DSCC v. Simon, A20-1017

Decision Date28 October 2020
Docket NumberA20-1017
Citation950 N.W.2d 280
Parties DSCC, et al., Respondents, v. Steve SIMON, in his official capacity as Minnesota Secretary of State, Respondent, Republican Party of Minnesota, et al., Appellants.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Sybil L. Dunlop, Samuel J. Clark, Katherine M. Swenson, Greene Espel PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Marc E. Elias, Bruce V. Spiva, Lalitha D. Madduri, Stephanie I. Command, Christina A. Ford, Perkins Coie LLP, Washington, D.C., for respondents DSCC, et al.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jason B. Marisam, Cicely R. Miltich, Assistant Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent Steve Simon.

Benjamin L. Ellison, Jones Day, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and John M. Gore, E. Stewart Crosland, Stephen J. Kenny, Jones Day, Washington, D.C., for appellants.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

This appeal requires consideration of the limits in Minnesota Statutes on the number of voters that an individual may assist in marking a ballot, Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, subd. 1 (2018) (stating that a person cannot "mark the ballots of more than three voters at one election"), and the number of completed absentee ballots that an individual may collect and deliver, Minn. Stat. § 203B.08, subd. 1 (2018) (limiting a person to delivering completed ballots for "not more than three voters in any election"). Respondents DSCC and DCCC (collectively, the Democratic committees) are national committees of the Democratic Party that engage in organizing and voter activities in support of senate and congressional candidates. In a complaint filed in district court, the Democratic committees asserted that the statutory limit on the number of voters that may be assisted in marking a ballot and the limit on the number of completed ballots that may be collected for delivery conflict with and therefore are preempted by section 208 of the federal Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10508. The Democratic committees also asserted that these limits burden the right to vote, in violation of the Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 2 and Article VII, Section 1 ; and burden political speech and associational rights, in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution. Appellants Republican Party of Minnesota and Republican National Committee (collectively, the Republican committees), intervened in the district court proceeding.

The Democratic committees moved for a temporary injunction in the district court, which respondent Steve Simon, Minnesota Secretary of State, and the Republican committees opposed. After briefing and a hearing, the district court concluded that the Democratic committees were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and had demonstrated that a temporary injunction was warranted. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.02 (stating that a temporary injunction should be granted if "sufficient grounds exist"). The court therefore temporarily enjoined the Secretary of State from taking steps to enforce or require compliance with the voter-assistance and ballot-collection limits.

The Republican committees filed an appeal on August 3, 2020, and on August 12, 2020, filed a petition for accelerated review. We granted the petition and directed the parties to file briefs on an expedited schedule. We held oral argument on September 3, 2020. In an order filed on September 4, 2020, we affirmed the district court's decision on the preemption claim as to the limit on the number of voters that may be assisted in marking a ballot, Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, subd. 1, but otherwise reversed the district court's decision. This opinion explains the reasons for our decision.

FACTS

In general, only the voter can mark the ballot that the voter receives for a particular election. See, e.g. , Minn. Stat. §§ 203B.08, subd. 1 (stating that an "eligible voter who receives" an absentee ballot "shall mark" the ballot); 203B.081, subd. 3(c) (2018) (directing a voter who votes in person early to "immediately retire to a voting station" and "mark the ballot" issued to the voter); 204C.13, subds. 1–5 (2018) (describing the process of giving a voter who votes in person on election day "only one ballot," allowing the voter to "retire alone" to the voting booth, directing the voter to "mark" the ballot and then "immediately deposit" the ballot in the box). A person, other than the voter, who marks the ballot of a voter "except as authorized by law and as directed by the voter," commits a crime. Minn. Stat. § 204C.16 (2018).

Minnesota has, for decades, allowed voters to use the assistance of another individual in the voting process in certain situations.1 First, a voter who needs "assistance because of inability to read English or physical inability to mark a ballot" may "obtain the assistance of any individual the voter chooses," except for the "voter's employer, an agent of the voter's employer, an officer or agent of the voter's union, or a candidate for election." Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, subd. 1. Second, a voter who uses an absentee ballot to vote, after marking the ballot and sealing it in a return envelope, "may designate an agent to deliver in person the sealed absentee ballot return envelope to the county auditor or municipal clerk or to deposit the return envelope in the mail." Minn. Stat. § 203B.08, subd. 1. In both cases, however, the person who assists the voter, either in marking a ballot or delivering a marked ballot, cannot assist "more than three voters." Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, subd. 1 (stating that the person assisting "shall mark the ballots of [no] more than three voters at one election"); Minn. Stat. § 203B.08, subd. 1 (stating that the agent cannot deliver or mail the ballots for "more than three voters in any election").2

In February 2018, the State charged a former candidate for public office with criminal offenses for unlawfully marking a voter's ballot and other election-related offenses. State v. Thao , No. 62-CR-18-927 (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct.). In that proceeding, the district court concluded that a separate restriction on voter assistance, which prohibits a candidate from providing assistance to a voter in marking a ballot, Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, subd. 1, is preempted by section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. The defendant was later found not guilty based on stipulated facts and a reasonable reliance defense. State v. Thao , No. 62-CR-18-927, Verdict (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 9, 2018).

Thereafter, the candidate (and others) challenged the candidate and three-voter-assistance limits in Minn. Stat. § 204C.15, subd. 1, asserting that those restrictions burden the right to vote, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Thao v. Minn. Sec'y of State , No. 62-CV-20-1044, Complaint (Ramsey Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 11, 2020). The plaintiffs and the Secretary of State entered into a consent decree, agreeing that the candidate and three-voter-assistance limits are preempted by the Voting Rights Act. The Secretary of State agreed to notify election officials that these limits are unenforceable and to revise election training materials before the general election on November 3, 2020, to eliminate references to these restrictions. The district court entered this consent decree on April 21, 2020.3

The complaint in this case was filed on January 17, 2020. The Democratic committees asserted that the three-voter-assistance limits imposed by sections 203B.08 and 204C.15 "directly contradict federal law," unduly burden the fundamental right to vote, and infringe on the "core political" speech and associational rights of organizations and citizens that work to increase voter turnout. Specifically, the Democratic committees alleged that the three-voter-assistance limits impose burdens on voters who need assistance due to language barriers or disabilities in marking a ballot or delivering a completed ballot. Relying on the Thao criminal case, the Democratic committees asserted that the criminal penalties for violating the voter-assistance limits deter volunteers and other workers from engaging in voter activities on behalf of political organizations. Finally, the Democratic committees alleged that their get-out-the-vote efforts communicate messages regarding participation in democratic elections that are protected political speech and involve associational rights that are burdened by Minnesota's voter-assistance limits.

On March 12, 2020, the Democratic committees moved for a temporary injunction. In support of their motion, the Democratic committees submitted declarations from individuals who work with Minnesotans with disabilities and with Hmong Americans, Somali Americans, and Native Americans living in Minnesota; researchers who focus on voter turnout in communities in which voters need assistance due to language or physical disabilities or socioeconomic or geographic factors; and community organizers for the Democratic committees. These declarations explained the challenges faced by voters with disabilities or who do not speak English as a primary language and, therefore, the need for assistance in voting. The Republican committees and the Secretary of State opposed the motion.

Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion for a temporary injunction.4

ANALYSIS

We review the district court's decision to grant a temporary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P'ship , 811 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. 2012) ; see Eakman v. Brutger , 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979) ("The sole issue on appeal [from an order denying a temporary injunction] is whether there was a clear abuse of ... discretion."). The district court abuses its discretion when it grants a temporary injunction based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. Dahlberg Bros. v. Ford Motor Co. , 272 Minn. 264, 137 N.W.2d 314, 323 (1965).

Because a temporary injunction is granted before a trial on the merits, "a showing of...

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    ...Stat. § 363A.04. "Preemption is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation, which is subject to de novo review." DSCC v. Simon, 950 N.W.2d 280, 287 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). Minnesota courts have previously addressed the scope of the MHRA's preemption provision. In Williams v. S......
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    ...Shall is a mandatory term. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2020) (stating that "'[s]hall' is mandatory"); see also DSCC v. Simon, 950 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Minn. 2020) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2018) when construing a statute). Third, subdivision 1(d) of Minn. Stat. § 518A.42 p......
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