Droney v. Fitch
| Decision Date | 14 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:10-CV-114 CAS,4:10-CV-114 CAS |
| Parties | FREDERICK RAYMOND DRONEY, Plaintiff, v. COL. TIM FITCH, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Pending before this Court are motions to dismiss plaintiff's second amended complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by defendants Col. Ron Replogle, Col. Tim Fitch, Robert McCullough, and Eric Holder.1 Plaintiff opposes the motions and has also filed a motion for summary judgment. The motions are briefed and are ripe for review.
Plaintiff Frederick Raymond Droney, who is proceeding pro se, brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16991, and how it has been applied to him by officials of the State of Missouri. Plaintiff brings suit against Col. Tim Fitch, Chief of Police for St. Louis County, Robert P. McCullough, Prosecuting Attorney forSt. Louis County, Col. Ron Replogle, Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol, and Eric H. Holder Jr., United States Attorney General. In his second amended complaint, plaintiff claims he is not an offender within the meaning of SORNA and, therefore, he cannot be required to register in Missouri. Plaintiff also claims SORNA is unconstitutional in that it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. He contends the State of Missouri is unlawfully implementing SORNA in that SORNA requires plaintiff to comply with Missouri's more onerous registration requirements, which the Missouri Supreme Court ruled violate the Missouri Constitution for persons convicted prior to the enactment of the Missouri sex offender registration statute. Plaintiff also challenges the enforcement mechanism of SORNA, and asks the Court to declare that he cannot be prosecuted under SORNA.
All defendants move to dismiss. They argue plaintiff is require to register under SORNA, and that the Eighth Circuit has already decided that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Additionally, the state defendants argue plaintiff is required to register in Missouri regardless if he crosses state lines, and regardless if Missouri is in compliance with SORNA. Defendant Holder argues SORNA does not violate the Commerce Clause, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's constitutional claims against defendant Holder in his official capacity.
Plaintiff opposes the motions to dismiss, and has also filed a motion for summary judgment asserting there are no issues of material facts, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all claims. Defendants Replogle, Fitch, and McCullough respond that there are no genuine issues of material facts, but that the complaint should be dismissed or summary judgment should be entered in their favor because plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the followingreasons, the Court will grant defendants' motions to dismiss and deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In the complaint, a plaintiff "must include sufficient factual information to provide the 'grounds' on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 222 (2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires a plaintiff to plead "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. at 562 (quoted case omitted). This standard "simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim or element]." Id. at 556.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, even if it appears that "actual proof of those facts is improbable, " Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, and reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Materials attached to the complaint as exhibits maybe considered in construing the sufficiency of the complaint. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986).
The standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The initial burden is placed on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Ia. v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988) (). Once this burden is discharged, if the record shows that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on a material factual issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
It is undisputed that plaintiff was convicted in the circuit court of Howard County, Missouri in June 1989 of two counts of sodomy. Plaintiff was sentenced to ten years in prison. Plaintiff states that he was released from prison and placed on parole in August 1995, at which time he was required to register as a sex offender under Missouri law. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 589.400, et seq. ("SORA"). Plaintiff stopped registering because the Missouri Highway Patrol informed him that he was no longer required to do so in light of the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling in Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. 2006)(en banc). In the Phillips case the Missouri Supreme Court held thatthe portions of SORA that imposed an affirmative duty to register based on pleas or convictions for conduct committed prior to enactment of the statute violated the state's constitutional prohibition of laws "retrospective in operation." Id. at 850 ().
Later in 2006, however, Congress enacted SORNA, which provides that "a sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides." 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a). After the passage of SORNA, and the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Keathley, 290 S.W.3d 719 (2009) (en banc), the Missouri Highway patrol informed plaintiff that he was once again required to register in Missouri as a sex offender. In the Keathley case the Missouri Supreme Court wrote, Id. at 720.
It is undisputed that plaintiff has filled out Missouri sex offender registration forms since July 15, 2009, and that as of January 5, 2011, he was listed as being compliant with Missouri's registration requirements.
Plaintiff challenges that he is an offender within the meaning of SORNA, and argues he is not required to register in Missouri under the authority of SORNA.
In 2006, Congress enacted SORNA, which provides in pertinent part that:
A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student. For initial registration purposes only, a sex offender shall alsoregister in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the jurisdiction of residence. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a).
The statute also states:
The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section. § 16913(d).
On February 28, 2007, the Attorney General issued an a rule, effective February 28, 2007, which states in pertinent part:
The requirements of [SORNA] apply to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to enactment of that Act. 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (emphasis added).
Under the statute, a "sex offender" is "an individual who was convicted of a sex offense." 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1). A "sex offense" includes "a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another" and "a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor." § 16911(5)(A)(i) and (ii). The term "specified...
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