Dryer v. Flower Hosp., No. 3:04 CV 7631.

• Decision Date: 25 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 3:04 CV 7631.
• Parties: Catherine DRYER, Plaintiff, v. FLOWER HOSPITAL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

Page 934

383 F.Supp.2d 934

Catherine DRYER, Plaintiff, v. FLOWER HOSPITAL, Defendant.

No. 3:04 CV 7631.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.

August 25, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James D. Caruso, Arnold & Caruso, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiff.

Gerald R. Kowalski, Meredith L. Mercurio, Cooper & Walinski, Toledo, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KATZ, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Flower Hospital's ("Flower Hospital" or "Hospital") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 9) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act Claim (Doc. No. 6). Plaintiff Catherine Dryer ("Dryer") has filed a response (Doc. No. 10) and a supplement thereto (Doc. No. 17-1). Defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. No. 20). This Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., claims and supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant's motions.

BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2003 Dryer filed a negligence claim against Flower Hospital in state court (Doc. No. 1, Attachment 1, Exhibit A), which was amended on September 27, 2004 to include claims under the ADA (Doc. No. 1, Attachment 1, Exhibit B). On October 7, 2004, Flower Hospital filed a Notice of Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Doc. No. 1), which was granted on October 14, 2004 (Doc. No. 4).

Dryer suffers from Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease ("COPD"), a disease which inhibits lung function.¹ (Doc. No. 17-3, Consultation, pg. 1). As a result of this condition, she has been prescribed oxygen to assist with her breathing. (Doc No. 9-2, Deposition of Catherine Dryer at 24). In addition to an oxygen tank for long-term home use, id. at 39, Plaintiff has portable tanks, which hold four hours worth of oxygen, id. at 38.

On April 3, 2002, Dryer's husband was admitted to Flower Hospital pending admission to Hospice. (Doc. No. 17-3, Consultation, pg. 1). Over the course of the next week, Plaintiff spent between twelve and fourteen hours a day in his hospital room. (Dryer at 24). She brought her oxygen tank to the Hospital daily, but due to the tank's limited capacity she consistently ran out of oxygen. Id. at 24-25. Flower Hospital has oxygen ports installed in hospital rooms to facilitate the administration of oxygen, and the room in which Dryer's husband was staying had two such ports. Id. at 27. These ports required the installation of an oxygen flow meter before they were usable. (Deposition of Mary Koepfer at 8-9). These meters were kept in a locked room that was accessible only to Hospital staff. Id. at 10. On some occasions, members of the respiratory staff assisted Dryer in hooking her breathing apparatus into the oxygen port in her husband's room. (Dryer at 26-27). However, Hospital staff ultimately told Dryer it was against Hospital policy to allow non-patients to use in-room oxygen ports. (Doc. No. 1, Exhibit R, Deposition of Laura Lane at 12). A physician, Dr. Joel Retholz, offered to write a prescription allowing Dryer access to the ports (Doc. No. 20, Deposition of Joel Retholz at 7) but this request was denied as well, since Dryer was not herself a patient of the Hospital. On April 13, 2002, while at the Hospital, Dryer experienced difficulty breathing and went to the emergency room, where she was personally admitted to Flower. (Doc. No. 17-3, Discharge Summary, pg. 1). She was placed on a respirator and hospitalized until April 20, 2002. (Doc. No. 17-3, Consultation, pg. 1).

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting one or more essential elements of the non-movant's claim. Id. at 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant meets this burden, the opposing party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Harris v. General Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 802 (6th Cir.2000). Summary judgment must be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Williams v. Belknap, 154 F.Supp.2d 1069 (E.D.Mich.2001) (citing 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987)). However, "`at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,'" Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 227 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505); therefore, "[t]he Court is not required or permitted to judge the evidence or make findings or fact." Williams, 154 F.Supp.2d at 1071. The purpose of summary judgement "is not to resolve factual issues, but to determine if there are genuine issues of fact to be tried." Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 928, 930 (S.D.Ohio 1999). Ultimately, this Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Atchley v. RK Co., 224 F.3d 537, 539 (6th Cir.2000).

B. Americans with Disabilities Act Claims

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals "in the full and equal enjoyment of ... any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). For purposes of Title III, a hospital is expressly among the "private entities" that are considered public accommodations where discrimination is prohibited. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).

Under the law, discrimination includes: "a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford ... goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations," 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), and "a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden," 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).

1. Disability

The initial determination is whether Dryer was "disabled" so as to fall under the protections of the ADA. To be considered disabled, Dryer must meet three essential elements. First, her condition must constitute a mental or physical "impairment," second, the impairment must impact one or more "major life activities," and third, the impairment must "substantially limit" the major life activities identified. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998).

A physical or mental "impairment," in this context, includes any condition affecting the body's respiratory or cardiovascular system. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(4)(1)(i)(A). Dryer's COPD is a disease that affects her respiratory system. Additionally, she has a history of coronary artery disease and possible congestive heart failure, (Doc. No. 17-3, Consultation, pg. 2), which would affect her cardiovascular system.² As a result, Dryer can show that she has an impairment.

"Major life activities" per se are defined in 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(4)(2), and include performing manual tasks, walking and breathing. COPD is a disease that, by its nature, affects Dryer's ability to breathe. It can also affect her ability to perform manual tasks and to walk, as attested to by her physician. (Doc. No. 17-2, Affidavit of Frank Horton). Her condition, therefore, impacts major life activities.

The final step in the analysis is whether the impairment "substantially limits" major life activities. A...