said:

[The] sentence on the contempt is suspended generally provided that the Defendant, Mary Ann Droney, on or before December 18, 1992 does the following:

a. Properly execute an assignment of the ownership of her interest in a 1987 Champion Trailer ... located at 192 East Cumberland Road, Oakland, Garrett County, Maryland, said trailer being specifically found by this Court to be "real estate" within the meaning of paragraph two of the aforementioned Judgment of Absolute Divorce dated January 22, 1991.

[b.] Pay to the Plaintiff, John H. Droney, the $1,000.00 ordered in paragraph six of the aforementioned Judgment of Absolute Divorce dated January 22, 1991.

[c.] Pay to the Plaintiff, John H. Droney, the sum of $500.00 toward counsel fees incurred in this contempt proceeding....

[d.] Pay to the Plaintiff, John H. Droney, the $25.00 in open costs in this contempt proceeding.

(Emphasis added).

On December 7, 1992, Ms. Droney noted an appeal of the 1992 Order.However, this Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the 1992 Order was not final because it did not impose any penalty.Consequently, it was not appealable.Droney v. Droney, 97 Md.App. 755(1993)(citingMitchell v. Mitchell, 61 Md.App. 535, 544-48, 487 A.2d 680(1985)).Accordingly, we declined to consider whether the home was, indeed, "real estate."

Meanwhile, on January 10, 1993, Mr. Droney filed a Petition for Further Contempt and Execution of Previously Suspended Sentence.Also, on April 19, 1993, Mr. Droney filed a Request for Garnishment of Property Other Than Wages, asking for garnishment of the $1,525 owed to Mr. Droney under the 1992 Order.On June 18, 1993, the trial court issued the writ, which was subsequently satisfied.¹

On March 9 and 10, 1994, Judge Turnbull heard Mr. Droney's Petition for Further Contempt.Again, Ms. Droney argued that she could not be in contempt as the Judgment did not order her to transfer anything other than "real estate," and a vehicle could not constitute real estate.Rejecting her argument, the court found as follows:

It's obvious from the [J]udgment of [A]bsolute [D]ivorce ... that it was the intent of the parties that Mrs. Droney get [the real estate located in]Baltimore County, Maryland, together with all the improvements thereon, which happens to be a house.It's also obvious from the other paragraph that Mr. Droney was to get the real estate located in Garrett County, Maryland, together with everything that there was on that particular property.I am absolutely convinced that neither the parties nor the attorneys at the time had any inkling whatsoever that there was some convoluted title floating around for what was once for the purpose of transporting a modular home or a movable home.

It is apparent ... that this house has been affixed to this property and is exactly that, it is a house that is affixed to this real estate and it has become part of the real estate and should be transferred as part of the real estate.Frankly, I don't think, if the circumstances were somewhat different, any court would have problems whatsoever with a bill to quiet title on the property and that would satisfy the title companies in this particular case.For [Ms. Droney] to come back at this point in time and say: "Oh, I forgot, this is part mine and it's personal property," is absolutely ludicrous.

This time, after again finding Ms. Droney in contempt, the court sentenced Ms. Droney to two years of incarceration, suspending all but one year (the "1994 Order").The court, however, allowed Ms. Droney to purge the contempt by executing the necessary documents to effectuate transfer of title of the home to Mr. Droney.Soon after being taken from the courtroom by the sheriff, Ms. Droney signed the documents, thereby purging the contempt.Ms. Droney now appeals from the 1994 Order.

Issues Presented

Ms. Droney presents five questions for our consideration, which we have re-worded slightly:

1.Did the court err in granting the Petition for Contempt to enforce a disposition of property, where the Court of Appeals has held this could not be done?

2.Did ...