Druhl v. Equit. Life Assur. Soc.

Citation56 N.D. 517,218 N.W. 220
Decision Date05 March 1928
Docket NumberNo. 5432.,5432.
PartiesDRUHL et al. v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court.

In an action on a life insurance policy providing for double indemnity in event the death of the insured results “solely from bodily injuries caused directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes by external, violent, and purely accidental means,” and is not the result of or caused directly or indirectly “by disease or illness of any kind, physical or mental infirmity,” it is held:

When an accident causes a diseased condition which, together with the accident, results in death, the accident alone is to be considered the cause of death within the provisions of the policy.

The term “physical infirmity” as used in the policy means something that materially impairs, weakens, or undermines the constitution of the insured, tends to reduce his powers of resistance, and thereby enhances the risk of death in case of injury.

In the instant case it is held that there is substantial evidence from which the jury could find that the death of the insured resulted solely from bodily injuries caused directly, exclusively, and independently of all other causes by external, violent, and purely accidental means, and that death was not caused directly or indirectly by physical infirmity or disease or illness of any kind.

Appeal from District Court, Ward County; Lowe, Judge.

Action by Perle May Druhl and another against the Equitable Life Assurance Society. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Dudley L. Nash, of Minot, for appellant.

L. J. Palda, Jr., C. E. Brace, and Robert W. Palda, all of Minot, for respondents.

CHRISTIANSON, J.

[1] Plaintiffs brought this action as beneficiaries in a policy issued by the defendant upon the life of Amiel Druhl. The insured was the husband of the plaintiff Perle May Druhl and the father of the plaintiff Maurice Druhl. By the terms of the policy, the defendant insured the life of Amiel Druhl and agreed to pay to the beneficiary named in the policy the sum of $3,000 upon due proof of the death of the insured. The policy further provided:

“In event of death from accident, the society agrees to increase the amount so payable to six thousand dollars upon due proof that the death of the insured resulted solely from bodily injuries caused directly, exclusively, and independently of all other causes by external, violent, and purely accidental means.”

“The increased amount of insurance * * * in case of accidental death shall be payable upon receipt of due proof that the death of the insured occurred while this policy was in full force and effect, and resulted solely from bodily injuries caused directly, exclusively, and independently of all other causes by external, violent, and purely accidental means, provided that death shall ensue within 90 days from the date of such injuries and shall not be the result of or be caused directly or indirectly by self-destruction, sane or insane, disease or illness of any kind, physical or mental infirmity, any violation of law by the insured, military or naval service of any kind in time of war or by engaging as a passenger or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic expeditions.”

The insured died July 17, 1925. The plaintiffs claimed that his death was due solely to accidental causes, and that they were entitled to receive from the defendants the sum of $6,000 under the provisions of the policy providing for double indemnity in case of accidental death. The defendant admitted that the beneficiaries were entitled to receive the face of the policy, namely, $3,000, but denied that there was any liability under the provisions of the policy providing double indemnity for accidental death. The sole question in controversy in this action is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the double indemnity. This question was decided in favor of the plaintiffs in the trial court, and the defendant has appealed.

It is the claim of the plaintiff that the death of the insured was caused by a blow upon his abdomen by the handle of a plow which he was guiding-the plow striking a rock or some other obstruction while being drawn by four horses, with the result that the handle of the plow struck the insured in the abdomen, inflicting injuries from which he died. The accident occurred July 7, 1925, and the insured died July 17, 1925. The evidence adduced shows without dispute that the insured received severe injuries on July 7, 1925, while guiding a plow which was being drawn by four horses, the handle of the plow striking the insured in the abdomen. The insured was brought to Minot and placed in a hospital on the afternoon of the following day. Shortly thereafter an operation was performed for appendicitis. The doctors performing this operation found that he was not suffering from this disease; and, while he was under the same anæsthetic, they performed another operation, apparently of an exploratory nature, the exact nature of which does not appear in the evidence. The insured died July 17, 1925. After his death, an autopsy was performed, and in the abdominal cavity there was found a blood clot about three inches in diameter and a complete intestinal obstruction involving the small intestine approximately within three feet of its junction with the large intestine. The doctor who performed, and those who observed the performance of, the autopsy, testified that it was found that the insured, a number of years prior thereto, had had an operation for hernia, and that the obstruction of the bowel was due to the twisting of the small bowel around a band of adhesions involving the small bowel at the side of the obstruction and the so-called greater omentum. The greater omentum, according to the medical testimony, does not normally adhere to the small bowel; but in this case it did so adhere, and the coils of the bowel were in turn attached to one another. The sole question involved here is whether in the circumstances it can be said that the death of the insured was due to such causes as to bring it within the above-quoted provisions of the policy providing for double indemnity in case of accidental death.

The doctor who performed the autopsy had also been called to see the insured some hours before his death. He testified that in his opinion the blood clot was caused by the blow from the plow handle at the time the insured was injured. He further testified that, basing his opinion upon the assumed facts as to the previous condition of health of the insured, the infliction of the injury by the plow handle, and the condition of the insured immediately following and continuing up to the time of death, and the physical facts disclosed by the examination of the abdominal cavity upon the autopsy, the obstruction of the bowels was occasioned by the blow of the plow handle, and that the toxemia or poisoning of the insured's system resulting in his death was due to the obstruction of the bowel. On cross-examination, the doctor testified in part:

“Q. These adhesions, Doctor, that you were talking about as being old adhesions, could they not be a cause of the obstruction? A. They were factors, but not the exciting factors, in my opinion.

Q. You mean in your opinion the man could be in good health and still have those adhesions? A. Perfect health.

Q. So that...

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22 cases
  • Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Gratiot, 1742
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • September 26, 1932
    ...harmless; that deceased suffered an accident on July 2, 1930, which caused his death. Hagens and Wehrli in reply. The case of Druhl v. Equitable Assn., 218 N.W. 220 by defendant in error, does not sustain the contention of her counsel. Nichols v. Com. Trav. Accident Assn., (Mass.) 109 N.E. ......
  • Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • January 8, 1940
    ...other causes by the blow which Druhl received from the plow handle; and that the obstruction of the bowel was the direct cause of death." (p. 523.) cites the cases of Taylor v. New York L. Ins. Co. 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912, 60 A.L.R. 959; Bennett v. Travelers' Protective Asso. 123 Neb. 3......
  • Turner v. Mut. Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1946
    ...234 Iowa 817, 13 N.W.2d 440, 153 A.L.R. 697;Cotten v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 5 Cir., 41 F. 506;Druhl v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 56 N.D. 517, 218 N.W. 220, 60 A.L.R. 962;Commercial Casualty Co. v. Mathews, 57 Ga.App. 446, 195 S.E. 887. Assuming that the assured was charged with n......
  • Kasper v. Provident Life Ins. Co., s. 9612
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • October 11, 1979
    ...187 N.W.2d 657 (N.D.1971); Jacobson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 69 N.D. 632, 289 N.W. 591 (1940); Druhl v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 56 N.D. 517, 218 N.W. 220 (1928). But where the policy also contains an "exclusionary" clause and it is found that a preexisting bodily infirmit......
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