Drouillard v. Am. Alt. Ins. Corp.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 334977,334977 |
| Citation | 916 N.W.2d 844,323 Mich.App. 212 |
| Parties | Jeremy DROUILLARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Mark Granzotto, PC (by Mark Granzotto ) and Fraser & Souweidane (by Stuart A. Fraser IV ) for plaintiff.
kallas & henk, pc (by Contantine N. Kallas and Michele L. Riker-Semon ) for defendant.
Before: Talbot, C.J., and Meter and Tukel, JJ.
Defendant, American Alternative Insurance Corporation (AAIC), appeals by leave granted1 an order denying its motion for summary disposition in this dispute over uninsured motorist coverage. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of AAIC.
On the evening of October 13, 2014, plaintiff, Jeremy Drouillard, an emergency medical technician, was involved in a single-vehicle accident while riding as a passenger in an ambulance driven by his partner, Angelica Schoenberg. Schoenberg and Drouillard were traveling westbound on Griswold, in "lights and sirens mode," on their way to a service call near the intersection of Griswold and 14th Street. Schoenberg opined that she was driving less than 45 miles per hour when the ambulance suddenly struck something in the intersection of Griswold and 13th Street. She did not know what she struck until she exited the ambulance and saw drywall dust and debris scattered in the roadway. As a result of the accident, Drouillard suffered injuries to his lumbar spine and was eventually disabled from work.
The events surrounding the accident were witnessed by three bystanders, who resided in homes fronting Griswold near the intersection with 13th Street. According to these bystanders, a white pickup truck driving on 13th Street darted across Griswold in front of the ambulance. The rapid acceleration of the truck caused a large quantity of building materials to fall from the truck's bed or trailer into the roadway, blocking both traveling lanes on Griswold. Shortly thereafter, the ambulance entered the intersection and struck the building materials.
Drouillard's employer maintained insurance for the ambulance through a policy issued by AAIC, which included an endorsement for Michigan uninsured motorist coverage. The endorsement stated that AAIC would pay all amounts an insured individual was entitled to recover from the owner or driver of an "uninsured motor vehicle." Pertinent to this matter, the policy defined "uninsured motor vehicle" as follows:
Drouillard filed suit against AAIC on September 21, 2015, seeking uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to the stated policy terms. AAIC admitted that Drouillard was an "insured" who would qualify for uninsured motorist benefits if all other terms and conditions were satisfied, but AAIC maintained that benefits were not available to Drouillard because there was no "uninsured motor vehicle" involved in the accident. AAIC moved for summary disposition on this basis, arguing that the pickup truck did not qualify as a hit-and-run vehicle and that the pickup truck did not cause an object to hit the insured ambulance. The trial court rejected both arguments, and this appeal followed.
This Court reviews de novo rulings on summary disposition motions.2 AAIC did not identify the subrule under which it brought its motion for summary disposition. However, because AAIC challenged the factual sufficiency of Drouillard's claim and relied on evidence beyond the pleadings, we review the court's ruling under the standards applicable to MCR 2.116(C)(10).3 The trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) only if "there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."4 "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ."5
"An insurance policy is similar to any other contractual agreement, and, thus, the court's role is to 'determine what the agreement was and effectuate the intent of the parties.' "6 The Court ascertains the intent of the parties by examining the language employed in the contract.7 The words and phrases used should be construed in context, and this Court may consult a dictionary in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of undefined language.8 "Every word, phrase, and clause in a contract must be given effect, and [an] interpretation that would render any part of the contract surplusage or nugatory must be avoided."9 "If the contractual language is unambiguous, courts must interpret and enforce the contract as written because an unambiguous contract reflects the parties' intent as a matter of law."10 "A contract is ambiguous when, after considering the entire contract, its words may reasonably be understood in different ways."11
AAIC argues on appeal that it was entitled to summary disposition because there was no evidence that an "uninsured motor vehicle" was involved in the accident in light of the contractual definition of an uninsured motor vehicle as a vehicle that is a "hit-and-run vehicle." Specifically, AAIC argues that the common usage of the phrase "hit-and-run" denotes a knowledge element on the part of the driver, and AAIC calls our attention to various statutes establishing criminal penalties for a " 'driver of a vehicle who knows or who has reason to believe that he or she has been involved in an accident' " but fails to stop at the scene.12 Drouillard, on the other hand, contends that the phrase "hit-and-run" does not involve a knowledge component and suggests that a hit-and-run vehicle is involved in an accident whenever neither the driver nor the owner of the vehicle can be identified.
We find it unnecessary to determine whether the phrase "hit-and-run vehicle" requires knowledge of the accident on the part of the driver because assuming, without deciding, that knowledge is required, the trial court correctly concluded that questions of fact remained as to that issue. On appeal, AAIC argues that the only evidence of the truck driver's knowledge consisted of eyewitness speculation.13 Although it is true that "[s]peculation and conjecture are insufficient to create an issue of material fact,"14 a fact-finder could infer from evidence other than eyewitness speculation that the driver was aware that the building materials he was hauling had fallen into the road. Although the eyewitnesses differed as to whether the building materials included lumber or consisted solely of drywall, they agreed that there was such a large amount of materials deposited in the road that the pile measured approximately two feet high. They also agreed that the accident occurred quickly after the materials landed in the roadway: one witness described the lapse of time as approximately three to five seconds; another witness estimated that it was "[m]aybe half a minute, if that"; and a third witness observed that the pickup truck had "barely cleared the intersection" before the ambulance arrived. Given the quantity of dropped materials and the immediacy of the ambulance's collision, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the driver knew about the loss of the building materials from the sudden absence of weight from the vehicle and, in turn, came to realize that the materials had caused an accident. The trial court did not err by reaching the same conclusion.
Next, AAIC argues that the plain language of the insurance policy only provides coverage in these circumstances if the pickup truck caused an object to hit the insured ambulance. Therefore, according to AAIC, it was entitled to summary disposition because the unrefuted evidence demonstrated that the ambulance struck the stationary pile of building materials—the building materials did not strike the ambulance.
As it relates to this issue, the trial court found that it was required by this Court's holding in Dancey , to deny AAIC's motion for summary disposition. In that case, this Court was called upon to interpret identical policy language to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits after she struck a ladder in the roadway when there was no direct evidence that the ladder had fallen from a vehicle.15 The Court examined a line of cases involving accidents in which a vehicle came into contact with some object cast off from another vehicle.16 It found the circumstances before it distinguishable from similar cases because there was no "objective and convincing evidence of another unidentified vehicle that could have been the source of the object that made contact with the insured vehicle."17 Nonetheless, it affirmed the trial court's denial of summary disposition because the accident had occurred on a raised overpass that was only accessible to vehicular traffic.18 The Court reasoned that even without evidence of an identified vehicle from which the ladder may have fallen, the unique location of the accident created a question of fact "with regard to whether a substantial physical nexus exists between the ladder and an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle."19
Importantly, the issue before the Court in Dancey , and the reason for the Court's conclusion, was whether the plaintiff could establish a substantial physical nexus between the ladder and a hit-and-run vehicle. By...
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