Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 17 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 960418,960418 |
| Citation | 947 P.2d 678 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | 328 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 329 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 Michael Aaron DRYSDALE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., fka The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, an Ohio corporation; Granite School District, a governmental entity and political subdivision of the State of Utah; TNT Auction, Inc., a Utah corporation; Tire World, a Utah corporation; Marler Tire Supply Company, Inc.; and John Does II through X, Defendants and Appellees. |
Thomas L. Kay, Paul D. Newman, David N. Wolf, Salt Lake City, for Ford Motor Co.
INTRODUCTION
Michael Aaron Drysdale appeals the trial court's grant of Ford Motor Company's ("Ford") motion for summary judgment. We reverse.
On June 13, 1992, Drysdale was driving his 1980 Ford Pinto south on Interstate 15 near Beaver, Utah, when one of his tires blew out. His car slid into the median and rolled several times. Drysdale was severely injured as a result. Following the accident, Drysdale's family removed the blown tire and accompanying rim from the car and then had the car towed to a service station near Beaver. Sometime during Drysdale's hospital stay, and apparently without his knowledge or consent, the proprietors of the service station destroyed the car. It was not until approximately five months after the accident that Drysdale discovered that the car no longer existed.
Drysdale filed suit against several parties to recover damages relating to the accident. Against Ford, Drysdale made claims of strict products liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligence based on allegations that the car was defective, unreasonably dangerous, and unfit for the purpose for which it was sold. Ford moved for summary judgment, arguing that the car was the most relevant and crucial piece of evidence in this case and that without it Drysdale could not possibly prove, and Ford could not adequately defend, the case. The trial court granted the motion, and Drysdale appeals.
On appeal, Drysdale claims that the trial court incorrectly granted Ford's motion for summary judgment. He argues first that the trial court's dismissal of his case was more properly characterized as a discovery sanction for failure to preserve evidence under rule 37(b)(2)(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Drysdale argues that since the destruction of the car was not willful on his In response, Ford emphasizes that in Utah proximate cause is a required element in a products liability cause of action. Ford argues, however, that without the car, Drysdale cannot prove that the alleged design defect was the proximate cause of the particular injuries he sustained in the accident. Ford further claims that it cannot properly defend Drysdale's action without the car.
part, the trial court's sanction was an abuse of discretion. Drysdale further argues that if the dismissal was in fact a summary judgment, it was still improperly granted, reasoning that the destruction of the car does not preclude him from making out a prima facie case of design defect, since the alleged defect would be evident in any 1980 Ford Pinto. Drysdale also asserts that the trial court's findings of fact stating that Ford was "unfairly" and "severely prejudiced" by the destruction of the car were disputed, precluding summary judgment.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review them for correctness. Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1991). Further, "we view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. Finally, summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
We must first determine whether the trial court dismissed Drysdale's claims on summary judgment or, as Drysdale argues, as a discovery sanction. The language employed by Ford in its motion and by the trial court in its order is helpful in making this determination. Ford's motion was styled a "Motion for Summary Judgment," and the trial court explicitly stated that it was granting "Ford's Motion for Summary Judgment." In its memorandum in support of its motion, Ford argued that "Drysdale's failure to preserve the vehicle effectively prevents him from establishing the elements of his claim against Ford." After pointing out the necessity of proving that an allegedly defective product actually caused injury, Ford argues that Drysdale simply cannot show this without the car. The trial court adopted these arguments when it stated that it was granting Ford's motion "for the reasons and on the grounds set forth in the memoranda filed in support of Ford's motion." Clearly, these are proper claims and relevant arguments in a summary judgment context, and neither Ford in its motion nor the trial court in its order ever discussed discovery sanctions. Because nothing in Ford's motion or in the trial court's order leads us to think that Drysdale's claims were dismissed as a discovery sanction, we conclude that Ford's motion was in fact a rule 56 motion for summary judgment and that the trial court properly treated it as such.
We now address whether the motion was properly granted. We think it was not. "Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before judgment can be rendered against them unless it is obvious from the evidence...
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