Drury v. Young

• Decision Date: 12 July 1882
• Citation: 58 Md. 546
• Parties: EDWARD T. DRURY, WILLIAM H. IJAMS, JR. AND SAMUEL M. RANKIN v. WILLIAM H. H. YOUNG.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

58 Md. 546

EDWARD T. DRURY, WILLIAM H. IJAMS, JR. AND SAMUEL M. RANKIN v. WILLIAM H. H. YOUNG.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

July 12, 1882

APPEAL from The Superior Court of Baltimore City.

This suit was brought by the appellee against the appellants. The declaration charged that the plaintiff, on the 26th day of August, 1881, bargained and agreed with the defendants, to buy of them, and the defendants then sold to the plaintiff twenty-five hundred cases (five thousand dozen) of C. C. C. 3 lb. first quality, country packed tomatoes at $1.10 per dozen, to be delivered on cars at the Philadelphia Depot within a reasonable time after the date of said contract, and to be paid for by the plaintiff to the defendants, cash on delivery, and one and a half per cent. to be deducted for brokerage, and in consideration thereof, and that the plaintiff had then undertaken to accept and receive the said tomatoes and to pay the defendants for the same at the price aforesaid; defendants then promised the plaintiff to deliver the said tomatoes to him as aforesaid; and further, that though the plaintiff was at all times from the making of the said bargain and sale as aforesaid, ready and willing to receive and accept the said tomatoes, and to pay the said defendants therefor upon delivery the stipulated price, yet the defendants subsequently, to wit, on the twenty-ninth day of August, 1881, absolutely refused to deliver the said tomatoes to the plaintiff, then or at any other time, and absolutely refused to perform then, or at any other time each and all of the terms of the said contract by them to be performed, which said refusals they, then and there communicated to the said plaintiff, by reason of which said refusals to perform their contract by the defendants, the plaintiff was greatly damaged.

The plaintiff filed with the narr., which contained three counts, the following account:

BALTIMORE Aug. 31st, 1881.

Mess. Drury, Ijams & Rankin,

To W H. H. Young & Co., Dr.

To am't difference in price between goods purchased of you, on 26th

inst., and goods purchased to fill same order, you having failed to

do so, viz.,

2,000 cans 3lb tomatoes, 4,000 doz. @ 1.35 net cash, 5,400 00 500 cans 3lb tomatoes, 1,000 doz. @ 1.25 net cash, 1,250 00 -------- 6,650 00 CR. 2,500 c's 3lb c's tomatoes, 5,000 doz. @ 1.00 5,500 00 Less 1 o-o cash 55.00 Less 1 o-o brokerage 55.00 110 00 __________ 5,390 00 -------- 1,260 00 --------

 The defendants pleaded that they never were indebted as alleged, and that they did not promise as alleged.
                 

 The defendants took five exceptions,--four to matters of evidence, and the fifth was taken to the rulings of the Court upon their prayers. The insertion of the third exception only, is deemed necessary.
                  

 Third Exception.--The plaintiff then proposed to ask a witness, who had testified that he was a merchandize broker, whether there was an established custom and usage with reference to discount on sales for cash, and whether, or not, there was any established custom in regard to the allowance of brokerage when goods were sold to a broker personally; but the defendants objected to the question. The Court said "receive it, subject to exceptions." The defendants said they did not wish this to go in subject to exceptions, but excepted to the ruling of the Court then. The Court said it would let the testimony in, subject to exceptions. To the action of the Court in refusing to exclude the testimony, but admitting it subject to exceptions, the defendants excepted.
                 

 The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, for $750, and judgment was entered accordingly. The defendants appealed.
                 

 The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., STONE, MILLER, ALVEY, ROBINSON and RITCHIE, J.
                  

 Orlando F. Bump, for the appellants.
                  

 B. Howard Haman, and  Edgar H. Gans, for the appellee.
                 

 STONE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
                 

 One of the questions presented for our consideration in this case is, whether the "note or memorandum in writing" required by the seventeenth section of the Statute of Frauds, must be delivered to the other party thereto. It is apparent from the evidence that the note or memorandum in writing relied on in this case, was made by the bookkeeper of the appellants by the direction of one of them, and by the bookkeeper placed in their safe, among other papers, where it remained from the 27th of August, 1881, the day on which it was written, until it was produced in Court, at the trial of the case in February, 1882. There is no evidence that this note was ever seen by the appellee, or even its existence known to him until the trial; and it certainly never was delivered to him, or went out of the possession of the appellants, until produced in Court. It is strongly insisted by the appellants that the Statute is not gratified without a  delivery of this note or memorandum. It must be borne in mind that the Statute of Frauds was not enacted for cases where the parties have signed a written contract; for in these cases, the common law affords quite a sufficient guarantee against frauds and perjuries, as is provided by the Statute. The intent of the Statute was to prevent the enforcement of  parol contracts, unless the defendant could be shown to have executed the alleged contract by partial performance, or unless his signature to some written note or memorandum of the bargain--not to the bargain itself, could be shown.
                 

 The existence of the note or memorandum presupposes an antecedent contract by parol, of which the writing is a note or memorandum.  Benjamin on Sales, sec. 208.
                 

 Now the Statute itself is entirely silent on the question of the delivery of the note or memorandum of the bargain, and its  literal requirements are fulfilled by the existence of the note or memorandum of the bargain, signed by the party to be charged thereby. The Statute itself deals exclusively with the existence and not with the custody of the paper.
                 

 If the non-delivery of the note, does not violate the letter of the Statute, would it violate its spirit and be liable to any of the mischiefs which the statute was made to prevent?
                 

 The Statute was passed to prevent fraud practiced through the instrumentality of perjury. It was passed to prevent the defendant from suffering loss, upon the parol testimony of either a perjured or mistaken witness, speaking of a bargain different from the one in fact made. It made the defendant only liable when a note or memorandum of the bargain signed by himself was produced at the trial.
                 

 If produced from the defendant's own custody, it guards against the mischief that the Statute was passed to prevent, just as well as if produced from the custody of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the one likely to suffer by leaving the evidence of his bargain in the hands of the defendant--not the defendant himself.
                 

 The Statute of Frauds is an English Statute, and in the absence of any express adjudication of our own Court, we naturally look to the English Courts as the best

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