Drown v. Allen

• Decision Date: 10 November 1879
• Citation: 91 Pa. 393
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Drown <I>versus</I> Allen.

91 Pa. 393

DrownversusAllen.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 21, 1879.

November 10, 1879.

October 21st 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ.GREEN, J., absent

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie county:Of October and November Term 1879, No. 217.

Benson & Brainerd for plaintiff in error.—General reputation of want of good character, in the particular in which it has been assailed, is receivable in evidence in mitigation of damages and to show want of malice: Conroe v. Conroe, 11 Wright 200;Moyer v. Moyer, 13 Id. 211.When, therefore, the alleged slander is an accusation that the plaintiff is a thief, how, upon principle or practice, can the defendant be denied the right to prove in mitigation of damages that the plaintiff had acquired a prior general reputation of being a thief?

The defendant to avail himself of his defence properly pleaded "Not guilty," and justification: Peters v. Ulmer, 24 P. F. Smith 404.

H. W. Blakeslee, Geo. A. Allen and J. Ross Thompson, for defendant in error.—In the case of Conroe v. Conroe, 11 Wright 200, relied upon by plaintiff in error, the alleged slander consisted of general charge of want of chastity, not a specific act, and, consequently the general reputation of plaintiff as to want of chastity was admissible.

In Moyer v. Moyer, 13 Wright 211, the alleged slanderous words charged the plaintiff with perjury, and consequently evidence of a general reputation for truth and veracity was admissible.In this case the defamatory words charge a want of honesty, and the court admitted evidence as to general reputation for honesty.Surely the plaintiff in this case has no cause to complain, for the admission by the court is broader than the offer, including not only what the plaintiff in error asked, but even more, even the ordinary transactions of every-day life, in which a party may or may not have dealt honestly.As a charge of perjury puts in issue character for truth and veracity, so does a charge of being a thief the general character for honesty.

Mr. Justice PAXSONdelivered the opinion of the court, November 10th 1879.

This was an action on the case for slander.The plaintiff is a minister of the gospel in the Zion Church.The alleged slander consisted in the charge that he was a thief and had stolen a sheep.Pleas: the general issue and justification.Upon the trial, the counsel for defendant proposed to ask the witness upon the stand, "What is the general reputation of the plaintiff as to being a thief?"The question was objected to by the plaintiff and the objection was sustained by the court, the learned judge holding that the proper question to be put is, "What is the general reputation of the plaintiff for honesty?"To this ruling the defendant excepted, and it is the subject of the one assignment of error.

Whatever may have been the rule at one time, the later cases establish the principle, that in an action for slander the defendant may show, in mitigation of damages, the general bad character of the plaintiff for the particular thing with which he is charged.Thus, if the slander consisted in a charge that the plaintiff was unchaste, evidence is admissible that the plaintiff's general reputation for chastity is bad.And the same in respect of any other vice or crime.This principle is distinctly asserted in Conroe v. Conroe and Wife, 11 Wright 198, and forcible and satisfactory reasons given therefor by Mr. Justice STRONG.The same doctrine was reasserted by Mr. Justice READ, in the later case of Moyer v. Moyer, 13 Wright 210.We need not repeat what was so well said in those cases.They rest upon the principle that a reputation already damaged in the very point in controversy,...