DSM Inv. Grp. v. City of Des Moines

• Decision Date: 21 September 2022
• Docket Number: 21-1887
• Parties: DSM INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, IOWA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

DSM INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, IOWA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-1887

Court of Appeals of Iowa

September 21, 2022

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael Jacobsen, Judge.

DSM Investment Group, LLC appeals from a district court ruling in favor of the City of Des Moines.

Cornelius S. Qualley of Qualley Law, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

John O. Haraldson, Assistant City Attorney, Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.

AHLERS, PRESIDING JUDGE.

DSM Investment Group, LLC (DSM) appeals from a district court ruling in favor of the City of Des Moines (City). DSM contends the district court erred in (1) failing to rule on a motion in limine; (2) failing to award DSM damages; (3) determining DSM's expenses were unrecoverable attorney fees; and (4) failing to rule on DSM's due process claim.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

This dispute began in 2018 and involves a property owned by DSM in Des Moines. DSM has three members: George Qualley, Cornelius Qualley, and Riley Hogan. DSM leased the property to a separate entity that operates a bar on the premises. The bar business is owned by George and Cornelius.

The City police department issued a notice to DSM dated May 24. The notice declared DSM's property to be a specified crime property based on reports of criminal or illegal activity occurring at the property. The notice gave DSM twenty days "to cure the problem . . . in order to avoid the imposition of a penalty pursuant to the provisions of section 364.22 of the Code of Iowa [(2018)]." It instructed DSM to contact a specific police officer "in order to begin the abatement process." The notice further explained that DSM had "the right to request an administrative hearing in which [it] may challenge this declaration of [the] property as a Specified Crime Property" and that DSM would need to "issue a request in writing to the City Clerk of the City of Des Moines . . . within ten days of service of [the] notice." The notice warned DSM that if it "fail[ed] to abate the violations regarding [the] property, a lawsuit could be filed against [it] for a violation of Section 70-212 of the Des Moines Municipal Code."

After DSM received the notice, George instructed Cornelius to "perform appropriate legal research on it to see what the underlying basis was" and "to take any and all actions necessary to . . . have [the specified crime property designation] discharged." He also instructed Cornelius to contact the police officer designated in the notice and request an administrative hearing.

DSM requested a hearing to challenge the declaration. The City informed DSM that the administrative hearing was set for July 18. This was beyond the fifteen days provided for in the municipal code. See Des Moines, Iowa, Code art. 2 div. III, § 70-218(a). Two days before the hearing was scheduled to take place, DSM filed a petition asserting its due process rights were violated. It sought injunctive relief and damages. The next day-the day before the hearing-DSM received a letter^[1] from the City stating its attorney reviewed the specified crime property designation and determined the property did not meet the definition of a specified crime property, so the July 18 hearing was cancelled. As a result, DSM withdrew its motion for a temporary injunction.

Responding to the lawsuit filed by DSM, the City filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss the petition. The court ultimately denied the City's motion as to DSM's action for damages but granted it as to DSM's request for a permanent injunction.

On July 30, 2019, DSM emailed discovery requests to the City's attorney. The discovery included requests for admissions pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510. The City's attorney responded by asserting that discovery was not permissible until the parties completed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.507 conference. No further events related to the discovery requests occurred until September, when a trial scheduling and discovery plan was filed. Two days later, DSM emailed the City's attorney stating it "would like to renew [its] discovery request as of today and the deadlines set forth therein."

In February 2020, DSM moved for summary judgment based on its claim that the City's failure to respond to DSM's requests for admissions caused the requests to be deemed admitted. In response, the City filed responses to the requests for admissions and a motion seeking an order allowing the filing of responses pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.511. The City also resisted DSM's motion for summary judgment and filed its own motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the court denied both motions for summary judgment but did not expressly rule on the City's motion for authorization to submit responses to the requests for admissions.^[2]

Prior to trial, DSM filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the City from presenting any evidence that would "contradict[] an admission by the [City] to [DSM]'s requests for admissions." The court did not issue a written order on the motion, and it was not discussed at trial.^[3] Following trial, the court issued a written order on November 8, 2021, in which it determined that DSM was not entitled to attorney fees or damages. On November 29, DSM filed a motion to reconsider, requesting the court to rule on its motion in limine, reconsider the court's damages ruling, and address its underlying due process claim. The City resisted, noting DSM's motion was filed beyond Rule 1.904(2)'s fifteen-day deadline. The court agreed with the City that it could not consider DSM's motion.

DSM appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Iowa 2022). As for our review of the decision made by the district court following a bench trial, the standard of review depends upon the manner in which the case was tried. Dix v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 961 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Iowa 2021). Both parties agree this case was tried at law, so we review for correction of errors at law. See id.

III. Discussion A. Motion in Limine

DSM's first claim is that the district court erred in not ruling on its motion in limine seeking to prevent the City from presenting evidence that would contradict the statements in DSM's requests for admissions. We reject this claim for multiple reasons.

The first problem with DSM's claim is that DSM did not comply with our rules of civil procedure in serving the requests for admissions. To begin, DSM sent the requests before the parties had conducted the discovery conference required by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.507. DSM was prohibited from sending the requests that early. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.506(1)(a) ("A party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by rule 1.507.").

DSM violated another rule by failing to file notice that it had served the requests for admissions. See Iowa Ct. R. 16.401(2) ("Parties must file a notice with the court when serving a request for discovery, a response to discovery, or a notice of deposition on another party."). This violation resulted in prejudice to the City due to a change in attorneys by the City at what turned out to be a critical time regarding the deadline to respond to the requests for admissions. The City's new attorney filed an appearance while there was still time to respond to the request for admissions if they had been properly served. The new attorney searched the docket, which revealed no discovery requests had been served by DSM due to DSM's failure to file notice in accordance with Rule 16.401(2).^[4] So the new attorney did not find out about the purported requests for admissions until DSM filed its motion for summary judgment, which was based on those purported requests. Upon discovering that DSM had purportedly served requests for admissions, the new attorney promptly filed responses and a motion asking the court to accept the City's responses. We decline to allow DSM to use its failure to comply with our civil procedure and electronic-filing rules to gain a tactical advantage, which is what DSM seeks to do here. For this reason alone, the district court had no obligation to grant DSM's motion in limine.

Second, upon discovering that DSM had attempted to serve requests for admissions, the City's new attorney promptly filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.511 asking the court to accept its responses to the requests for admissions. Although the district court never expressly ruled on the motion, the fact that the court did not grant DSM's motion for summary judgment indicates that it was accepting the City's responses. Having impliedly accepted the responses, the court had no obligation to grant DSM's motion in limine at trial.

Third the issue DSM raises is framed as an evidentiary claim, namely DSM claims the district court should have excluded any evidence that conflicted with the City's purported admissions. We find no error in the district court's refusal to grant DSM's motion in limine. To begin, this was a bench trial. Motions in limine are generally unnecessary and superfluous in bench trials, as the judge deciding the case is going to become aware of the evidence the moving party seeks to exclude at some point anyway, either in ruling on the motion or in ruling on objections made at trial, so there is no need to insulate the factfinder from the disputed evidence like there is in a jury trial. See Short v. Elliott Equip. Co., No. 16-1795, 2018 WL 540336, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2018) ("Short also filed a number of motions in limine . . . that ultimately became moot when ...