Drossos v. United States

• Decision Date: 07 November 1924
• Docket Number: No. 6687.,6687.
• Citation: 2 F.2d 538
• Parties: DROSSOS v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

2 F.2d 538 (1924)

DROSSOS v. UNITED STATES.

No. 6687.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

November 7, 1924.

F. W. James, of Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff in error.

Charles M. Morris, U. S. Atty., of Salt Lake City, Utah (Edward M. Morrissey, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for the United States.

Before LEWIS, Circuit Judge, and MUNGER and MILLER, District Judges.

MILLER, District Judge.

The plaintiff in error was indicted on three counts in the United States District Court for the District of Utah for violation of the White Slave Traffic Act (Comp. St. §§ 8812-8819).

The first count charged the defendant with having transported one Panagoula Georgopoulos, a female not the wife of plaintiff in error, in interstate commerce over the Bamberger Electric and Oregon Short Line Railroad from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Anaconda, Mont., for the purposes of prostitution, concubinage, debauchery, and other immoral purposes.

The second count charged plaintiff in error on the same day with inducing, enticing, and persuading the said female to leave Salt Lake City, in the state of Utah, and to go and be carried in interstate commerce over the lines of the said railroads, common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, to the city of Anaconda, in the state of Montana, for the unlawful purposes of prostitution, debauchery, and other immoral purposes.

The third count charged the plaintiff in error on the same date with procuring, obtaining, and assisting and aiding in procuring and obtaining a certain railroad ticket over the lines of the Bamberger Electric from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Ogden City, Utah, and thence from Ogden City, Utah, to the city of Anaconda, Mont., which tickets were then and there to be and were then and there used by the said female in going in interstate commerce from Salt Lake City, Utah, to Anaconda, Mont., for the purposes of prostitution, debauchery, and other immoral purposes.

The case was tried to a jury and a verdict of guilty on each count was returned by them, upon which a sentence was imposed under each count of two years in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, to run concurrently.

With reference to certain testimony introduced by the government relative to the relations of the plaintiff in error and the female, Panagoula Georgopoulos, in Salt Lake City prior to their journey to Anaconda, and relative to their relations while at Anaconda, the court instructed the jury as follows:

"If you are convinced that this relation — that the relationship of these parties in Anaconda was innocent, that the defendant had no intention of engaging in immoral relations with this woman when he left here after her arrival in Montana, and if you are convinced by the evidence introduced in behalf of the defendant, then you should acquit him upon all the counts of the indictment. But if you are convinced that this man joined in this trip with this woman for the purpose of cohabiting with her unlawfully and illegally, and that he transported her, purchased the ticket, or assisted in purchasing the ticket, and that he persuaded or induced her to go, then he would be guilty under the indictment."

To this instruction plaintiff in error timely excepted, and the giving of such instruction is now assigned as error. Standing alone, it must be conceded that this instruction is palpably erroneous and prejudicial, in that it shifts the burden of proof and in effect tells the jury: (1) That to acquit they must be convinced that the relationship of the parties in Anaconda was innocent; (2) they must be convinced that the defendant had no intention of engaging in immoral relations with this woman when he left Salt Lake City after her arrival in Montana; and (3) that they must be so convinced by the evidence introduced in behalf of the defendant.

The only question is whether it was cured in subsequent instructions.

Subsequently, and bearing on the question presented, the court charged the jury as follows:

"All presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence, and a man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown he is entitled to an acquittal," and then followed a not...