Drury v. Volusia County, Case No. 6:10-cv-1176-Orl-28DAB
| Decision Date | 28 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:10-cv-1176-Orl-28DAB |
| Parties | ASHLEY DRURY, Plaintiff, v. VOLUSIA COUNTY, ROBERY PAUL TAMERIS, JECOA DUANE SIMMONS, CHRISTIN DUARTE, KEVIN SWEAT, individually and in his official capacity as Director of the Volusia County Beach Patrol, JAMES DINNEEN, in his official capacity as County Manager for Volusia County, Florida, MARY ANNE CONNORS, in her official capacity as Deputy County Manager for Volusia County, Florida, and MIKE COFFIN, in his official capacity as Director of the Volusia County Department of Public Protection, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This case is before the Court on the following motions: (1) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts I Through IV (Doc. 29) filed by Defendant Jecoa Duane Simmons; (2) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts I Through IV (Doc. 30) filed by Defendant Robert Paul Tameris1; (3) Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 36) filed byDefendants Kevin Sweat, James Dinneen, Mary Anne Connors, Mike Coffin, and Volusia County ("the County"); and (4) Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement (Doc. 70) filed by Defendant Christin Duarte.2 Plaintiff has filed Responses to these motions. (Docs. 47, 46, 50, & 72, respectively).
During the summer of 2008, when she was sixteen and seventeen years old, 4 Plaintiff was employed by the Volusia County Beach Patrol ("the Beach Patrol") as a lifeguard. (Compl. ¶ 29). Defendants Simmons and Tameris—thirty-five and forty-three years old, respectively—were Plaintiff's direct supervisors, and Defendant Duarte was introduced to Plaintiff as a "senior lifeguard"; Duarte was thirty years old at the time. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 34, 37, & 39). Defendant Sweat was the Director of the Beach Patrol during the time of the events at issue. Id. ¶ 14).
Plaintiff alleges that while she was a lifeguard, Tameris, Simmons, and Duarte "established... intimate relationship[s]"? with her and used their positions as her superiors to foster those relationships. Id. ¶ 31). Plaintiff further alleges that during the time she was employed by the Beach Patrol and beginning just after she reached the age of seventeen, she had sexual intercourse with Tameris three times, (Id. ¶¶ 34-35), and with Simmons and Duarte once each, (Id. ¶¶ 37-40). Plaintiff asserts that she did not and could not give consent to these sexual encounters because she was a minor child at the time and was therefore legally incapable of giving consent. (Id. ¶ 42). Additionally, consent was allegedly not possible because of a "coercive environment" that existed in the Beach Patrol; sexual encounters between senior lifeguards and underage lifeguards were "part of the culture" and "a condition for employment" at the Beach Patrol. (Id. ¶ 43).
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in August 2010, alleging that the Defendants—Tameris, Simmons, Duarte, Sweat, Volusia County, the County Manager, the Deputy County Manager, and the Director of the County Department of Public Protection—violated her constitutional rights and committed several state law torts. The Complaint sets forth eleven counts, including: three claims for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all of the Defendants (Counts I, II, and III); one conspiracy count under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against Defendants Tameris, Simmons, and Sweat (Count IV); one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against Defendant Sweat only (Count V); state law claims of negligent supervision (Count VI) and negligent retention (Count VII) against the County only; three state law battery claims—one each against Tameris, Simmons, and Duarte (Counts VIII, IX, and X); and one count of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Tameris, Simmons, Duarte, and Sweat (Count XI). In the motions currently before the Court, one or more of the Defendants has raised challenges to all but the state law battery claims in Counts VIII, IX, and X.
"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "'[D]etailed factual allegations'" are not required, but "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In considering a motion to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court limits its "consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed." LaGrasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
A. Rule 8(a)
Some of the Defendants initially argue that the Complaint does not conform to the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) that it provide "a short and plain statement of the claim." They contend that the Complaint is "shotgun pleading" that is vague, conclusory, and repetitive and that it is not clear which allegations pertain to which claims.
The Complaint is not a "shotgun pleading." It contains eleven counts in forty-one pages and provides fair notice of the claims brought against each Defendant and the basis therefor. The Complaint complies with the requirements of Rule 8(a).
Defendants Dinneen, Connors, and Griffin are sued only in their official capacities as managers and directors for Volusia County, and Defendant Sweat is sued in both his individual capacity and his official capacity. These Defendants assert that they are improperly named in their official capacities because the County is the proper Defendant and thus naming the individuals in their official capacities is superfluous. In her Response, Plaintiff concedes this point and acquiesces to the dismissal of these Defendants in their official capacities. (Doc. 50 at 4). Thus, the claims against Defendants Dinneen, Connors, and Griffin will be dismissed, and the claims against Defendant Sweat will be dismissed insofar as they are brought against him in his official capacity.
In Counts I, II, and III, Plaintiff brings—pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983—three claims for constitutional violations against Tameris, Simmons, Duarte, Sweat, and the County. Plaintiff contends that Tameris, Simmons, and Duarte violated several of her constitutional rights by engaging in sexual relations with her while she was a minor and while they were her supervisors at the Beach Patrol, and she contends that Sweat and the County are also liable. In Count I, Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; in Count II, she asserts a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim; and in Count III, she asserts a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim.
"In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law." Griffinv. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). For the most part, the Defendants do not assert that the allegations of the Complaint, if proven to be true, could support a finding of a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.5 Indeed, courts have recognized that sexual offenses committed by state actors violate the Constitution in some circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (); Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1303 (); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 445, 451 (5th Cir. 1994) (). Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded violations of her constitutional rights.
The Defendants do challenge whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the acts at issue were committed "under color of law." Their arguments on this point are unavailing.
Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1303 (citation omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1523 (11th Cir. 1995)). Additionally, "a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of law when he abuses the position given to him by the State." Id.
The Defendants contend that the Complaint's allegations "do not rise to the level of an abuse of power" by any of the Defendants, (Doc. 36 at 12), and that Plaintiff does not allege whether the acts at issue occurred "on or off duty" or during or after work, (see Doc. 29 at 3; Doc. 30 at 3). The Defendants are incorrect; Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for a deprivation of rights by someone "acting under color of state law."
Although the Eleventh Circuit has made a distinction ...
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